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Certied code technology and type systems research has reached a point where it is now
possible to certify advanced safety and security properties of low-level systems code.
Type systems are a common programming language feature today, allowing fast and
easy verication of basic safety properties for application developers. Although veri-
able bytecode and typed common intermediate languages have made signicant contri-
butions in the area of secure computing, a considerable amount of further (unveried)
compilation and optimization is required before programs written in such languages can
run on actual hardware. To address this issue, research in the past decade has turned
to the use of type systems and logic to verify properties of low-level code. Much of this
work focuses only on carrying through the compilation of high-level languages down to
veriable machine code. There has not been signicant progress in combining such com-
pilation withvericationandcertication ofthatcodewhichisonlywrittenatthesystems
programming and assembly code level. Indeed, providing security guarantees for such
infrastructure code has become a dire need.
This thesis aims at a framework to certify the whole code. It presents an approach
by which well-typed, high-level programs are compiled to certied machine code. In the
same framework,theruntime library and operatingsystemscomponentssuchas memory
management can be certied safe at thelevel of assembly code. Now, thecomplete combi-
nation of compiled high-level code and low-level system libraries can be veried for safe
operation according to a user'ssafety policy. To enable this development,I developa new
alternative for producing foundational proof-carrying code (FPCC), utilizing a syntactic
encoding of the high-level type system along with syntactic soundness proofs.2
The rst part of this thesis describes a monolithic compilation scheme from a high-
level type system to FPCC, utilizing the syntactic method. In the second part, I rene the
framework to produce localized invariants, allowing for interoperation between different
source languages. Finally, I demonstrate an application of the framework to a typed as-
sembly language with a region-based memory management library, where the library is
certied using low-level Hoare logic reasoning.A Syntactic Approach to
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vChapter 1
Introduction
At 11:30 p.m. EST on January 3, 2004, the Mars Exploration Rover Spirit sent its rst ra-
dio signal to NASA scientists following its initial impact on the surface of the Red Planet.
Then, after two weeks of exciting image gathering and exploration activities, a break-
down in communication occurred during which scientists would receive no more than a
simple communication tone, indicating a serious anomaly aboard the spacecraft. It took
10 days of long-distance diagnostics and debugging to nally restore the rover to health
again. Scientists determined that thousands of old les had accumulated in Spirit's ash
memory and the onboard software was having difculty managing the memory short-
age situation, resulting in a complete reboot of the rover's computer about once every
hour [53].
A certain amount of Spirit's onboard memory is dedicated to its real-time operating
system and assorted science applications, the rest is used to store acquired data. As the
mission progressed, technicians were supposed to periodically download and delete old
data les to free up data memory for reuse, but apparently this step had not been per-
formed fast enough in the excitement of the Mars landing [87].
Despite claims that it was a system constraint and not a hardware or application
bug, it seems very strange that the computer software embedded in such a precious ma-
chine had not taken into account the occurence of such a memory shortage scenario. Per-
1haps the possibility had risen in the minds of the programmers or system designers, but
the proper checks to ensure that it did not happen, and to handle the situation automati-
cally if a critical memory shortage was imminent, were not put into the code.
It would certainly be ideal that a set of appropriate safety specications be provided
with embedded operating systems code, such as that on the Mars rover, along with a
guarantee that the actual code satises and conforms to those specications. In fact, a
framework to handle such system safety and integrity concerns using techniques from
mathematical logic and programming language semantics has already been developed in
the form of proof-carrying code [55]. In this dissertation, I will be contributing a new design
totheproof-carryingcode(PCC) framework, allowingforcertication ofsafetyproperties
for code written in different high- and low-level programming languages and integrated
together to form a complete runtime system.
1.1 Proof-Carrying Code
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) was initially developed in the context of network packet l-
ters [56]. The basic idea of PCC, as the name implies, is that a piece of executable code
comes packaged with a proof of its safety. A diagram of a PCC system is given in Fig-
ure 1.1. In a PCC system, there are typically two main entities, (1) a code producer, who
transformsa sourcecodeprogramintocompiledmachine codealongwithitssafetyproof,
and (2) a code consumer, who wishes to run the compiled code as long as it satises the
safety policy.
While themain subjectof thisdissertationisthemechanism by which safetyproofsare
generated and checked, I will briey review here what a safety policy is. Although a code
consumer may ideally wish to specify that the code should do exactly what it is supposed
to do, this is usually impractical for any programs other than short, trivial ones. The
task of (formally) specifying everything that a large, complex piece of code is expected to
accomplish is much toohard and open toerror anyway. Instead, thecode consumercould
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Figure 1.1: A (foundational) proof-carrying code system.
3dene a set of restrictions on execution a security policy [71] dening what code behavior
is unacceptable. There are then a variety of types of security policies that may be applied
 e.g. access control, information ow, and availability. For this thesis, I will be using only
access control policies, which restrict the operations that principals (e.g. blocks of code)
can perform on objects (e.g. computer memory). In the terminology of [44], this means to
specify safety properties of code  policies stating that no bad thing must happen during
execution.
In the rst part of this dissertation, I will be using a simple safety policy that only
requires code never reach an illegal or non-decodable instruction. Later on, in Chapter 5,
I will extend the policy to restrict memory accesses. Throughout, I assume a system in
which the safety policy is xed ahead of time and known to all parties. The issue of
generating PCC packages where the code producer does not know the consumer's safety
policy ahead of time is a topic of ongoing and future research. Furthermore, it should
be noted that some part of the framework described in this thesis, developed jointly with
Yu [97, 98], has been used to specify and prove more advanced security and correctness
properties of low-level system code [97, 98, 99].
Returning to Figure 1.1, note that as usual with PCC, the code component that ac-
companies the safety proof is actual machine code. More accurately, the code binary is
a representation of the machine state  memory and registers  at program startup. Al-
though the ideas of PCC can be applied to code at higher levels, we will concentrate on
producing proofs at the lowest level of the machine.1 The motivation for this is based
on a desire to reasonably minimize the trusted computing base (TCB) of the PCC system.
The TCB is the totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system, including
hardware, rmware, and software, the combination of which is responsible for enforcing
a security policy. The smaller the mechanisms in this set are, the easier it is to verify them
and the more condent one may be that they will operate correctly.
1In fact, the development of PCC followed a progression of research in the areas of higher level type
systems and type-preserving compilation. See Chapter 7 for related works in these areas.
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To understand this, consider the diagram of a conventional compilation system in
Figure 1.2. If we are using a strongly typed language, like Java or ML, then all the com-
ponents in the gure with which the original program source code interacts are in the
TCB. We must trust that the type system is correct in that well-typed programs will not
get stuck when compiled and run on the CPU. Then, we must trust that the type checker
correctly implements the type system, and that the compiler will not introduce any bugs
in the compiled binary. Finally, we must trust that the machine hardware will actually
work according to specications and execute the binary code as expected.
In Figure 1.2, one of the most error-prone components is the compiler. Compilers
are large, complicated pieces of code themselvesand are extremely likely to produce erro-
neousoutputat some point of transforming and optimizing program code. One approach
to dealing with this is to somehow verify the compiler to obtain a formal guarantee that it
will always work correctly. PCC takes quite a different approach, which is to remove the
compiler from the TCB entirely. Hence, the situation in Figure 1.1, where the compiler is
not part of the code consumer'sTCB. Ideally, the TCB of such a systemis composedof the
following:
1. Hardware - My research concentrates entirely on certifying software components so
5we take it for granted that the actual machine hardware will operate as expected.
2. Logic - Thesafetypolicyandproofsofsafetymustbeexpressedin someformal logic.
The logic should have appropriately good qualities  for instance, consistency:
that one cannot prove a statement and its negation at the same time. Proving such
desirable properties of a logic is done by hand and we must trust that such proofs
are correct. The smaller and simpler the logic we use, the more condence we may
have in its soundness properties. This is a very important issue for PCC, and we
will later cite an example of using an unsound logic, which completely undermines
the safety properties of the entire system.
3. Proof checker - The proof checker is a software implementation of the PCC logic. It
allows one to express statements in the syntax of the logic and mechanically check
proofs, which are a series of applications of the logical inference rules. Assuming
a logic has all the desirable properties, we must trust that the proof checker imple-
mentation is correct. The checker is, however, a much smaller program than even a
simple compiler, so it is feasible for a human to inspect and verify. Though I have
notfocusedonan absolutelyminimal proofcheckerformy currentwork,Appeland
Michael [6] have aggressively pursued this aspect of the TCB in related PCC work.
4. Safety Policy - The nal trusted component of the ideal PCC system is the denition
of safety. This is expressed in the syntax of the logic and must be satised before
code will be allowed to execute. The safety policy component may actually be made
up in turn of several pieces:
(a) Machine encoding - Within the PCC logic, one must provide a specication of
the physical machine hardware and its operational semantics. This encoding
must match the actual behavior of the machine.
(b) Decoder - Code to convert between the actual machine state and the encoding
in the logic.
6(c) Specication of the actual policy, in terms of the machine encoding (a). I have
already given above an overview of the type of policies I will work with. For
more concrete denitions see Sections 2.2.3 or 5.3.2.
Thus, the components to the right of the vertical line in Figure 1.1 make up the ideal
PCC trusted code base. On the left side, we do not care what the source program is,
or how the compiler and proof generator produce a code package, as long as our proof
checker veries that the safety proof for the binary code satises the established policy.
I have been refering to Figure 1.1 as an ideal PCC diagram. The reason is that his-
torically the rst developmentsof PCC included more components than these in the TCB.
I will now give an overview of traditional PCC, followed by the development of foun-
dational PCC, which corresponds more to Figure 1.1.
1.2 Traditional Proof-Carrying Code
The concept of proof-carrying code was rst introduced by Necula and Lee [56, 54, 58].
Subsequentdevelopmentsresultedin PCC-generating compilers forJava programs[15], a
subset of C, and a minimal subset of ML. A comprehensive overview of the initial system
can be found in Necula's thesis [55]. The basic framework of Necula, et al. is diagrammed
in Figure 1.3.
Although it looks considerably more complicated than Figure 1.1, it must be noted
that this pioneering work focused very much on the practical aspects of implementing a
realistic framework. Thus, the Java system cited above could handle real world Java
programs of up to half a million lines of code [70]. Nonetheless, the emphasis on en-
gineering and scalability meant a larger TCB  and the possibility, and even discovered
presence, of security holes.
Intheoriginal PCC system,a certifyingcompilertakesa sourceprogramand produces
binary code along with annotations (such as loop invariants) to various instructions in
the code. These annotations are fed to a verication condition generator (VCGen) which
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8producesasetofconditionsthatmustbeshowntoholdforthesafetypolicytobesatised.
A proof of these verication conditions (VC) is then produced by an automatic theorem
prover (or even by hand). The binary code and the VC proof make up the PCC package.
In this setup, note that the proof provided does not directly show the safety policy is
satised. Instead, as the safety policy is implicitly dened by the way the VCGen works,
we must trust that the VCs produced imply the safety policy. But this is only proved by
hand, not formally (mechanically) as part of the framework. The VCGen itself is quite a
large and complex piece of code (23,000 lines of C code in [15]) to include in the TCB.
Finally, in the traditional PCC setup, the logic used is typically a standard mathemat-
ical logic extended with a number of type-system specic primitives. For example, [15]
uses rst-order predicate logic enriched with Java-specic predicates and rules for ob-
jects, interfaces, methods, etc. The implication of this is that it is a much more difcult
and error-prone task to show that the logic satises the desirable properties alluded to
on page 6. Introducing type system primitives into a logic, along with associated rules of
inference, can lead to subtle interactions with the base logic and unsoundness. In [15] a
bug was found in the safety conditions for virtual method calls, documented by League,
et al. [45]. A malicious code producer could thus exploit such a security hole to get the
consumer to run completely unsafe code on his or her system.
Besides increasing the size of the TCB, the original framework for PCC limits the ex-
ibility of the system. In the previous paragraph I mention the use of a logic and VCGen
customized with Java-specic extensions. This means that the safety policy is expressed
in terms of Java constructs and it requires that the program code be annotated with Java
typing information. Thus, for compiling another source language, it is necessary to use a
completely different VCGen (and probably proof checker), which would result practically
in a proliferation of incompatible PCC compiler systems.
In order to alleviate the drawbacks discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, Appel et
al. [3] introduced the notion of foundational proof-carrying code (FPCC). This, in a sense,
purist approach corresponds more directly to Figure 1.1. Emphasizing a minimal TCB
9 as opposed to rapid engineering of a full-scale, realistic system  FPCC removed the
VCGen and any type system-specic primitives from the right hand side of Figure 1.3.
However, developing safety proofs for such a framework was not straightforward or so
it seemed at rst. In the next section, I describe the development of the FPCC framework
by Appel et al. and then concluded the chapter with an overview of my alternative FPCC
framework and an outline of the rest of this thesis.
1.3 Foundational Proof-Carrying Code (Semantic Approach)
Foundational proof-carrying code (FPCC) [4, 3] focuses on constructing and verifying
proofs using strictly the foundations of mathematical logic, with no type system-specic
axioms or primitives. FPCC, in principle, is immediately more exible and secure than
traditional PCC because it is not tied to any particular type system and has a smaller
trustedbase(theVCGenis gone). ForFPCC, theoperationalsemanticsof machine codeas
well as the concept of safety are dened in a suitably expressive logic. The code producer
must provide both the executable code and a proof in the foundational logic that the code
satises the safety condition. Both the machine description and the proof must explicitly
dene, down to the foundations of mathematics, all required concepts and must prove
any needed properties of these concepts.
Foundational proofs, however, are much harder to construct. Previous efforts on
FPCC [4, 25, 5, 2] all required constructing sophisticated semantic models to reason about
types. For example, to support contravariant recursive types, Appel and Felty [25] ini-
tially decided to model each type as a partial equivalence relation, but later found that
buildingtheactual foundationalproofswouldrequireyearsofeffortimplementingmachine-
checkedproofsofbasicresultsincomputabilitytheory[5,page2]. AppelandMcAllester[5]
later proposed an indexed model which signicantly simplied the proofs but still in-
volves tedious reasoning of computation steps with each type being dened as a complex
set of indexed values. More seriously, none of these approaches could be easily extended
10to support mutable elds. A solution for handling mutable elds was proposed later
by Ahmed et al. [2]  it involves building a hierarchy of G¨ odel numberings and making
extensive changes to semantic models used in existing FPCC systems [4, 5].
In the remainder of this section, I will compare the method of generating proofs in the
traditional VCGen-based framework and a semantic FPCC-based system. A concrete ex-
ample will hopefully clarify for the reader some aspects of the VCGen and PCC discussed
in the previous section, while also demonstrating complications that arise in the semantic
approach to FPCC.
Let us consider a hypothetical source code snippet that reads an element from a tuple:
(l1) val t : int  int := (3, 4);
. . .
(l2) val y : int := snd(t);
I will only concentrate on line (l2) here. A compiler might compile the assignment op-
eration onthis line to a machine load instruction(or more accurately, thebinary encoding)
such as ld ry; rt(1).
Now let us see how traditional PCC would produce a safety proof for this piece of
code. When this instruction is examined by the VCGen, the following obligation will be
produced as part of the VC [55, page 71]:
readable(M, R(rt) + 1)
That is, in the current memory, M, the address computed by the contents of register
rt incremented by 1 must be readable according to the safety policy. This VC term goes to
thePCC theoremprover. ThePCC theoremprover implementsa logic extendedwith type
system-specic primitives and inference rules. So, for example, the following inference
rule might be built into the theorem prover [54]:
M ` v : 1  2
readable(M;v) ^ readable(M;v+ 1) ^ M ` M(v) : 1 ^ M ` M(v + 1) : 2 (1.1)
11At the point that line (l2) is being processed, the prover will have the information
(e.g. from type annotations) that the content of register rt, R(rt), does have a tuple type,
intint, with relation to the current memory, M. It then directly applies the inference
rule (1.1) to satisfy the necessary VC obligation.
In this example, the rule (1.1) is quite simple and we can imagine that adding tuple
type primitives to a logic will not be that dangerous. However, to handle more realistic
type systems, like Java's, one would have to start including much more complex infer-
ence rules to the logic, VCGen, and theorem prover, resulting in the dangerous situation
described in Section 1.2.
Now let us see how (semantic) FPCC works. Instead of extending the logic with type
primitives, FPCC interprets types as predicates in the base logic:
dM ` v : 1  2e =def readable(M;v) ^ readable(M;v+ 1)
^ dM ` M(v) : 1e ^ dM ` M(v + 1) : 2e
(1.2)
That is, the fact that data in memory has a tuple type in the source language is inter-
preted as the proposition on the right side of the denition above. A base case predicate
may be dened for the int type:
dM ` v : inte =def true (1.3)
And, the readable predicate itself may be dened using more primitive constructs of
the logic, such as requiring all readable addresses be less than 50:
readable(M;v) =def v < 50 (1.4)
Thus, for the code compiled from line (l2) in our example, we have the source typing
information,
M ` R(rt) : int  int
12FPCC then interprets this as the following proposition (expanding all denitions, in-
cluding readable):
R(rt) < 50 ^ R(rt) + 1 < 50 ^ true ^ true (1.5)
The FPCC consumer may specify a safety policy that all memory loads must only be
from addresses less than 50 (i.e. readable). Thus, the compiled binary code, ld ry;rt(1),
would clearly satisfy this requirement in the context of (1.5). Notice now that the FPCC
reasoning only involves normal arithmetic and logic operators. The logic is much smaller
and simpler, as will be the corresponding proof checker; and there is no VCGen at all. In
more proper notation, source code types are formalized as functions on sets. So, (1.2) and
(1.3) would be written as [3]:
d1  2e(M)(v) =def readable(M;v) ^ readable(M;v+ 1):::
dinte(M)(v) =def true
(1.6)
The logical type then of semantic interpretations of source code types such as int is a
predicate on a memory and integer value:
type = mem ! val ! prop
Now let us suppose tuple elements are mutable and consider a third source code line:
(l3) snd(t) := y;
which compiles to a machine store instruction, st rt(1); ry. Based on the source code,
we may assign types to the registers as follows:
M ` R(ry) : int (1.7)
M ` R(rt) : int  int (1.8)
13Expanding the semantic interpretation of (1.8) we again have the proposition (1.5)
above, while (1.7) simply expands to the true proposition by (1.3). Locally, then, the store
instruction will not cause any problems because we are dealing with base true proposi-
tions at the location R(rt) + 1.
However, what if there is aliasing in the register le? That is, the content of rs is the
same as that of rt and somehow rs has the type:
M ` R(rs) : int  (int  int)
Now the second element of R(rs) is supposed to be a tuple pointer but we are writing
a plain integer to the second element of R(rt), where R(rt) = R(rs). In this situation, we
would no longer be able to satisfy the typing requirement of R(rs) after the store instruc-
tion is executed.
Most source level type systems eliminate this problem of aliasing by xing a single
type for each memory location and only allowing writes of that type to the location. In
such a context,thesituation above wheretwo aliases have different typeswould notarise.
But how can this be achieved in the FPCC semantic model of types? We cannot specify
a type mapping directly because all types are being interpreted as predicates. The FPCC
approach was to enhance the meaning of types by adding an allocset mapping to de-
nition (1.6) something like:
d1  2e(M)(a)(v) =def ::: ^ a(M(v)) = d1e(:::) ^ a(M(v + 1)) = d2e(:::)
dinte(M)(a)(v) =def true
(1.9)
The idea being to enforce that all predicates on memory addresses be consistent with
themappingdenedbytheallocset, a. However,thedenitionaboveisnotwell-founded.
Examing the logical types of d1  2e and a, we now have:
14type = mem ! allocset ! val ! prop
allocset = val ! type
with an inconsistent cardinality in the metalogical type (note the circularity in the deni-
tion). This problem stumped the FPCC developers for over a year [3] until a solution
was produced by Ahmed, et al. [2], which forms the basis of Ahmed's thesis dissertation.
The semantic modeling of types hit other similar difculties when dealing with rst-
class functions (code pointers) and recursive types. As a result, the semantic models be-
came much more complex in order to handle the additional type system features.
1.4 Dissertation Contributions and Outline
Incontrasttothedevelopmentsdiscussedabove, Ihaveworkedonasyntactic approach
toFPCC whichis themain topicofthisdissertation. Inmyapproach, Ihaveavoidedusing
a logic with type system primitives as PCC, while at the same time have been immedi-
ately able to handle type system features that took years of work for the semantic FPCC
approach to model. In addition, I have developed a framework allowing the interaction
between code compiled from different type systems, or allowing the interoperation of
code a portion of which is automatically proven safe based on compilation from a high
level type-safe language, and the remaining portion of which (the runtime library) has
been certiedmanually or semi-automatically using a proof assistant. The potential, then,
is a framework where certied user programs can run on, and interact with, a similarly
certied runtime library and operating system. Though I have not yet progressedto actu-
ally programming a full-scale runtime system or operating system, this dissertation lays
a viable foundation for such an effort.
In the next chapter, I describe the machine, logic, and safety policy that will be used
in the rest of the work. Then, in Chapter 3, I introduce the syntactic approach to FPCC.
The chapter is based mostly on previously published papers by Hamid, Shao, Trifonov,
15et al. [33, 34]. Chapter 3 presents a somewhat monolithic approach to building certied
syntactic FPCC packages and does not address the issue of interfacing with a runtime
systemorothertypesystems. Thus,I extendtheframeworkforthat purposein Chapter 4,
which is based on a recent paper by Hamid and Shao [32]. In Chapter 5, I demonstrate
an application of the framework for an assembly language with a region type system and
the corresponding region management runtime library. Finally, I discuss in Chapter 6 a
variety of issues that I have encountered in my work on syntactic FPCC, and conclude
with related works, a summary, and future work in Chapters 7 and 8.
Scope of the Dissertation
Before progressing onto the bulk of this thesis, I would note that the framework con-
structed so far is a prototype for an idealized machine, as will be described in more de-
tail in the next chapter. Thus, I will not be presenting here a solution to the Mars rover
problem  i.e., an operating system kernel or full-scale memory management runtime
library. As discussed in the earlier sections of this introduction, my prototype develop-
ment shows that common type system features that have not been handled adequately
or easily in previous frameworks can be supported in a straightforward manner using a
syntactic approach to proof-carrying code. This thesis is supported by other researchers'
recent and ongoing developments of more complete PCC frameworks for realistic ma-
chines (e.g. [19, 18]) based on the syntactic approach I have presented in the rst half of
this dissertation. For my own research, I have not immediately concentrated on technical
details such as targeting a real machine, but have instead focused on the aspect of code
interoperation for PCC. The latter part of this dissertation deals with my extension of the
prototype framework to handle the issue of interfacing type system code with a certied
library. In Chapter 8, I discuss some further limitations and future work in the context of
my current prototype before concluding.
16Coq implementation
All the proofs described in this paper have been formalized and mechanically proven in
the Coq proof assistant, unless otherwise noted. (In particular, proofs for the runtime
system of Chapter 5 are still in progress.) For each chapter, then, I provide a link to the
downloadable Coq code and in each section I will mention the corresponding Coq le
in the proof development. Also, the main portion of the Coq developments has been
included in the Appendices.
17Chapter 2
A Machine and Logic for
Foundational Proof-Carrying Code
In this chapter, I present the target machine on which programs will run and the logic
that I use to reason about the safety of the code being run. Throughout the thesis I
will use an idealized machine to present my FPCC framework. A real machine intro-
duces many engineering details xed-size integers, overow, addressing modes, mem-
ory model, variable length instructions, relative addressing, speculative execution, etc.
which I would rather avoid while presenting my central contributions. Although some
progress has been made towards an implementation upon the IA-32 (Intel x86) architec-
ture, I leave that as future work for now. The primary issues that I have worked to solve
for this thesis an FPCC framework that easily handles advanced type system features
such as mutable records and recursive types, and interfacing between code written at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction or type systems are orthogonal to the technical details of a
real architecture, although there are indeed many important issues to be dealt with there.
Following the presentation of the machine in Section 2.1, I present the logical system
that I have used for reasoning about safety. The logic must be suitably expressive enough
to encode the operational semantics of machine code as well as the concept of safety. A
code producer will provide both the executable code and a proof in the foundational logic
18Word 3 w;i;pc ::= 0 j 1 j :::
Regt 3 r ::= r0 j r1 j ::: j r15
Cmd 3 c ::= add rd;rs;rt j addi rd;rs;i j sub rd;rs;rt j subi rd;rs;i
j mov rd;rs j movi rd;i j bgt rs;rt;w j bgti rs;i;w
j ld rd;rs(i) j st rd(i);rs j jd w j jmp r j illegal
M 2 Mem = Word ! Word
R 2 RFile = Regt ! Word
S 2 State = Mem  RFile  Word
Figure 2.1: Machine state: memory, registers, and instructions (commands).
that the code satises the safety condition. In Section 2.2, I also dene a safety condi-
tion that I will use throughout the rst part of this thesis and discuss how proofs will be
generated.
The Coq les corresponding to this chapter may be downloaded at:
http://flint.cs.yale.edu/flint/publications/safpccjar.html
The Coq developments for this chapter and the next are also included in Appendix A.
2.1 An Idealized Machine
The idealized machine I use is dened by a machine state and a step function describing
the deterministic transition from one machine state to the next. The state consists of the
hardware components of the machine: a memory, register le, and a special register con-
taining the current program counter (pc), dened in Figure 2.1. I use a 16-register word-
addressed machine with an unbounded memory of words of unlimited size. The gure
alsoshowstheinstructionset(which Iwill refertoascommands todistinguishfromassem-
bly language instructions presentedin a later chapter). Informally, thecommands have the
following effects:
19add rd;rs;rt set register rd to the sum of the contents of rs and rt;
addi rd;rs;i set rd to the sum of the contents of rs and i;
sub rd;rs;rt set rd to the difference between the contents of rs and rt;
subi rd;rs;i set rd to the difference between the contents of rs and i;
mov rd;rs copy the contents of rs into rd;
movi rd;i move an immediate value, i, into rd;
bgt rs;rt;w branch to location w if rs > rt;
bgti rs;i;w branch to location w if rs > i;
ld rd;rs(i) load the contents of memory location rs + i into rd;
st rd(i);rs store the contents of rs into memory location rd + i;
jd w direct jump (transfer execution) to location w;
jmp r indirect jump to the address in register r;
illegal put the machine in an innite loop.
Of course, these commands are actually encoded as words (integers) in the machine
state. I deneCmd as an inductive typebecause its constructorsare much easier to manip-
ulate that the encoded words. Now, in order to specify the operational semantics of the
machine, I dene a decoding function (Dc) and a Step function. Dc (of type Word ! Cmd)
decodes integers words from memory into the appropriate structured representation of
commands shown in Figure 2.1. Non-decodable words will result in an illegal in-
struction (indicating the program counter is at a non-code address and the machine has
crashed).
The Step function describes the deterministic transition from one machine state to the
next, depending on the command at the current pc. Its denition is given in Figure 2.2.
The commands' effects are as they have been informally explained above. In our ideal-
ized machine, the load and store commands have no side conditions because memory is
innite (readable and writable limitations on areas of memory will be specied later in
20if Dc(M(pc)) = then Step(M;R;pc) =
add rd;rs;rt (M;Rfrd 7! R(rs) + R(rt)g;pc+1)
addi rd;rs;i (M;Rfrd 7! R(rs) + ig;pc+1)
sub rd;rs;rt (M;Rfrd 7! R(rs)   R(rt)g;pc+1)
subi rd;rs;i (M;Rfrd 7! R(rs)   ig;pc+1)
mov rd;rs (M;Rfrd 7! rsg;pc+1)
movi rd;i (M;Rfrd 7! ig;pc+1)
ld rd;rs(i) (M;Rfrd 7! M(R(rs) + i)g;pc+1)
st rd(i);rs (MfR(rd) + i 7! R(rs)g;R;pc+1)
bgt rs;rt;w
(M;R;pc+1) when R(rs)  R(rt)
(M;R;w) when R(rs) > R(rt)
bgti rs;i;w
(M;R;pc+1) when R(rs)  i
(M;R;w) when R(rs) > i
jd w (M;R;w)
jmp r (M;R;R(r))
illegal (M;R;pc)
Figure 2.2: Machine semantics.
my safety policy see Chapter 5).
Coq code: tis.v formalizes Figure 2.1 and the decode and step functions of this sec-
tion.
2.2 The Logic and Safety Condition
2.2.1 The Calculus of Inductive Constructions
In order to produce FPCC packages, we need a logic in which we can express (encode)
the operational semantics of the machine dened above, as well as dene the concept and
criteria of safety. A code producer must then provide a code executable (initial machine
state) along with a proof that the initial state and all future transitions therefrom satisfy
the safety condition.
The foundational logic I use is the calculus of inductive constructions (CiC) [78, 62].
CiC is an extension of the calculus of constructions (CC) [16], which is a higher-order
typed lambda calculus. CC corresponds to a variant of higher-order predicate logic via
the formulae-as-types principle (Curry-Howard correspondence [40]). The syntax of CC
21is:
A;B ::= Set j Type j X j X:A:B j AB j X:A:B
The Coq implementation (discussedmore below) addsanother sort, Prop, to thecalcu-
lus, along with Set. Under the proposition-as-types, proofs-as-terms paradigm, if A has sort
Prop then it represents a logical proposition. A term M that inhabits A (i.e. has type A) is
a proof of the proposition. On the other hand, terms of the sort Set are used as the types
of data types, such as the natural numbers, lists, trees, booleans, etc.
CiC, as its name implies, extends the calculus of constructions with inductive de-
nitions [17, 64, 62]. An inductive denition can be written in a syntax similar to that of
ML datatypes. For example, the following introduces an inductive denition of natural
numbers of kind Set with two constructors of the specied types:
Inductive Nat : Set := zero : Nat j succ : Nat!Nat
Inductive denitions may be parameterized as in the following denition of polymor-
phic lists:
Inductive List [t:Set] : Set := nil : Listt
j cons : t!Listt!Listt
The logic also provides elimination constructs for inductive denitions, which com-
bine case analysis with a x-point operation. Objects of an inductive type can thus be
iterated over using these constructs. In order for the induction to be well-founded and
for iterators to terminate, a few constraints are imposed on the shape of inductive deni-
tions; most importantly, the dened type can only occur positively in the arguments of its
constructors. Mutually inductive types are also supported.
Thecalculusofinductiveconstructionshasbeenshowntobestronglynormalizing [88],
hencethecorrespondinglogic isconsistent. Itis supportedbytheCoq proofassistant[78],
which I use to implement a prototype system of the results presented in this thesis.
22In the remainder of this thesis, I will often use more familiar mathematical notation
(as in Figure 2.1) to present denitions and the statement of propositions, rather than the
strict denition of CiC syntax given in this section. For example, the application of two
terms will be written as A(B) and inductive denitions will be presented in BNF format.
I will often, however, retain the  notation, which can generally be read as a universal
quantier.
2.2.2 Representing Proofs and Coq Syntax
Before discussing safety proofs, I rst give a taste of the Curry-Howard correspondence
between proofs and programs in action  that is, how one uses a calculus like CiC to state
propositions and represent proofs.
Let us say we wish to produce some proofs about properties of the natural numbers,
dened above (Nat). First, I dene the less-than-equal predicate using an inductive de-
nition:
Inductive le [n:Nat] : Nat!Prop := le n : lenn
j le s : m:Nat:lenm!len(succm)
This denition corresponds to the pair of inference rules:
n  n (LE N) n  m
n  m + 1 (LE S)
Now, suppose we wish to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1 (n le zero) For all natural numbers n, 0  n.
Proof By induction on n. Base case n = 0: apply the (LE N) rule. Inductive case
n = m + 1: by the inductive hypothesis, we know 0  m. Then use this with the (LE S)
23rule to show 0  m + 1. 
In the CiC calculus, we would represent this proof as a function taking a natural num-
ber argument n and producing a proof term that 0  n. The proof term is built by recur-
sive case analysis on the argument, corresponding to the induction in our written proof
above:
zero_le_n : n:Nat:le0n
:= n:Nat: Cases n of
zero ) (le_n zero)
| succm ) (le_s zero m (zero_le_n m))
The recursive call corresponds to use of the inductive hypothesis.
Thus, the process of formalizing and mechanizing proofs in CiC is very similar to
writing a program, although there are constraints on what programs can be written. In
practice, such proofs are developedusing the Coq proof assistant [79], an implementation
of the CiC calculus. Coq concrete syntax is somewhat different than the mathematical
syntax used above. Additionally, over the course of my dissertation work, the Coq tools
have undergone a major upgrade with a revised syntax. Unfortunately, therefore, some
of my proof developments for this thesis are in the older (version 7.3) syntax while I have
done the latest developments using the new (8.0) syntax.
The table below compares Coq notations to the CiC syntax presented earlier in this
section.
CiC Coq 7.3 Coq 8.0
Set Set, Prop Set1, Prop
Type Type Type
X x x
X:A:B [x:A] B fun x:A => B
AB A B A B
X:A:B (x:A) B forall x:A, B
24The notation for inductive denitions and case analysis in Coq is essentially similar
to the example above with natural numbers and less-than-equal. Coq provides a number
of primitive tactics used to develop proofs interactively. Though powerful, however, the
level of automation is not as much as one might hope for, as I will discuss in Section 6.1.
For now, let us resume the discussion of proofs and safety in the FPCC framework.
2.2.3 Dening Safety
The safety condition is a predicate expressing the fact that code will not go wrong. I say
that a machine state S is safe if every state it can ever reach satises the safety policy SP:
Safe(S;SP) = n:Nat:SP(Stepn(S))
A typical safety policy may require such things as the program counter must point to
a valid instruction address in the code area and that any writes (reads) to (from) memory
must be from a properly accessible area of the data space. For the next chapter of this
thesis, I will be using a very simple safety policy, requiring only that the machine is never
at an invalid instruction:
BasicSP(M;R;pc) = (Dc(M(pc)) 6= illegal)
We can easily dene access controls on memory reads and writes by including an-
other predicate in the safety policy, SafeRdWr(M;R;pc)  I will do this in Chapter 5. By
reasoning over the number of steps of computation more complex safety policies includ-
ing temporalconstraintscan potentially beexpressed. However,I will notbe dealing with
such policies here.2
The FPCC code producer has to provide an encoding of the initial state S0 along with
a proof A that this state satises the safety condition BasicSP, specied by the code con-
1Predicative universe.
2Yu [99] has recently shown some results in this.
25sumer. The nal FPCC package is thus a pair:
F = (S0 : State; A : Safe(S0;BasicSP)):
2.2.4 Generating Proofs
In the rst iteration, the actual proof of safety is organized following the approach used
by Appel et al. [4, 5]. I construct an induction hypothesis Inv, also known as the global
invariant, which holds for all states reachable from the initial state and is strong enough
to imply safety. Then, to show that the initial state S0 is safe, I provide proofs for the
propositions:
FPCC Initial Condition: Inv(S0)
FPCC Preservation: S:State:Inv(S)!Inv(Step(S))
FPCC Progress: S:State:Inv(S)!SP(S)
These propositions intuitively state that the invariant holds for the initial state, and for
every subsequent state during the execution. FPCC Progress establishes that whenever
theinvariant holds,thesafetypolicy of themachine is also satised. Together,theseimply
that duringthe executionof theprogram thesafetypolicy will never be violated. To prove
the initial state is safe, rst I use the Initial Condition and Preservation, and show by
induction that
n:Nat:Inv(Stepn(S0)):
Then Safe(S0) follows directly by Progress.
Unlike Appel et al., who construct theinvariant by means of a semantic model of types
at the machine level, my approach is based on the use of type soundness [93]: I dene
Inv(S) to mean that S is well-formed syntactically. The well-formedness property must
be preserved by the step function, and must imply safety; the proofs of these properties
are encoded in the FPCC logic as proof terms for Preservation and Progress.
26In the following chapter I show how to derive the notion of well-formedness for a
machine stateby relating the state toa type-correctprogram in a typedassembly language.
The type system of the language denes a set of inference rules for judgments of the form
` P, meaning that the program P is well-formed (type-correct). The dynamic semantics
of the language species an evaluation relation 7 ! on programs; I use here the term
program to denote not only code but a more general conguration fully representing
a stage of the evaluation. The syntactic approach to proving soundness of a type system
involves proving progress3 (if ` P, then P is not stuck, i.e. there exists P0 such that P 7 !
P0) and preservation (if ` P and P 7 ! P0, then ` P0).
The central idea of my approach to FPCC is to nd a typed assembly language and
a translation relation ) between its programs and machine states, such that type-correct
programs are mapped to well-formed states, and the evaluation relation is related to the
machinestepfunctionthatis, ifP ) S andP 7 ! P0,thenP0 ) Step(S). Iftheseproper-
ties hold, I can dene the invariant Inv(S) as simply stating that there exists a type-correct
program P such that P ) S. Then the proofs of progress and preservation for the type
system (completely formalized in the FPCC logic) can be used to construct straightfor-
ward proofs of the corresponding propositions needed for the safety proof for S0. Further
details of the construction of proof terms are provided in Section 3.2.3.
The methodof generating FPCC proofs above appears somewhat monolithic in its use
of theglobal invariant asI have describedabove. Itimposesrequirementsonthedesignof
the typed assembly language other than just having a sound type system. If the assembly
language has macro instructions (e.g. malloc [52, 51] and newarray [95], which ex-
pand into sequences of several machine instructions), the well-formedness of the assem-
bly program alone will be insufcient for the construction of the global invariant. This is
because Inv musthold for all machine statesreachable from S0. For theintermediate states
of the execution of a macro instruction there are no corresponding well-formed assembly
3This refers to progress in the source type system, not the FPCC Progress proposition dened earlier in
this section.
27programs. Hence, each one of the assembly instructions must correspond to exactly one
machine instruction. Note, however, that this exact correspondence of instructions is not
necessary in general for the syntactic approach to work, although it facilitates the deni-
tion of the invariant and allows for a simpler presentation.
In fact, in Chapter 4, I will rene the approach described above by inserting a generic
layer of reasoning above the machine code which can (1) be a target for the compilation of
typed assembly languages, (2) certify low-level runtime system components using asser-
tions as in Hoare logic, and (3) glue together these pieces by reasoning about the com-
patibility of the interfaces specied by the various types of source code. In this context,
the global invariant is broken down into a disjunction of local invariants on each indi-
vidual machine instruction. The local invariants still use the syntactic FPCC approach to
relate machine instructions to the typed assembly language source code, but by breaking
apart theglobal invariant, Ican easily handle macro instructionsandinteractions between
different type systems.
28Chapter 3
A Syntactic Approach to
Foundational Proof-Carrying Code
An overview of the syntactic approach to FPCC has been given in the previous chapter.
In this chapter, I dene a sample source language and type system, including its static
and dynamic semantics and proof of soundness. Then I show how to compile programs
from this language to the machine dened in Chapter 2, producing the required FPCC
proofs in the process. I also give an overview of the Coq implementation (Appendix A),
the complete les of which are available for download at:
http://flint.cs.yale.edu/flint/publications/safpccjar.html
3.1 Featherweight Typed Assembly Language
The source language that I will be compiling to FPCC is a version of the typed assembly
language (TAL) by Morrisett et al. [52]. The approach developed in this thesis can be
appliedtoaTAL-likelanguageextendedwithhigher-orderkindsandrecursive types. For
simplicity, I only introduce here a subset of such a language, called Featherweight Typed
AssemblyLanguage(FTAL).Itdoesnotinclude polymorphismorexistentialtypes,which
can be easily added but would complicate the presentation (Chapter 5 presents another
29(type)  ::=  j int j 8[ ] j h 1
' 1;:::; n
' ni j :
(init ag) ' ::= 0 j 1
(heap ty) 	 ::= f0: 0;:::;n: ng
(alloc pt ty)  ::= fresh j used(n)
(regle ty)   ::= fr0: 0;:::;rn: n;r15:g
(label) l ::= 0 j 1 j :::
(user reg) r ::= r0 j r1 j ::: j r14
(all reg) ^ r ::= r j r15
(word val) v ::= l j i j ? j foldv as
(heap val) h ::= hv1;:::;vni j code [ ]:I
(heap) H ::= f0 7! h0;:::;n 7! hng
(regle) R ::= fr0 7! v0;:::;r15 7! v15g
(instr)  ::= add rd;rs;rt j addi rd;rs;i j alloc rd[~ ] j bgt rs;rt;l
j bump i j fold rd[];rs j ld rd;rs(i) j mov rd;rs
j movi rd;i j movl rd;l j st rd(i);rs j unfold rd;rs
(instr seq) I ::= ;I j jd l j jmp r
(program) P ::= (H;R;I)
Figure 3.1: Syntax of FTAL.
TAL with these features). However, it does support rst-class code pointers, recursive
types, memory allocation, and mutable records (tuples).
The syntactic approach to FPCC as presentedhere requires that for each machine state
and each state transition, there be a corresponding FTAL program and transition. For
most FTAL instructions it is easy to see there is a one-to-one mapping to the machine
instructions of Section 2.1. However, having a malloc macro instruction in FTAL (as
in TAL) will not work because it cannot be mapped to a single machine instruction and
will not satisfy our requirements for generating FPCC proofs, since there would be no
corresponding FTAL state between the expanded machine instructions. (See Section 3.1.6
for details on this issue.) My approach here is to make the memory allocation model
explicit and split the malloc instruction into, in this case, two individual instructions.
303.1.1 Syntax
The syntax of FTAL is presented in Figure 3.1. As in TAL, the abstract machine state
(which I will call a program to distinguish from the machine state of Section 2.1) consists
of a heap H, a register le R, and a sequence of instructions I. The heap maps labels l
to heap values h, and the register le maps registers ^ r to word values v. I use fg for an
empty heap. The notation Hfl 7! hg represents a heap which extends H with a label l
mapped to h. Similar notation is used for heap types, register les, and register le types
(except that for the latter two, I also use the same notation to indicate an update to the
mapping). When extending the heap, the type system will implicitly enforce a constraint
that the labels in the heap be in consecutive ascending order starting at 0. In the register
le type ( ), r15 is a special allocation pointer register and of the remaining user registers,
not all of them need appear in the type. The notation jHj and j	j is used to represent the
number of labels in the heap and heap type, respectively. Notice, that this number will
also correspond to the next unused label in the heap or heap type.
Only tuples and code blocks are stored in the heap and thus these are the heap values.
Word values include labels (pointers to heap values), integers, recursive data, and junk
values (?), which are used by the operational semantics to represent uninitialized tuple
elements annotated with a type. The distinction betweenword values and small values in
TAL is eliminated in FTAL by specializing the instruction set. Thus, for example, there are
now two instructions for addition, one (add) taking a register and the other (addi) using
an immediate value as the third operand.
The memory model is a simple linear unbounded heap with an allocation pointer
pointing to the heap top, initially set to the bottom of the heap space. Memory alloca-
tion consists of copying the current allocation pointer to a register using alloc and then
adjusting the allocation pointer with bump. In Section 3.2.1 we will see how these two in-
structions can be directly translated into one FPCC machine instruction each. One of the
general registers, r15, is reserved as the allocation pointer register, tracking the amount
31of allocated memory. FTAL instructions will only explicitly refer to the rst 15 user
registers (r).
Afteran allocinstruction, a correspondingbump must be executed,toadjust thealloca-
tion pointer, before alloc can be used again. To statically enforce this, I give the allocation
pointer register a special allocation status type, , rather than a normal type. The possible
types for this register, fresh and used(i), reect the two states of allocation. Keeping track
of the allocation status allows other instructions to be interleaved between an alloc and
bump pair.
To meaningfully implement linear allocation, we need an ordering on memory labels,
so I have dened labels as natural numbers. To determine whether a label has been allo-
cated in the heap, it is compared with the heap size, jHj.
The types of FTAL are integers, code, tuple types annotated with initialization ags
('), and recursive types. The initialization ags indicate whether there is valid data at
each position of the tuple (when a tuple is rst allocated, all the ags are 0). Other than
fold and unfold, the remaining instructions (add, addi, bgt, mov, movi, movl, ld, and st) are
equivalent or similar to those in the original TAL. A code block is a sequence of instruc-
tions, annotated with a register le type (essentially specifying the preconditions on the
data expectedin the registers when the code block begins executing). Code blocks always
end with a jmp or jd instruction, though they may also be exited in the middle by bgt.
Operations on recursive types in FTAL are supported by the fold and unfold instruc-
tions. Dynamically, these are no different than a simple mov. Statically, however, their
purpose is to cast the type of a word, by either rolling up or unrolling the recursive
type. (See the relevant rules of the static semantics in Section 3.1.3.)
3.1.2 Dynamic Semantics
The operational semantics of FTAL is presented in Figure 3.2. Most of the instructions
have an intuitively clear meaning. The ld and st instructions load from and store to a
32(H;R;I) 7 ! P where
if I = then P =
add rd;rs;rt;I0 (H;Rfrd 7! R(rs) + R(rt)g;I0)
addi rd;rs;i;I0 (H;Rfrd 7! R(rs) + ig;I0)
alloc rd[~ ];I0 (H0;Rfrd 7! lg;I0)
where~  =  1;:::; n, R(r15) = l,
and H0 = Hfl 7! h?1;:::;?nig
bgt rs;rt;l;I0 (H;R;I0) when R(rs)  R(rt); and
(H;R;I00) when R(rs) > R(rt)
where H(l) = code [ ]:I00
bump i;I0 (H;Rfr15 7! jHjg;I0)
fold rd[rs];;I0 (H;Rfrd 7! foldR(rs)asg;I0)
jd l (H;R;I0) where H(l) = code [ ]:I0
jmp r (H;R;I0) where H(R(r)) = code [ ]:I0
ld rd;rs(i);I0 (H;Rfrd 7! vig;I0) where 0  i < n
H(R(rs)) = hv0;:::;vn 1i
mov rd;rs;I0 (H;Rfrd 7! R(rs)g;I0)
movi rd;i;I0 (H;Rfrd 7! ig;I0)
movl rd;l;I0 (H;Rfrd 7! lg;I0)
st rd(i);rs;I0 (Hfl 7! hg;R;I0) where 0  i < n
R(rd) = l, H(l) = hv0;:::;vn 1i, and
h=hv0;:::;vi 1;R(rs);vi+1;:::;vn 1i
unfold rd;rs;I0 (H;Rfrd 7! vg;I0)
where R(rs) = foldv as
Figure 3.2: Operational semantics of FTAL.
tuple in the heap using the specied index. The instruction bgt rs;rt;l tests whether the
value in rs is larger than that in rt, and, if so, transfers control to the code block at l.
In order to allocate a tuple in the heap, rst the alloc instruction is used to copy the
current heap allocation pointer to rd and allocate the desired size in the heap. Before the
next allocation, the allocation pointer needs to be adjusted. This is achieved using the
bump instruction, which sets the allocation pointer to the next unused region of the heap,
as described earlier. (The i argument is not used by the operational semantics.) Since
we assume a linear allocation method, unused regions of the heap are simply all those
beyond the currently allocated data.
The fold instruction annotates the value of rs with the recursive type and moves it into
rd, while unfold extracts the value from the recursive package in rs into rd. Note that the
33Judgment Meaning
`   is a well-formed type
` 	 	 is a well-formed heap type
`     is a well-formed regle type
`  1   2  1 is a subtype of  2
`  1   2  1 is a regle subtype of  2
` P P is a well-formed program
`H:	 H is a well-formed heap of type 	
	 ` R:  R is a well-formed regle of type  
	 ` l: l is a label of allocation status 
	 `h: hval h is a well-formed heap value of type 
	 ` v: v is a well-formed word value of type 
	 ` v:' v is a well-formed word value of type '
	;  `I I is a well-formed instruction sequence
Figure 3.3: Static judgments of FTAL.
fold and unfold instructions of FTAL (as well as TAL) are not no-ops but copy a value from
one register to another.
3.1.3 Static Semantics
The primary judgment of the static semantics is that of the well-formedness of a program.
That in turn depends on judgments of the well-formedness of the heap, heap type, reg-
ister le, register le type, and instruction sequence. The various typing judgments are
summarized in Figure 3.3. The complete rules of the FTAL static semantics are given in
Figures 3.4 to 3.6.
The top-level well-formedness rules are shown in Figure 3.4. To have a well-formed
program, the heap and register le must be well-formed in some appropriate environ-
ments, as must be the current instruction sequence. Additionally, the current instruction
sequence must be present in the heap. The notation I tail I0 means that I is a sufx of
I0. For a heap to be well-formed the domain of the heap type must be the same as that of
the heap and each heap value must be well-formed. However, the type of a well-formed
register le need only specify a subset of the registers in its domain. The premise on the
second line of the (REG) rule is not needed for FTAL type soundness but it is necessary to
34` P `H:	 	 ` R: 
`H:	 	 ` R:  	;  `I
9l 2 Dom(H):H(l)=code [ 
0]:I0 and I tail I0
` (H;R;I)
(PROG)
` 	 j	j=jHj 	 `H(l):	(l) hval (0l<jHj)
`H:	
(HEAP)
	 ` R(ri): i (0in) 	 ` R(r15):
8r 2 Dom(R) fr15g:if R(r) = l then l < j	j
	 ` R:fr0: 0;:::;rn: n;r15:g
(REG)
Figure 3.4: Well-formedness of FTAL programs, heaps, and register les.
enforce some invariants during the translation to FPCC, as will be discussed later.
Subtyping is used for two purposes: one to allow a code block to be called when the
current register le type is more detailed than needed, and the other to be able to type-
check the initialization of an uninitialized tuple element as described below.
To type-check heap allocation and the load and store operations, we follow TAL by
introducing initialization ags in the type of tuples. When a tuple is newly allocated on
the heap, all the elements are agged with 0. A store operation will set the ag of the
appropriate element to 1. Thus, a load operation is only well-formed if the agged typeof
the element being accessed is set to 1. Because the type system only approximately tracks
the initialization of tuple elements, we use subtyping to allow initialized tuple elements
to be treated as if they were not initialized  see rules (0-1) and (LABEL) in Figure 3.5.
In this way, if a tuple is updated through one register, aliased pointers (labels) in other
registers or in the heap will still be well-typed (although they may be treated as still being
uninitialized).
35`  ` 	 `   `  1   2 `  1   2
FTV() = ;
` 
(TYPE)
`  i (1in)
` fl0: 0;:::;ln: ng
(HTYPE)
`  i (0in)
` fr0 7! v0;:::;rn 7! vng
(RFTYPE)
` 
`   
(REFLEX)
`  1   2 `  2   3
`  1   3
(TRANS)
`  i (1in)
` h 1
' 1;:::; i 1
' i 1; 1
i; i+1
' i+1;:::; n
' ni  h 1
' 1;:::; i 1
' i 1; 0
i; i+1
' i+1;:::; n
' ni
(0-1)
`  i (0im) (mn)
` fr0 7! v0;:::;rm 7! vmg  fr0 7! v0;:::;rn 7! vng
(WEAKEN)
	 `h: hval 	 ` v: 	 ` l: 	 ` v:'
	 ` vi: i
' i (1in)
	 `hv1;:::;vni:h 1
' 1;:::; n
' ni hval
(TUPLE)
`   	;  `I
	 `code [ ]:I:8[ ] hval
(CODE)
	 ` i:int
(INT) 	 ` v:[:=]
	 ` foldv as:::
(FOLD)
` 	(l)  
	 ` l:
(LABEL)
l=j	j
	 ` l:fresh
(FRESH)
l=j	j 1 	 ` l:h 1
' 1;:::; n
' ni
	 ` l:used(n)
(USED)
	 ` v:
	 ` v:' (INIT)
` 
	 ` ?:0 (UNINIT)
Figure 3.5: Well-formedness of FTAL types, heap and word values.
36	;  `I
 (rs)=int  (rt)=int 	; frd : intg `I
	;  `add rd;rs;rt;I
(ADD)
 (rs)=int 	; frd : intg `I
	;  `addi rd;rs;i;I
(ADDI)
`  i 	; frd : h 1
0;:::; n
0igfr15 : used(n)g `I
	; fr15 : freshg `alloc rd[ 1;:::; n];I
(ALLOC)
	; fr15 : freshg `I
	; fr15 : used(n)g `bump n;I
(BUMP)
 (rs)=int  (rt)=int 	(l)=8[ 
0] `     
0 	;  `I
	;  `bgt rs;rt;l;I
(BGT)
	; frd :  (rs)g `I
	;  `mov rd;rs;I
(MOV)
	; frd : intg `I
	;  `movi rd;i;I
(MOVI)
	; frd : g `I ` 	(l)  
	;  `movl rd;l;I
(MOVL)
 (rs) = h 0
' 0;:::; i 1
' i 1; 1
i; i+1
' i+1;:::; n 1
' n 1i
	; frd :  ig `I (0  i < n)
	;  `ld rd;rs(i);I
(LD)
 (rs)= i  (rd)=h 0
' 0;:::; n   1
' n   1i
	; frd : h 0
' 0;:::; i   1
' i   1; 1
i; i + 1
' i + 1;:::; n   1
' n   1ig `I (0i<n)
	;  `st rd(i);rs;I
(ST)
 (rs) = [:=] 	; frd : :g `I
	;  `fold rd[rs];:;I
(FOLD-I)
 (rs) = : 	; frd : [:=]g `I
	;  `unfold rd;rs;I
(UNFOLD)
	(l)=8[ 
0] `     
0
	;  `jd l
(JD)
 (r)=8[ 
0] `     
0
	;  `jmp r
(JMP)
Figure 3.6: Well-formedness of FTAL instruction sequences.
37The special allocation register is typed using a new judgment of allocation status:
l=j	j
	 ` l:fresh
(FRESH)
l=j	j 1 	 ` l:h1
' 1;:::; n
' ni
	 ` l:used(n)
(USED)
In the rst typing rule, a label whose value is equivalent to the size of the heap type
mustnecessarilybeunallocated, i.e. fresh. Whenallocation takesplace, thentheallocation
register temporarily points to the newly allocated memory, and thus will have allocation
status used(n) where n is the length of the allocated tuple. The assignment of allocation
status interacts with the two novel FTAL instructions, alloc and bump, as shown in their
typing rules:
`  i 	; frd : h 1
0;:::; n
0igfr15 : used(n)g `I
	; fr15 : freshg `alloc rd[ 1;:::; n];I
(ALLOC)
	; fr15 : freshg `I
	; fr15 : used(n)g `bump n;I
(BUMP)
For an alloc instruction to be well-typed, the allocation register, r15, must be in the
fresh status, since otherwise, as can be seen from the operational semantics, the previ-
ously allocated data will be overwritten. After the alloc instruction, the remainder of the
instruction sequence is checked with the status of r15 changed to used(n). No further al-
location can take place until a bump instruction is encountered, which resets the status to
fresh, corresponding again to the update in the operational semantics.
Coq code: ftal.v contains the encoding of FTAL syntax and semantics.
3.1.4 Examples
In this section, I give a couple of examples of FTAL programs to demonstrate that such a
language (eventually extended with polymorphism and existentials, of course) provides
38features which make it suitable for compiling high-level languages such as Java, ML, or
Safe C.
The rst example is the calculation of a Fibonacci number in Figure 3.7. The C-like
program at the top of the gure can be compiled to the FTAL code below it. The code
segments fib, fib_loop, and fib_return form a function, written in continuation pass-
ing style (CPS), which calculates the Fibonacci number with index given in r1, and then
passes control to the continuation function given in r14. The main block calls fib to cal-
culate F10 and passes the address of the halt block as its continuation. fib initializes
the loop variables and then jumps into the loop code segment fib_loop, which jumps to
fib_returnwhen the calculation is done. As the body of main appears twice in the gure
(once in the initial program state), it has been factored out as I to save space.
Thesecondexample, in Figure3.8, demonstrateshowtouserecursivetypesand mem-
ory allocation to handle classes and objects. Class c has no data elds and only one
method f, which takes an object of class c and invokes its method f. In the main pro-
gram, an object of class c is created and its method f is called with the object itself as
argument. The program will end up in an innite recursive call to c.f. In FTAL, an object
of class c is represented as a recursive tuple type whose only element is a code block with
an only argument of the object type c. The code block at label c_f uses the unfold and
ld instructions to extract the argument object's own method f, and then jumps to it. The
constructor for c, inlined in the main code block, uses the alloc and bump instructions to
allocate heap space for a tuple, then initializes its method f with the label c_f, and folds
the tuple into an object using the fold instruction. Similarly to c_f, the main code block
then extracts method f from the newly created object and jumps to it.
3.1.5 Soundness
In order to produce the necessary FPCC proofs as described in Section 2.2.4, we must
encode the complete semantics of FTAL in CiC along with its proof of soundness, which
39int fib (n:int) { // "Safe C" code
int a=1, b=1;
for (int i=2; i++; i<=n)
{ int c = a + b; a = b; b = c; }
return a;
}
int main () {
return fib(10);
}
P = (H; {}; I) // FTAL code
H = fib: code[{ r1:int, r14:8[{r1:int}] }].
mov r3, r1;
movi r1, 1;
movi r2, 1;
movi r4, 2;
jd fib_loop
fib_loop: code[{ r1:int, r2:int, r3:int, r4:int,
r14:8[{r1:int}] }].
bgt r4, r3, fib_return;
add r5, r1, r2;
mov r1, r2;
mov r2, r5;
addi r4, r4, 1;
jd fib_loop
fib_return: code[{ r1:int, r14:8[{r1:int}] }].
jmp r14
halt: code[{r1:int}].
jd halt
main: code[{}].
I
I = movi r1, 10;
movl r14, halt;
jd fib
Figure 3.7: FTAL Example: Fibonacci Numbers
40class c { // "Safe C++" code
void f (c x) { x.f(x); }
}
void main () {
c x = new c;
x.f(x);
}
P = (H; {}; I) // FTAL code
c = .<8[{r1:}]>
H = c_f: code[{r1:c}].
unfold r2, r1;
ld r2, r2(0);
jmp r2
main: code[{}].
I
I = alloc r1 [8[{r1:c}]];
bump 1;
movl r2, c_f;
st r1(0), r2;
fold r1[c], r1;
unfold r2, r1;
ld r2, r2(0);
jmp r2
Figure 3.8: FTAL Example: Mini-Object
41will be used in dening and proving the FPCC propositions. The critical theorems for the
soundness of FTAL are the usual progress and preservation lemmas:
Theorem 3.1 (FTAL Progress)
If ` P, then there exists P0 such that P 7 ! P0.
Theorem 3.2 (FTAL Preservation)
If ` P and P 7 ! P0, then ` P0.
As usual, several intermediate lemmas are used to prove these two theorems, all of
which can be formally encoded and proved in the Coq proof assistant. The most impor-
tant of these lemmas are given below. Their encoding in Coq is described in Section 3.3.
As the proofs of these lemmas and the two theorems above are extremely similar to those
of the original TAL [52], I omit any discussion of them here. In this regard, my main
contribution has been to mechanize proofs that had previously only been done on paper.
Lemma 3.3 (FTAL Register File Update)
1. If 	 ` R:  and 	 ` v: then 	 ` Rfr 7! vg: fr : g.
2. If 	 ` R:  and 	 ` l: then 	 ` Rfr15 7! lg: fr15 : g.
Lemma 3.4 (FTAL Canonical Word Forms) If `H:	 and 	 ` v: then:
1. if =int then v=i;
2. if =8[ ] then v=l and H(l)=code [ ]:I;
3. if =h 1
' 1;:::; n
' ni then v=l;
4. if =:0 then v=foldv0 as.
Lemma 3.5 (FTAL Canonical Register Word Forms) If 	 ` R:  and  (r)= then:
1. R(r)=v;
2. if =int then R(r)=i;
423. if =h 1
' 1;:::; n
' ni then R(r)=l.
Lemma 3.6 (FTAL Canonical Heap Forms) If 	 `h: hval then:
1. if =8[ ] then h=code [ ]:I and 	;  `I;
2. if =h 1
' 1;:::; n
' ni then h=hv1;:::;vni and 	 ` vi: i
' i
Lemma 3.7 (FTAL Register File Weakening) If `  1   2 and 	 ` R: 1 then 	 ` R: 2.
Lemma 3.8 (FTAL Heap Extension) If `H:	, l = jHj (thus, l 62 Dom(H)), and ` ,
then:
1. ` 	fl : g;
2. if 	 ` v:0 then 	fl : g ` v:0;
3. if 	 ` v:' then 	fl : g ` v:';
4. if 	;  `I then 	fl : g;  `I;
5. if 	 ` R: fr15 : freshg then 	fl : g ` R: fr15 : used(n)g;
6. if 	 `h:0 hval then 	fl : g `h:0 hval;
7. if 	fl : g `h: hval then `Hfl 7! hg:	fl : g.
Lemma 3.9 (FTAL Heap Update) If `H:	 and `   	(l) then:
1. ` 	fl : g;
2. if 	 ` v:0 then 	fl : g ` v:0;
3. if 	 ` v:' then 	fl : g ` v:';
4. if 	;  `I then 	fl : g;  `I;
5. if 	 ` R:  then 	fl : g ` R: ;
6. if 	 `h:0 hval then 	fl : g `h:0 hval;
7. if 	fl : g `h: hval then `Hfl 7! hg:	fl : g.
43Now that we have an assembly language with a sound type system, we are ready to
generate proof-carrying code from a well-typed FTAL program.
Coq code: lemmas_ftal.v contains these lemmas and their complete proofs.
3.1.6 Designing TAL for FPCC
I have designed a novel FTAL language for the presentation in this thesis which corre-
sponds closely to the underlying machine dened in Section 2.1. As will become clear in
the next section, every well-formed FTAL state can be mapped to a safe machine state,
and this property is used to produce a safety proof for the machine state.
For safety policies which need to enforce complex constraints on every machine state
or step, such a one-to-one mapping can be very convenient. In general, however, this
strict correspondence is not necessary for the syntactic approach to work. For example, if
we wished to retain macro instructions in the FTAL language, our denition of FPCC
Preservation might be modied to
S:State:Inv(S)!9n:Nat:Inv(Step(n+1)(S))
stating that starting from a state satisfying the global invariant, the machine will eventu-
ally (after one or more steps) reach another state satisfying the invariant. Better yet, I will
showinChapter4amoregeneralwaytohandlemacroinstructions,andeventhosewhich
do not have any runtime effect. When introducing polymorphism or existentials into the
FTAL language, there will be certain FTAL operations(e.g. typeapplication) which do not
correspond to any run-time machine instructions at all. In this case, the FTAL operation
would correspond to a cast in the FPCC proof for the machine state.
Another reason why na¨ vely using existing typed assembly languages will not neces-
sarily help in producing FPCC is that the type system must be designed to enforce appro-
priateinvariants. Thereare requirementsin thetypingrulesof FTALwhich are notcritical
for FTALsoundnessbut are necessarywhen translating FTAL to FPCC as described in the
44next section. An example of this is the requirement in the (REG) rule (Figure 3.4) that all
labels in registers be within the domain of the heap (including those registers that are
not specied in the type of the register le and hence not accessible by well-formed code
anyway). This condition is crucial in proving the properties discussed in Section 3.2.3.
3.2 Translating FTAL to FPCC
Asoutlinedin Section2.2.3, an FPCC package providesan initial state,S0, anda proofthat
the state satises the safety policy. In the next few subsections, I show how to translate
an FTAL program into a machine state and how to use the FTAL type system to generate
proofs of the FPCC Preservation and Progress propositions, which imply safety.
3.2.1 From FTAL to Machine State
FTAL programs are compiled to machine code by (1) dening a layout for the memory
which maps heap values of the program to memory addresses, (2) translating FTAL in-
structions to machine instructions, and (3) choosing the appropriate program counter and
register values. The layout must ensure that there are no overlaps between the images of
tuples and code sequences in the memory. Our choice of the FTAL instruction set allows
us to translate every FTAL instruction into one machine instruction word.
I will express the correspondence between an FTAL program and a machine state by
a family of translation relations upon the various syntactic categories. The forms of these
relations are:
45Relation Correspondence
(H;R;I) ) (M;R;pc) FTAL program to machine state
L ` H ) M FTAL heap to memory
L ` R ) R register les
L ` I ) s Mi::j sequence of instructions to
memory layout
L ` c ) i w instruction translation
L ` h ) h Mi::j heap value to memory layout
L ` v ) w w word value to machine word
Recall that the machine memory is modeled as a function, Word ! Word, so M(w)
denotes the memory word at address w. The judgments L ` I ) s Mi::j and L ` h ) h Mi::j
state that a sequence of instructions and a heap value (either a tuple or a code block),
respectively, translate to a series of consecutive words in memory M from address i to
address j.
An important step in the translation is attening the FTAL heap into the machine
memory. To achieve this, I dene a Layout function of type Heap ! Label ! Word which,
givenanFTALheap,returnsamappingfromlabelstomemoryaddresses. (Intherelations
above, L is this Layout function applied to the heap.) For our current purpose, we dene
Layout(fg)(l0) =0
Layout(Hfl 7! hg)(l0)=
8
> <
> :
w + size(h); if l < l0
w; otherwise;
where w = Layout(H)(l0)
wheresize(h) isthesize oftheheapvalue h (nforan n-tuple,andthelengthoftheinstruc-
tion sequence for a code block). This Layout function maps labels to addresses starting at
0 and forces the translation ) to lay out FTAL heap values compactly, consecutively, and
with no overlapping (due to the implicit type system constraint that the labels in a well-
46formed heap appear in descending order). Additionally, the rst unused label (whose
value equals the size of the heap) is mapped to the rst unused address. These properties
of the Layout function are useful later on in proving FPCC Preservation and Progress.
The translation relations are dened by a set of inference rules, given in Figure 3.9.
The rules are straightforward and operate purely on the syntax of FTAL programs. Note
that FTAL type annotations are discarded in the translation (for example, in the fold in-
struction), andlabel wordvaluesare mappedtomemorywordsusingthelayoutfunction.
Each FTAL heap value corresponds to a sequence of words in memory. A heap translates
to a memory if every heap value in the heap translates to the appropriate sequence of
memory words. Registers translate directly between FTAL and the machine (^ r is dened
in Figure 3.1 and r in Figure 2.1). An FTAL program corresponds to a machine state if
the translation relation holds on the heap and register le, and if the current instruction
sequence is at some location in the memory. Since in a well-typed FTAL program the cur-
rent instruction sequence must also be present in the heap, we can always translate it to
a known program counter. Notice that the FTAL alloc and bump instructions correspond
to machine move and addition instructions, respectively, using the register reserved for
allocation, r15. (It is for this purpose that bump has an i argument.)
The translation relation as presented in Figure 3.9 is not deterministic with respect to
the unused and uninitialized parts of the memory and to the positioning of the program
counter. However, it is straightforward on the basis of its denition to develop a deter-
ministic function (i.e. a compiler) which translates an FTAL program into a machine state
for which the translation relation described above holds. In the next section, I will show
how this initial translation is used to provide the Initial Condition FPCC proof.
3.2.2 The Global Invariant
As discussed in Section 2.2.4, in addition to translating the FTAL program to an initial
machine state S0, we must dene the invariant Inv, which holds during the execution of a
47WORD VALUES
L ` l ) w L(l) L ` i ) w i
for any w
L ` ? ) w w
L ` v ) w w
L ` foldv as ) w w
INSTRUCTIONS
L ` add rd;rs;rt ) i add rd;rs;rt
L ` addi rd;rs;i ) i addi rd;rs;i
L ` alloc rd[~ ] ) i addi rd;r15;0
L ` bump i ) i addi r15;r15;i
L ` fold rd[rs]; ) i addi rd;rs;0
L ` unfold rd;rs ) i addi rd;rs;0
L ` ld rd;rs(i) ) i ld rd;rs(i)
L ` st rd(i);rs ) i st rd(i);rs
L ` mov rd;rs ) i addi rd;rs;0
L ` movi rd;i ) i movi rd;i
L ` movl rd;l0 ) i movi rd;L(l0)
L ` bgt rs;rt;l ) i bgt rs;rt;L(l)
INSTRUCTION SEQUENCES
L ` c ) i Dc(M(i)) L ` I ) s M(i+1)::j
L ` c;I ) s Mi::j
Dc(M(i)) = jd (L(l0))
L ` jd l0 ) s Mi::i
Dc(M(i)) = jmp r
L ` jmp r ) s Mi::i
HEAP VALUES
L ` vi ) w M(j + i) for 0  i  n
L ` hvo;:::;vni ) h Mj::(j+n)
L ` I ) s Mi::j
L ` code [ ]:I ) h Mi::j
HEAP, REGISTER FILE, PROGRAM
L ` H(l) ) h ML(l)::L(l+1) 1 0  l < jHj
L ` H ) M
L ` R(^ ri) ) w R(ri) 0  i  15
L ` R ) R
Layout(H) ` H ) M
Layout(H) ` R ) R
Layout(H) ` I ) s Mpc::pc+jIj 1;
where 9l 2 Dom(H):(H(l) = code [ ]:I0;I tail I0; and
pc = Layout(H)(l) + jI0j   jIj)
(H;R;I) ) (M;R;pc)
Figure 3.9: Relating FTAL programs to machine states.
48machine program, and provide proofs of:
FPCC Initial Condition: Inv(S0)
FPCC Preservation: S:State:Inv(S)!Inv(Step(S))
FPCC Progress: S:State:Inv(S)!SP(S)
The invariant simply has to ensure that the machine state at each step corresponds to
a well-typed FTAL program, which will allow us to use the formalized versions of the
proofs of the progress and preservation lemmas for FTAL to generate formal proofs of
the corresponding properties of the invariant. Since the denition of Inv requires us to
state that an FTAL program is well-typed, it must be expressed not just in terms of FTAL
programs, but of their typing derivations:
Inv(S) = 9P : program: ((` P) ^ (P ) S))
Hence, the invariant holds on a state if there exists an FTAL program that is well-typed
and translates to the state.
The proof of the initial condition can now be obtained directly in the process of trans-
lating an initial well-formed FTAL program to machine state as described in Section 3.2.1.
It remains, therefore, to prove the two lemmas.
3.2.3 The Preservation and Progress Properties
Progress in our case is easy to prove: since the invariant states that there exists a well-
typed FTAL program that translates to the current state, it is obvious by examination of
the translation rules that such an FTAL program will never translate to a state in which
the program counter points to an illegal instruction.
The remaining proof term, for Preservation, is thus themost involved of the generated
FPCC proofs. It is obtained in the following way:
Given a program P and a typing derivation for ` P, we know by FTAL progress
that there exists a program P0 such that P 7 ! P0. Furthermore, by FTAL preservation,
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Figure 3.10: Relationship between FTAL evaluation and machine semantics.
we know that ` P0. Now, the premise of our FPCC Preservation theorem provides us
with a machine state S such that P ) S, and we need to show that there exists another
well-typed program that translates to Step(S). The semantics of FTAL has been set up so
that this well-typed program is exactly P0. It remains now for us to prove that indeed
P0 ) Step(S), as diagrammed in Figure 3.10.
Essentially, we need to show that the FTAL evaluation relation corresponds to the ma-
chine's step function. This is proved by induction on the typing derivation of ` P. For
each possible case, we use inversion1 on the structure of P, the FTAL evaluation relation,
the translation relation, and the machine Step function to gain the necessary informa-
tion about the structure of P0, S, and Step(S). Many of the cases of this proof are fairly
straightforward.
Let us briey consider one of the interesting cases of the Preservation proof, which is
when the current instruction is alloc. Corresponding to the diagram in Figure 3.10, we
1Inversion is simply a process of backwards reasoning given a premise, one infers what judgment rule
must have been used to prove it and then adds the assumptions of that rule to one's list of available facts. For
example, if we know an FTAL program is well-typed then, by inversion, the only possible rule that would
allow one to prove such a judgment is (PROG) on page 35; hence, we can infer, for instance, that there must
also exist a proof that the heap component of the program is well-typed.
50have the following setup:
P = (H;R;alloc rd[ 1;:::; n];I)
P0 = (H0;R0;I)
S = (M;R;pc)
Step(S) = (M;R0;(pc + 1))
where H0, R0, and R0 can be determined by the operational semantics of FTAL and the
denition of the Step function (Figure 2.2).
We now need to prove that P0 is related to Step(S) by the translation. First, we know
by the properties of the layout function that applying it to an extended heap maintains
the mapping of all the existing labels in the old heap. Now, the FTAL heap is updated
after evaluation but the memory stays the same after the step. However, since the update
to the heap is only with uninitialized values, which can be translated to any word, the
translation will still hold on the unchanged memory. Thus, we can show that the updated
heap translates to the unaltered memory. Then, relating the two updated register les
is not difcult, nor is showing that the residual instruction sequence corresponds to the
next program counter value. Well-formedness of P (i.e. ` P) is used in various steps of
this proof, for instance, to reason that any labels in the registers are within the domain of
the heap, hence the layout function on the updated heap, H0, preserves the mappings of
existing labels.
This completes the translation, or compilation, of a well-typed FTAL program to an
FPCC code package. The FTAL program can be shown to correspond to an initial ma-
chine state and that state can be shown safe using the proofs of Preservation and Progress
developed here.
Coq code: translate_ftal.v denes the translation of Section 3.2.1 as well as con-
tains the complete FPCC proofs described in this section.
513.3 Implementation in Coq
An implementation of the syntactic approach presented in this thesis consists of an FTAL
compiler which generates FPCC packages. An FPCC package consists of two parts: the
initial machine state and the proof of safety. The proof of safety can be further divided
into two pieces: one is the proof of the Preservation and Progress theorems and the other
is the proof that the initial machine state satises the Initial Condition property. Note
that the proofs of Preservation and Progress (which are constructed semi-automatically)
do not change for any machine state which has been generated by compiling an FTAL
program. Thus, these properties need only be proven once and can then be reused for all
FPCC packages produced by this compiler.
In the following sections, I rst describe our Coq representation of the machine and
the encoding of FTAL syntax and semantics and soundness theorems. Next I discuss
implementationoftheformalproofsofFPCCPreservationandProgress,whichweredone
interactively using the Coq proof assistant. Finally, I describe a compiler which parses
an FTAL program, performs type-checking, and automatically produces the Coq term
representing the typing derivation. This typing derivation is then used to construct the
proof of the Initial Condition property.
Coq is a proof assistant tool for the calculus of inductive constructions (Section 2.2).
It provides an interactive interface for constructing formal proofs in the logic. The Coq
syntax2 for -abstraction, X :A:B, is [X:A]B. The syntax for dependent products, X :
A:B, is (X:A)B and Coq allows for the normal arrow abbreviation of this when the bound
variable does not occur in the body, e.g. A->B. Coq syntax for inductive denitions is that
described in Section 2.2. Coq uses the sort Prop for logical propositions and the sort Set
for the type of data type specications (booleans, natural numbers, lists, programs, etc.).
2This syntax is for Coq version 7, using which these proofs were built.
523.3.1 Encoding Machine Semantics
The Coq encoding of the machine to which FTAL programs are translated is very similar
to the presentation in Section 2.1. For example, having dened the registers as an induc-
tive set with 16 constructors, I then dene the memory and register le as being functions
and the state as a triple of memory, register le, and program counter:
Definition Word := nat.
Inductive _Reg : Set := _r0 : _Reg | _r1 : _Reg | ...
Definition Mem := Word -> Word.
Definition _RegFile := _Reg -> Word.
Definition State := (Mem * (_RegFile * Word)).
The instruction set is then dened as an inductive denition with appropriate con-
structors:
Inductive _Instr : Set
:= _add : _Reg -> _Reg -> _Reg -> _Instr
| _addi : _Reg -> _Reg -> Word -> _Instr
| _movi : _Reg -> Word -> _Instr
| _bgt : _Reg -> _Reg -> Word -> _Instr
| _jd : Word -> _Instr
| _jmp : _Reg -> _Instr
| _ld : _Reg -> _Reg -> Word -> _Instr
| _st : _Reg -> Word -> _Reg -> _Instr
| _ill : _Instr.
I next decide on how to encode the instructions above as natural numbers and write a
Coq function which uses the appropriate arithmetic operations to decode a natural num-
ber into an _Instr:
1ex
Definition Dc : Word -> _Instr := ...
We are now ready to encode the semantics of the machine as given in Section 2.1. For
updating the register le and memory, I dene auxiliary functions, as in the code below
(beq_reg compares equality of two register names and returns a boolean):
Definition updateregfile
: _RegFile -> _Reg -> Word -> _RegFile
53:= [R:_RegFile; rd:_Reg; v:Word]
([r:_Reg] if (beq_reg r rd) then v else (R r)).
Definition Step : State -> State
:= [St:State] Cases St of (M, (R, pc)) =>
Cases (Dc (M pc)) of
(_add rd rs rs')
=> (M, ((updateregfile R rd
(plus (R rs) (R rs'))),
(S pc)))
| (_jd l)
=> (M, (R, l))
| ...
| _ill => St
end
end.
Finally, we can state the safety policy we wish to enforce and dene what a safe machine
state is. The MultiStep function simply applies the Step function to the given state n
times:
Definition SP [S:State]
:= (let (M,T')=S in (let (R,PC)=T' in ~(Dc (M PC))=_ill)).
Definition Safe [S:State]
:= (n:nat)(SP (MultiStep n S)).
3.3.2 Encoding FTAL Syntax
Encoding theFTAL language is a more involved process. I start by deningeach syntactic
category as an inductive type. For example, the FTAL types are encoded as follows:
Definition initflag := bool.
Inductive Omega : Set
:= intty : Omega
| codety : (Map Reg Omega) -> APTy -> Omega
| tupty : (list Omega) -> (list initflag) -> Omega
| recty : (OmegaL (S O)) -> Omega.
The list in the tuple type constructor is the usual denition of a list, found in the Coq
library. Hence, the tuple type constructor takes as arguments a list of types and a list of
initialization ags, encoded as booleans. (Alternatively, I could have used a list of pairs
54but in practice this encoding seemed easier to work with.) Map is dened as a list of pairs
where the rst element of each pair is used as a key for lookup and update operations.
The type of a register le (used by codety) is a map from registers (denition presented
below) to types. I also dene a well-formed Map, used later, as being a list of pairs in
which the rst element of every pair in the list is distinct from all others.
A well-formed type in the FTAL language will never have free type variables, but
variables may appear in a recursive type. Hence, I represent the type under the recursive
type constructor by a lifted version of Omega which uses deBruijn indices to represent
variables. The parameter of the OmegaL type below tracks the number of free type vari-
ables in the term to ensure the correctness of our substitution and unfolding functions for
recursive types:3
Inductive OmegaL : nat -> Set
:= inttyL : (OmegaL O)
| codetyL : (i:nat) (Map Reg (OmegaL i)) ->
APTy -> (OmegaL i)
| tuptyL : (i:nat) (list (OmegaL i)) ->
(list initflag) -> (OmegaL i)
| rectyL : (i:nat) (OmegaL (S i)) -> (OmegaL i)
| varL : (i:nat) (OmegaL (S i))
| liftL : (i:nat) (OmegaL i) -> (OmegaL (S i)).
FTAL registers are dened as in the machine above. Unlike the presentation in pre-
vious sections, we carry the special allocation pointer separately from the rest of of the
register le, hence there are only 15 registers dened for FTAL. The r15 register, or AP
below, is simply a label (which is dened to be a natural number). The special allocation
pointer types are encoded as an inductive denition and the types of register les and
heaps are maps from registers or labels, respectively, to Omega (the heap type also requires
that the map be well-formed, as dened above):
3This encoding of variables is discussed in more detail in Section 6.2.
55Inductive Reg : Set := r0 : Reg | r1 : Reg | ...
Definition label := nat.
Definition AP := label. (* alloc. ptr. (r15) *)
Inductive APTy : Set
:= fresh : APTy
| used : nat -> APTy.
Definition RegFileTy := (Map Reg Omega).
Definition HeapTy := (WFMap label Omega).
The remainder of the denitionsfor FTAL syntax are fairly intuitive and match closely
the presentation in Figure 3.1, except that r15 and its type are carried separately as AP and
APTy:
Inductive Instr : Set
:= add : Reg -> Reg -> Reg -> Instr
| addi : Reg -> Reg -> int -> Instr
| alloc : Reg -> (list Omega) -> Instr
| bgt : Reg -> Reg -> label -> Instr
| bump : int -> Instr
| fold : Reg -> Omega -> Reg -> Instr
| ld : Reg -> Reg -> int -> Instr
| mov : Reg -> Reg -> Instr
| movi : Reg -> int -> Instr
| movl : Reg -> label -> Instr
| st : Reg -> int -> Reg -> Instr
| unfold : Reg -> Reg -> Instr.
Inductive InstrSeq : Set
:= iseq : Instr -> InstrSeq -> InstrSeq
| jd : label -> InstrSeq
| jmp : Reg -> InstrSeq.
Inductive WordVal : Set
:= wl : label -> WordVal
| wi : int -> WordVal
| wuninit : Omega -> WordVal
| wfold : WordVal -> Omega -> WordVal.
Inductive HeapVal : Set
:= tuple : (list WordVal) -> HeapVal
| code : RegFileTy -> APTy -> InstrSeq -> HeapVal.
Definition Heap := (WFMap label HeapVal).
Definition RegFile := (Map Reg WordVal).
Definition Program := (Heap * (RegFile * (AP * InstrSeq))).
563.3.3 Encoding FTAL Semantics and Soundness
Each judgment form of the dynamic and static semantics can be viewed as a relation and
is also encoded as an inductive denition. For every evaluation or typing rule, there
is an associated constructor of the appropriate inductive denition. (This allows us to
use Coq's inductive elimination constructs to perform inversion and induction on typing
derivations.) I show the encoding of several evaluation rules in Figure 3.11.
The reglookup and regupdext are to be read as propositions stating that looking up
the value of a given registerin a registerle (which is denedto be a Map) yields the given
word value and that updating or extending the mapping of a register in a register le
resultsin a newregisterle, respectively. Fortheheap (and similarly heap type,which are
both dened as well-formed Maps) the hextend proposition requires that the label being
added to the domain of the heap is not already being mapped in the heap. The hupdate
proposition only holds true when the label is in fact present in the heap mapping. These
propositions are dened inductively as relations on Maps.
The encodings of the main static judgments are given in Figures 3.12 and 3.13.
In order to formally prove the soundness of FTAL as encoded above, we proceed by
rst proving the same lemmas that are listed in Section 3.1.5. The statements of these
lemmas in Coq, while slightly verbose, are essentially the same as those listed in that
section. I generate the proofs of these lemmas interactively using Coq proof tactics. The
tactics of the proof assistant correspond to the steps that would be used in a hand proof,
e.g. induction, inversion, rewriting, application of rules (constructors), etc. I present the
statements of a few of these lemmas in Coq below (Register File Update, the second case
of Canonical Word Forms, and several cases of the Heap Extension lemma):
Lemma regfile_update
: (HT:HeapTy; R,R':RegFile; G,G':(Map Reg Omega))
(rd:Reg; v:WordVal; t:Omega)
(WFRegFile HT R G) ->
(WFWordVal HT v t) ->
(regupdext R rd v R') ->
(regupdext G rd t G') ->
(WFRegFile HT R' G').
57Lemma can_word_forms_code
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; v:WordVal; G:RegFileTy; T:APTy)
(WFHeap H HT) ->
(WFWordVal HT v (codety G T)) ->
(EX l | v=(wl l) /\ (EX I | (hlookup H l (code G T I)))).
Lemma heap_ext_2
: (H,H':Heap; HT,HT':HeapTy; t:Omega; l:label)
(v:WordVal; t':Omega)
(WFHeap H HT) ->
(hsize H l) ->
(htextend HT l t HT') ->
(WFWordVal HT v t') ->
(WFWordVal HT' v t').
Lemma heap_ext_4
: (I:InstrSeq)
(H,H':Heap; HT,HT':HeapTy; t:Omega; l:label)
(R:RegFileTy; A:APTy)
(WFHeap H HT) ->
(hsize H l) ->
(htextend HT l t HT') ->
(WFInstrSeq HT R A I) ->
(WFInstrSeq HT' R A I).
Lemma heap_ext_7
: (H,H':Heap; HT,HT':HeapTy; t:Omega; l:label)
(h:HeapVal)
(WFHeap H HT) ->
(hsize H l) ->
(htextend HT l t HT') ->
(hextend H l h H') ->
(WFHeapVal HT' h t) ->
(WFHeap H' HT').
Themain theoremsforthesoundnessofFTAL,preservationandprogress,follow from
the various lemmas:
Theorem ftal_preserv
: (P,P':Program) (WFProgram P) -> (Eval P P') -> (WFProgram P').
Theorem ftal_progress
: (P:Program) (WFProgram P) -> (EX P' | (Eval P P')).
We have now completely formalized the syntactic soundness proof of FTAL. In the
next section, I discuss the encoding of the translation relations betweenFTAL and the ma-
chine, and how FTAL soundness is used to produce the proofs of the FPCC Preservation
and Progress theorems.
58Inductive Eval : Program -> Program -> Prop
:= ev_add
: (H:Heap; R,R':RegFile; r15:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(rd,rs,rs':Reg; rsval,rsval':int)
(reglookup R rs (wi rsval)) ->
(reglookup R rs' (wi rsval')) ->
(regupdext R rd (wi (plus rsval rsval')) R') ->
(Eval (H,(R,(r15,(iseq (add rd rs rs') I'))))
(H,(R',(r15,I'))))
| ev_alloc
: (H,H':Heap; R,R':RegFile; r15:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(rd:Reg; V:(list Omega))
(regupdext R rd (wl r15) R') ->
(hextend H r15 (tuple (makeUninitTup V)) H') ->
(Eval (H, (R, (r15, (iseq (alloc rd V) I'))))
(H', (R', (r15, I'))))
| ev_bump
: (H:Heap; R:RegFile; r15:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(i:int; l:nat)
(hsize H l) ->
(Eval (H, (R, (r15, (iseq (bump i) I'))))
(H, (R, (l, I'))))
| ev_jd
: (H:Heap; R:RegFile; r15:AP)
(l:label; G:RegFileTy; T:APTy; I':InstrSeq)
(hlookup H l (code G T I')) ->
(Eval (H, (R, (r15, (jd l))))
(H, (R, (r15, I'))))
| ev_movl
: (H:Heap; R,R':RegFile; r15:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(rd:Reg; l:label)
(regupdext R rd (wl l) R') ->
(Eval (H, (R, (r15, (iseq (movl rd l) I'))))
(H, (R',(r15, I'))))
| ev_store
: (H,H':Heap; R:RegFile; r15:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; i:int; l:label;
V,V':(list WordVal); w:WordVal)
(reglookup R rd (wl l)) ->
(reglookup R rs w) ->
(hlookup H l (tuple V)) ->
(updatetuple V i w V') ->
(hupdate H l (tuple V') H') ->
(Eval (H, (R, (r15, (iseq (st rd i rs) I'))))
(H',(R, (r15, I'))))
| ...
Figure 3.11: Coq encoding of FTAL dynamic semantics
59Inductive RegFileSubtype (* register file subtyping: G <= G' *)
: RegFileTy -> RegFileTy -> Prop
:= weaken
: (G,G':RegFileTy)
((r:Reg; t:Omega) (reglookup G' r t) -> (reglookup G r t)) ->
(RegFileSubtype G G').
Inductive WFWordVal (* well-formed word values: HT |- w : t wval *)
: HeapTy -> WordVal -> Omega -> Prop
:= int_wval : (HT:HeapTy; i:int)(WFWordVal HT (wi i) intty)
| label_wval
: (HT:HeapTy; l:label; t,t':Omega)
(htlookup HT l t') ->
(Subtype t' t) ->
(WFWordVal HT (wl l) t)
| fold_word_wval
: (HT:HeapTy; w:WordVal; t:OmegaR; t':Omega)
(RUnlift (RUnfold t))=t' ->
(WFWordVal HT w t') ->
(WFWordVal HT (wfold w (recty t)) (recty t)).
Inductive WFInstrSeq (* well-formed instruction sequences: HT; G |- I *)
: HeapTy -> RegFileTy -> APTy -> InstrSeq -> Prop
:= s_add
: (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; T:APTy; I:InstrSeq)
(rd,rs,rs':Reg)
(reglookup G rs intty) ->
(reglookup G rs' intty) ->
(regupdext G rd intty G') ->
(WFInstrSeq HT G' T I) ->
(WFInstrSeq HT G T (iseq (add rd rs rs') I))
| s_alloc
: (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; I:InstrSeq)
(rd:Reg; n:nat; V:(list Omega))
n=(length V) ->
(regupdext G rd (tupty V (makeUninitTupty V)) G')->
(WFInstrSeq HT G' (used n) I) ->
(WFInstrSeq HT G fresh (iseq (alloc rd V) I))
| s_jd
: (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; T:APTy)
(l:label)
(htlookup HT l (codety G' T)) ->
(RegFileSubtype G G') ->
(WFInstrSeq HT G T (jd l))
| s_st
: (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; T:APTy; I:InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; i:int;
V,V':(list initflag); Ts:(list Omega); t:Omega)
(reglookup G rd (tupty Ts V)) ->
(reglookup G rs t) ->
(ListNth ? Ts i t) ->
(updatetupty V i V') ->
(regupdate G rd (tupty Ts V') G') ->
(WFInstrSeq HT G' T I) ->
(WFInstrSeq HT G T (iseq (st rd i rs) I))
| ...
Figure 3.12: Coq encoding of FTAL static semantics: main denitions (1 of 2)
60Inductive WFHeapVal (* well-formed heap values: HT |- h : t hval *)
: HeapTy -> HeapVal -> Omega -> Prop
:= tuple_wf
: (HT:HeapTy; wl:(list WordVal); tl:(list Omega); il:(list initflag))
(WFWordValinitList HT wl tl il) ->
(WFHeapVal HT (tuple wl) (tupty tl il))
| code_wf
: (HT:HeapTy; G:RegFileTy; I:InstrSeq; T:APTy)
(WFInstrSeq HT G T I) ->
(WFHeapVal HT (code G T I) (codety G T)).
Inductive WFHeap (* well-formed heap *)
: Heap -> HeapTy -> Prop
:= heap_wf
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy)
(EX s | (hsize H s) /\
(htsize HT s) /\
((n:label; h:HeapVal) (hlookup H n h) -> (lt n s)) /\
((n:label; t:Omega) (htlookup HT n t) -> (lt n s)) /\
((n:label) (lt n s) -> (EX h | (hlookup H n h))) /\
((n:label) (lt n s) -> (EX t | (htlookup HT n t))) /\
((n:label; h:HeapVal; t:Omega)
(hlookup H n h)->(htlookup HT n t)->(WFHeapVal HT h t)) /\
(OrdHeap H)
) ->
(WFHeap H HT).
Inductive WFRegFile (* well-formed register file *)
: HeapTy -> RegFile -> RegFileTy -> Prop
:= regfile_wf
: (HT:HeapTy; R:RegFile; G:RegFileTy)
((r:Reg; t:Omega)
(reglookup G r t) ->
(EX w | (reglookup R r w) /\ (WFWordVal HT w t))) ->
((r:Reg; v:WordVal; l:label; n:nat)
(reglookup R r v) ->
(stripWV v)=(wl l) ->
(htsize HT n) ->
(lt l n)) ->
(WFRegFile HT R G).
Inductive WFProgram (* well-formed program *)
: Program -> Prop
:= program_wf
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; R:RegFile; G:RegFileTy;
l:AP; t:APTy; I:InstrSeq)
(WFHeap H HT) ->
(WFRegFile HT R G) ->
(WFap HT l t) ->
(WFInstrSeq HT G t I) ->
(EX l | (EX G' | (EX T' | (EX I' | (EX n |
(hlookup H l (code G' T' I')) /\
(ISubDepth I I' n)))))) ->
(WFProgram (H, (R, (l, I)))).
Figure 3.13: Coq encoding of FTAL static semantics: main denitions (2 of 2)
613.3.4 Encoding FPCC Preservation and Progress
The translation relations (not shown here) are representedas a set of inductive denitions
which follow precisely the presentation in Figure 3.9, for example,
Inductive TrProgram
: Program -> State -> Prop := ...
The global invariant for FPCC can be dened in terms of the translation between a
well-formed FTAL program and the machine state:
Definition Inv [S:State]
:= (EX P:Program | (WFProgram P) /\ (TrProgram P S)).
Now we proceed to prove the FPCC Progress theorem:
Theorem Progress : (S:State) (Inv S) -> (SP S).
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, the Progress theorem is straightforward. Using several
CoqInversiontactics, wedeterminethatthereexistsawell-formedinstructionsequence
which translates to the program counter of the state. Then we perform case analysis on
the well-formed instruction sequence judgment and show that in every possible case, the
program counter of the state must be pointing to a non-illegal instruction.
Next is the FPCC Preservation theorem, which is more involved to prove but which
follows the discussion in Section 3.2.3:
Theorem Preservation : (S:State) (Inv S) -> (Inv (Step S)).
With these two theorems, we can now prove that a machine state will be safe if the FPCC
Initial Condition property is satised:
Theorem Safety : (S:State) (Inv S) -> (Safe S).
3.3.5 Generating the Initial Condition
In order to generate the Initial Condition, we would use a compiler that takes an FTAL
program and compiles it to a machine state, producing the necessary proofs in the pro-
cess.4 The structure of this compiler is fairly straightforward: After parsing an FTAL
4A complete compiler has not actually been developed because FTAL is a very simplistic language and
we have been working with an ideal machine anyway.
62source le, type-checking is performed. The algorithm for type-checking follows closely
the structure of the inductively dened static semantics in Coq. (Similarly, the compiler
structures for FTAL abstract syntax mirror the Coq encoding.) Thus, the type-checker, as
it analyzes the FTAL program, simultaneously builds a Coq term representing the proof
of well-formedness of the program. In particular, if P:Program, then the type-checking
phase produces a term, D:(WFProgram P).
Once type-checking is successfully completed, the compiler then translates the FTAL
program into a machine state. Again, this is done in such a manner that a Coq term repre-
sentingthemachine stateand theproofof therelation betweentheFTALprogram and the
machine state can be generated. That is, for some S:State, a term, T:(TrProgram P S),
is constructed. Along with the typing derivation term of P produced above, we can now
construct a proof that the global invariant holds on S. This can then be composed with the
Safety theorem of the previous section to produce a complete proof of the safety of the
machine state S, as specied by our safety policy.
3.3.6 The Complete System
We now have a complete system that starts with a typed assembly language program and
compiles it into an FPCC package, consisting of an initial machine state and a proof of
safety. Although my current implementation is not as realistic as [15, 4], the advantages
of the syntactic FPCC approach are still clear.
With respect to PCC implementations in general, the two most practical considera-
tions are the extent of the trusted computing base (TCB) and the size of the proofs that
are shipped with code. As for the former, the TCB of my syntactic FPCC implementation
would consist of the following: (1) a parser, which converts the state of the raw machine
into the encoding in the logic; (2) the encoding of the machine step function in the logic,
which must accurately capture the semantics of the real machine (that is, it must be ad-
equate); and (3) the proof-checker of the logic. The rst two will necessarily exist in any
63PCC system. For syntactic FPCC (and FPCC in general), the proof-checker is smaller and
more reliable than that of existing PCC systems because the logic used is much simpler.5
In addition, the VCgen is completely eliminated from the system.
Regarding the proofs that are shipped with syntactic FPCC packages, note that a large
portion of the safety proof is staticthe Progress and Preservation theorems hold regard-
less of the particular FTAL program from which the machine state was compiled. Hence,
this part of the proof does not need to be re-supplied (or even re-checked) with every in-
dividual FPCC package. Furthermore, the remaining portion of the proof simply consists
of the initial FTAL program and its typing derivation. The typing derivation can be easily
and quickly generated by either the code producer or consumer. Thus, if proof size is es-
pecially critical, the only additional information that needs to be supplied with the initial
machine state is the FTAL program itself with minimal type annotations.
3.4 Summary
This chapter has illustrated one of the main contributions of my dissertation, which is the
development of a new syntactic approach to producing foundational proof-carrying
code. Unlike earlier FPCC methods, I have been able to present a relatively simple and
straightforward compilation from TAL programs to certied machine code. Albeit the
technical product may not be as tangible (I have used a very restricted form of TAL and
an idealized machine), I have dealt with several theoretical aspects that required much
more effort in existing semantic FPCC frameworks. Among these features are, primarily,
mutable memory, rst-class code pointers, and recursive types.
5That is, taking into consideration the type-related axioms that need to be added to the base logic of those
systems. Furthermore, although our prototype uses the Coq proof assistant which integrates the proving and
checking processes it would not be at all difcult to separate the proof-checker out into a very small, simple
program, as has been done in previous FPCC approaches.
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Interfacing Type Systems and
Certied Machine Code
As discussed in the introduction, the initial proof-carrying code (PCC) systems specied
a safety policy using a logic extended with many (source) language-specic rules. While
allowing implementationof a scalable system,thisapproach to PCC suffers from toolarge
of a trusted computing base (TCB). It is still difcult to trust that the components of this
system  the verication-condition generator, the proof-checker, and even the logical ax-
ioms and typing rules  are free from error.
The development of another family of PCC implementations, known as Foundational
Proof-Carrying Code (FPCC), was intended to reduce the TCB to a minimum by express-
ing and proving safety using only a foundational mathematical logic without additional
language-specic axioms or typing rules. The trusted components in such a system are
mostly reduced to a much simpler logic and the proof-checker for it.
Both these approaches to PCC have so far one feature in common, which is that they
begin with a single source language and compile type-correct programs from that lan-
guage into machine code with a safety proof. However, the runtime systems of these
frameworks still include components that are not addressed in the safety proof [3, 19]:
low-level memory management libraries, garbage collection, debuggers, marshallers, etc.
65Furthermore, the issue of producing a safety proof for code that is compiled and linked
together from two different source languages was not addressed. (Some recent efforts on
this aspect in the context of the original PCC systems is cited in the Related Work.)
In this chapter, I introduce an FPCC framework for constructing certied machine
code packages from typed assembly language that will interface with a similarly certied
runtime system. The framework permits the typed assembly language to have a foreign
function interface in which stubs, initially provided when the program is being written,
are eventuallycompiledand linkedtocodethatmay havebeenwrittenin a languagewith
a different typesystem,or even certied directly in the FPCC logic using a proof assistant.
Experience has shown that foundational proofs are much harder to construct than
those in a logic extended with type-specic axioms. The earliest FPCC systems built
proofs by constructing sophisticated semantic models of types in order to reason about
safety at the machine level. That is, the nal safety proof incorporated no concept of
source level types  each type in the source language would be interpreted as a predi-
cate on the machine state and the typing rules of the language would turn into lemmas
which must prove propertiesabout the interaction of thesepredicates. While it seemsthat
this method of FPCC would already be amenable to achieving the goals outlined in the
previous paragraph, the situation is complicated by the complexity of the semantic mod-
els [25, 5, 2] that were required to support a realistic type system. Thus, it is not clear yet
how one would integrate the semantic models of different source type systemsand safety
proofs of the runtime components to produce a complete package.
For my work, I adopt the syntactic approach to FPCC, introduced in the previous
chapter. In this framework, the machine level proofs do indeed incorporate and use the
syntacticencodingofelementsofthesourcetypesystemtoderivesafety. Thepresentation
of the syntactic approach in Chapter 3 involves a monolithic translation from type-correct
source programs to a package of certied machine code. In this chapter, I rene the ap-
proachbyinsertinga genericlayer ofreasoningabovethemachine codewhich can(1) bea
target for the compilation of typed assembly languages, (2) certify low-level runtime sys-
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Figure 4.1: FPCC Certied Runtime Framework.
tem components using assertions as in Hoare logic, and (3) glue together these pieces
by reasoning about the compatibility of the interfaces specied by the various types of
source code.
A diagram of my framework is given in Figure 4.1. Source programs are written in
a typed high-level language and then passed through a certifying compiler to produce
machine code along with a proof of safety. The source level type system may provide a
set of functionality that is accessed through a library interface. At the machine level, there
is an actual library code implementation that should satisfy that interface. The non-trivial
problem is how todesigntheframework suchthat notonly will the twopiecesof machine
code link togetherto run, but that the safety proofs originating from two different sources
are also able to link together, consistent with the high-level interface specication, to
produce a unied safety proof for the entire set of code.
Notice that the interaction between program and library is two-way: either piece of
code may make direct or indirect function calls and returns to the other. Ideally, I want
to be able to certify the library code with no knowledge of the source language and type
system that will be interacting with it. At the same time I would like to support rst-class
code pointers at all levels of the code. Methods for handling code pointers properly have
beenoneofthemain challengesofFPCC andare oneofthedifferentiating factorsbetween
67semantic andsyntacticFPCC approaches. Fortheframeworkin thispaper,I havefactored
out most of the code pointer reasoning that is needed when certifying library code so that
the proofs thereof can be relatively straightforward.
In the following section I present the layer of reasoning which will serve as the com-
mon interface for code compiled from different sources. Then I present a typical typed
assembly language, extended with library interfaces and external call facilities. I nally
show how to compile this language to the target machine, expanding external function
stubs, and linking in the runtime library, at the same time producing the proof of safety
of the complete package.
Coq code: The Coq (version 8.0) prototype code of the development in this chapter
may be downloaded from:
http://flint.cs.yale.edu/flint/publications/rtpcc.html
4.1 A Language for Certied Machine Code (CAP)
Recalling the discussion in Section 2.2.4, we know what type of proof we are looking for;
the hard part is to generate that proof of safety. Previous approaches for FPCC [4, 5, 33]
have achieved this by constructing an induction hypothesis, also known as the global
invariant, which can be proven (e.g. by induction) to hold for all states reachable from the
initial stateand is strongenoughto imply the safetycondition. The nature of theinvariant
has ranged from a semantic model of types at the machine level (Appel et al. [4, 5, 77])
to a purely syntactic well-formedness property [33, 34] based on a type-correct source
program in a typed assembly language.
What I have developed in this chapter renes these previous approaches. I will still
be presenting a typed assembly language in Section 4.3, in which most source programs
are written. However, I introduce another layer between the source type system and
the raw encoding of the target machine in the FPCC logic. This is a type system or
specication system that is dened upon the machine encoding, allowing us to reason
68about its state using assertions that essentially capture Hoare logic-style reasoning. Such
a layer allows more generality for reasoning than a xed typesystem,yetat the same time
is more structured than reasoning directly in the logic about the machine encoding.
The language is called CAP and it uses the same machine syntax as presented in Fig-
ure 2.1. The syntax of the additional assertion layer is given below:
P;Q;R 2 Pred = State ! Prop
 2 CdSpec = Word * (Word  Pred)
CmdList 3 C ::= ; j c;C
WordList 3 W ::= ; j w;W
The name CAP is derived from its being a Certied Assembly Programming lan-
guage. An initial version was introduced in joint work with Yu [97] and used to certify
a dynamic storage allocation library. The version I use for this thesis introduces some
improvements such as a unied data and code memory, assertions on the whole machine
state, and supportfor user-speciable safety policies. Yu [99] has independentlyextended
the CAP system in a different direction to support certication of temporal properties for
concurrent assembly code.
Assertions (P,Q,R) are predicates on the machine state; the code specication () is a
partial function mapping memory addresses to a pair of an integer and a predicate. The
integer gives the length of the command sequence at that address and the predicate is the
precondition for the block of code. (The function of the length element is to allow us to
specify the addresses of valid code areas of memory based on .)
The operational semantics of the machine has already been presented in Section 2.1. I
now introduce CAP inference rules followed by some important safety theorems.
69c 2 fadd;addi;mov;movi;ldg
8S:(P(S) ^ curcmd(S)=c) ! (Q(Step(S)) ^ SP(S))
 ` SP fQgC
 ` SP fPgc;C
(CAP-PURE)
8S:(P(S) ^ curcmd(S)=st rd(i);rs)
! (Q(Step(S)) ^ SP(S) ^ :InCodeArea(;S:R(rd)+i))
 ` SP fQgC
 ` SP fPgst rd(i);rs;C
(CAP-ST)
8S: (P(S) ^ curcmd(S)=bgt rs;rt;w)
! ((S:R(rs)  S:R(rt) ! Q(Step(S)))
^ (S:R(rs) > S:R(rt) ! Q0(Step(S)))
^ SP(S))
 ` SP fQgC where (w) = (n;Q0)
 ` SP fPgbgt rs;rt;w;C
(CAP-BGT)
8S:(P(S) ^ curcmd(S)=jd w) ! (Q0(Step(S)) ^ SP(S))
where (w) = (n;Q0)
 ` SP fPgjd w;;
(CAP-JD)
8S:(P(S) ^ curcmd(S)=jmp r) ! (Q0(Step(S)) ^ SP(S))
where (S:R(r)) = (n;Q0)
 ` SP fPgjmp r;;
(CAP-JMP)
Flatten(W;M;f)  ` SP fPg(Map(Dc;W))
for all f where (f) = (length(W);P)
` SP M : 
(CAP-CDSPEC)
` SP M :   ` SP fPg(Map(Dc;W))
Flatten(W;M;pc) InCodeArea(;pc) P(M;R;pc)
` SP (M;R;pc)
(CAP-STATE)
Figure 4.2: CAP inference rules.
704.1.1 Inference Rules
CAP adds a layer of inference rules (typing rules) allowing us to prove specication
judgments of the forms:
 ` SP fPgC well-formed command sequence
` SP M :  well-formed code specication
` SP (M;R;pc) well-formed machine state
The inference rules for these judgments are shown in Figure 4.2. The rules for well-
formed command sequences essentially require that if the given precondition P is satis-
ed in the current state, then (1) the global predicate SP holds on that state and (2) there
must be some postcondition Q, which is the precondition of the remaining sequence of
commands, that holds on the state after executing one step.1 The rules directly refer to the
Step function of the machine; control ow instructions additionally use the code speci-
cation environment  in order to allow for the certication of mutually dependent code
blocks. The global predicate SP is provided as a parameter to the whole process of type-
checking a program; it is threaded through all the rules but does not change.
I group as pure commands all those which do not involve control ow and do not
change the memory (i.e. everything other than branches, jumps, and st). The st com-
mand requires an additional proof that the address being stored to is not in the code area
(i.e. I do not permit self-modifying code). curcmd(S) is dened as:
curcmd(M;R;pc) = Dc(M(pc))
The InCodeArea predicate in the rules uses the code addresses and sequence lengths
in  to determine whether a given address lies within the code area. The (CAP-CDSPEC)
1In the abstract syntax of CAP given here, only the precondition of an entire code block is specied explic-
itly; the postconditions of intermediate commands in the code block are embedded in the term representing
the well-formedness of the code. Of course, in practice we could provide a concrete syntax for CAP that
allows the user to annotate instructions explicitly with pre- and postconditions.
71rule ensures that the addresses and sequence lengths specied in  are consistent with
the code actually in memory.
The Flatten predicate is dened as:
Flatten(;;M;f) = True
Flatten(w;W;M;f) = M(f)=w ^ Flatten(W;M;f+1)
Note also, I use dot notation to refer to the components of a triple like the state: S:M,
S:R, etc.
4.1.2 Safety Properties
The machine of Section 2.1 will execute continuously, even if an illegal instruction is
encountered. Given a well-formed CAP state, however, we can prove that it satises:2
Theorem 4.1 (CAP Soundness)
For any safety policy SP and state S, if `SP S then (1) SP(S) and (2) ` SP Stepn(S) for all
integers n  0.
Proof sketch The proof is very straightforward: (1) the CAP inference rules ensure that
SP holds on every well-formed state, and (2) by induction on the well-formed command
sequence judgment. 
For the purposes of FPCC, we are interested in obtaining safety proofs in the context
of our policy as described in Section 2.2.3. For this chapter, I again dene the basic safety
policy as requiring that the machine always be at a valid instruction:
BasicSP(M;R;pc) = (Dc(M(pc)) 6= illegal)
2An even stronger statement of CAP soundness can be made, as given in [97] but I do not need it for my
development here.
72It is fairly straightforwardto showthat any well-formed CAP statewill be safe accord-
ing to this policy. That is, no matter what the global SP parameter is instantiated to (e.g.
it could simply be a trivial True predicate), the CAP inference rules at a minimum will
enforce the basic safety policy:
Lemma 4.2 For any SP, if ` SP S then BasicSP(S).
Proof Follows directly from examination of the well-formedness rules. Since there is no
rule for checking an illegal command, we know that the current command is not that,
since it is well-formed by the top-level rule (CAP-STATE). 
Now, from this lemma and the CAP Soundness theorem, we can derive the following
result for general safety policies:
Theorem 4.3 (CAP Safety)
For any SP and S, if ` SP S then Safe(S; S0:State:SP(S0) ^ BasicSP(S0)) according to the
denition of Safe on page 25.
Proof Directly from Lemma 4.2 and CAP Soundness. 
Threading an arbitrary SP through the typing rules is a novel feature not found in the
initial version of CAP [97]. In that case, there was no way to specify that an arbitrary
safety policy beyond BasicSP (which essentially provides type safety) must hold at every
step of execution. For this chapter, I will actually not make use of this feature but in the
next chapter, I will show how it is used with a more realistic and complex FPCC safety
policy.
From now on, I will write CAP judgment forms with a bulleted placeholder (`  S) to
indicate the use of a trivial global safety predicate (S:True) for SP.
Thus, to produce an FPCC package we just need to prove that the initial machine
state is well-formed in CAP with respect to the desired safety policy. This provides a
structured method for constructing FPCC packages in our logic. However, programming
and reasoningin CAP is still much toolow-level for thepractical programmer. Weneedto
73provide a method for compiling programs from a higher-level language and type system
to CAP. The main purpose of programming directly in CAP will then be to glue code
together from different source languages and to semi-automatically certify particularly
low-level libraries such as memory management, threads, etc.. In the next few sections, I
present a conventional typed assembly language and show how to compile it to CAP.
Coq code: The denition of CAP and the proved theorems of this section are in the
le captis.v.
4.2 The Code Pointer Problem
Before going on to a typed assembly language, let us try to understand one of the dif-
culties that arise when trying to use a Hoare logic-based framework to certify low-level
machine code. Consider the following annotated CAP code blocks that may be part of a
larger set of code making up a program or a system library:
23: { R(r0) > 0 }
movi r2, 9;
{ R(r0) > 0 /\ R(r2) = 9 }
. . .
{ R(r2) > 9 }
jd 52
52: { R(r2) > 5 }
. . .
{ R(r0) = R(r2) /\ R(r2) > 10 }
jd 78
78: { R(r2) > 8 }
. . .
{ R(r0) = 7 }
jd 23
The relevant part of the CAP code specication is composed from the preconditions
of these code blocks:
 = { 23:{ R(r0) > 0 }, 52:{ R(r2) > 5 }, 78:{ R(r2) > 8 }, ... }
74It is easy enough to verify these code blocks because the control ow only involves
direct jumps. Now, suppose instead of jd 52, the last command of the rst block was
jmp r5; i.e. register r5 contains a pointer to a continuation. It may be that r5 holds either
the address 52 or 78. Now, it is a bit more tricky to see how one would verify correctness
of this jump. One immediate option is to have the precondition of the jump to r5 specify
all the possible targets of the jump:
23: { R(r0) > 0 }
. . .
{ R(r2) > 9 /\ (R(r6) = 52 \/ R(r6) = 78) }
jmp r6
Then we would verify that the precondition (or postcondition) of the jump is stronger
thanthepreconditionsofall thepossibletargets. Oneobviousproblemwiththisapproach
is that it requires analysis of the whole program in order to determine all possible targets
of suchindirect jumps. While thismight be easilyenoughdone,it is notappropriateif this
codeis supposedtobe usedas a runtime library. Wedonotwant tohave torecomputethe
return targets of library code, in order to form new preconditions, each time it is linked
with a newly compiled source language program. Basically, when verifying library code,
we would like a natural way to do so without worrying about the user code with which
it will interact.
In order to achieve this modularity, one possibility could be to introduce an abstract
predicate, codeptr, to be used in the Hoare logic assertions. Thus, we could have a pre-
condition like:
23: { R(r0) > 0 }
. . .
{ R(r2) > 9 /\ codeptr( R(r6), { R(r2) > 5 } ) }
jmp r6
stating that the value in register r6 is a code pointer whose precondition requires the
value in r2 be greater than 5. The difculty then is how to keep the reasoning about the
codeptr predicates consistent. Since these predicates will appear within the denition of
75, we cannot dene codeptr(w,P) as meaning (w) = P because that would introduce
a circularity in the denition. One might imagine trying to add additional inference rules
to CAP for the jmp rule and the top-level rules that tie together the use of codeptr as
an abstract predicate, but I have not been able to achieve that. Furthermore, there is the
complication of mutually recursive code. Consider the case where the code pointer in
r6 above may itself perform an indirect jump through a register back to location 23. Not
only will the code pointerpredicates be nested,theyrequire a recursive typebecause each
depends on the other.
The solution I have adopted for my purposes, based on that introduced in [97, 98], is
to take advantage of the fact that our CAP language is in fact embedded in a higher-order
logic. Thus, when verifying a CAP code block such as 23 above, I quantify over the code
specication and precondition with an assumption that the postcondition will meet the
requirements of the indirect jump. For example, the block:
23: { Pre } // R(r0) > 0
C; // command list
{ Post } // R(r2) > 9
jmp r6
wouldactually becertiedinCAPusingthejudgmentform(assumingsomesafetypolicy,
SP):
 ` SP fPregC;jmp r6
Now, instead of directly certifying the code like this, where the simple precondition
will not be sufcient to handle the indirect jump, I prove this judgment in CAP as the
following lemma:
8;P: P ) Pre ^ (9Q: (R(r6)) = Q ^ Post ) Q) (1)
!  ` SP fPgC;jmp r6
The quantied predicate P here implies the necessary precondition of the code block
76itself, as well as the fact that there is a code pointer in the return register whose precondi-
tion is satised by Post.3
Now, this is only half the story. It allows us to verify the indirect jump of a single
code block, but when linking a whole program together, we have to provide a concrete
predicate for P. Again, P can be instantiated using a disjunction of all possible targets of
the jump, just like our earlier concrete precondition:
{ R(r2) > 9 /\ (R(r6) = 52 \/ R(r6) = 78) }
We are left with the premise of the lemma (1) above which is to show that this instan-
tiation of P satises the necessary conditions on the return code pointer. This can again
easily be done by analysis over the various cases of the disjunction.
So far, we have somewhat improved modularity of the certication process since the
code block itself is veried independent of its actual targets. While this approach may be
sufcient for verifying the actual code blocks of a runtime library (as shown in [97, 98]),
when compiling from a higher-level type system, we still need a way to link together the
code pointers of the high-level type system (and their associated type interfaces) with the
low-level CAP preconditions of the library code. For this purpose,I leverage my syntactic
approach to certied code in order to provide an automatic method of linking compiled
source programs from a type system to library code certied safe using the Hoare logic
based inference systemof CAP. Details of how this is done are contained in the remainder
of this chapter.
Asabriefoverview,theideaistoinstantiatethepredicateP withaninvariant basedon
Invof thepreviouschapter(Section3.2.2). Fortheexampleabove, wecouldusesomething
like: S: 9P : program: (` P :  ) ^ (P  ) S). The program P is not completely abstract
here but is constrained by the TAL type   for which this program must be well-formed in
order to show the necessary premise of lemma (1) above.   in this case would be a TAL
code type such as fr0 : int>0;r6 : 8[fr2 : int>9g]g (assuming a fancier TAL type system
which tracks integer values). By reasoning (syntactically) over the properties of the type
3P ) Q is dened as 8S:P(S) ! Q(S).
77system, we would be able to show that this invariant implies the necessary precondition
Pre of the code block, and it also enforces the correctness of the indirect jump. To show
the latter, we actually need to know more about the formation of the entire CAP code
specication e.g. , that its preconditions are consistent with the TAL code types. Details
and an example of how the complete CAP code specication is generated when linking
compiled TAL code to certied CAP code are given in Sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4.
Using the method outlined in the last few paragraphs, I am able to verify runtime
library code in CAP independent of the source language type system or other code that
it interacts with. Furthermore, use of syntactic type system-based invariants allows the
safety proof of compiled source code to automatically link with the proof of these certi-
edCAP codeblocks, oncethenecessarylemmas suchas (1) above have beenestablished.
4.3 Extensible Typed Assembly Language with Runtime System
In this section, I introduce an extensible typed assembly language (XTAL), again based
on that of Morrisett et al. [52]. After presenting the full syntax of XTAL, I give here only
a brief overview of its static and dynamic semantics,4 since it is very similar to FTAL
in the previous chapter, except for the addition of primitive arrays, a newpair macro
instruction, and stub values in the code heap. The data and code portions of the heap
have also been separated in XTAL and it uses pairs instead of the more general tuples of
FTAL.
4.3.1 Syntax
To simplify the presentation, XTAL's types (see Figure 4.3) involve only integers, pairs,
and integer arrays. (I have extended the Coq prototype implementation to include ex-
istential, recursive, and polymorphic code types.) The code type 8[ ] describes a code
pointer that expects a register le satisfying  . The register le type assigns types to the
4Chapter 5 gives the gory details of a more realistic variant of XTAL.
78word values in each register and the heap type keeps track of the heap values in the data
heap. I have separated the code and data heaps at this level of abstraction because the
code heap will remain unchanged throughout the execution of a program.
Unlike many conventional TALs, my language supports stub values in its code
heap. These are placeholders for code that will be linked in later from another source
(outside the XTAL system). Primitive macro instructions that might be built into other
TALs, such as array creation and access operations, can be provided as an external library
with interface specied as XTAL types. I have also included a typical macro instruction
for allocating pairs (newpair) in the language. When polymorphic types are added to the
language, this macro instruction could potentially be provided through the external code
interface; however, in general, providing built-in primitives can allow for a richer speci-
cation of the interface where the type system is too limited (see the typing rule for newpair
below).
The abstract state of an XTAL program is composed of code and data heaps, a register
le, and current instruction sequence. Labels are simply integers and the domains of
the code and data heaps are to be disjoint. Besides the newpair operation, the arithmetic,
memory access, and control ow instructions of XTAL correspond directly to those of the
machine dened in 2.1. The movl instruction is constrained to refer only to code heap
labels. Note that programs are written in continuation passing style; thus every code
block ends with some form of jump to another location in the code heap.
4.3.2 Static and Dynamic Semantics
The dynamic (operational) semantics of the XTAL abstract machine is dened by a set of
rules of the form P 7! P0. This evaluation relation is entirely standard (as in Figure 3.2)
except that the case when jumping to a stub value in the code heap is not handled. The
complete rules are omitted here.
For the static semantics, I dene a set of judgments as illustrated in Figure 4.4. Only
79(type)  ::= int j array j  0   1 j 8[ ]
(reg le type)   ::= fr0: 0;:::;rn: ng
(heap type) 	 ::= fl0: 0;:::;ln: ng
(label) l ::= 0 j 1 j :::
(register) r ::= r0 j r1 j ::: j r7
(word val) v ::= l j i
(code heap val) h ::= code [ ]:I j stub [ ]:;
(heap val) h ::= [i0;:::;in] j hv0;v1i
(instr)  ::= add rd;rs;rt j movi rd;i j movl rd;l j ld rd;rs(i)
j st rd(i);rs j newpair rd[ 0; 1]
(instr seq) I ::= ;I j jd l j jmp r
(code heap) C ::= fl0 7! h0;:::;ln 7! hng
(data heap) H ::= fl0 7! h0;:::;ln 7! hng
(reg le) R ::= fr0 7! v0;:::;rn 7! vng
(program) P ::= (C;H;R;I)
Figure 4.3: XTAL syntax.
a few of the critical XTAL typing rules are presented here. The top-level typing rule for
XTAL programs requires well-formedness of the code and data heaps, register le, and
current instruction sequence, and that I is somewhere in the code heap:
` C ` H : 	 C;	 ` R :   C;  ` I
9l 2 Dom(C): C(l) = code [ 
0]:I0 and I tail I0
` (C;H;R;I)
(PROG)
Heap and register le typing dependson the well-formedness of the elements in each.
Stub values are simply assumed to have the specied code type. From the instruction
typing rules, we show below the rules for newpair, jd, and jmp. The newpair instruction
expects initialization values for the newly allocated space in registers r0 and r1 and a
pointer to the new pair is put in rd.
80Judgment Meaning
`  0   1  0 is a register le subtype of  1
` (C;H;R;I) (C;H;R;I) is a well-formed program
`C C is a well-formed code heap
`H:	 H is a well-formed data heap of type 	
C;	 ` R:  R is a well-formed reg. le of type  
C `h cdval h is a well-formed code heap value
	 `h: hval h is a well-formed data heap value of type 
	 ` v: v is a well-formed word value of type 
C;  `I I is a well-formed instruction sequence
Figure 4.4: Static judgments.
C;  `I
C `code [ ]:I cdval
(CODE) C `stub [ ]:; cdval
(STUB)
 (r0) =  0  (r1) =  1 C; frd: 0   1g `I
C;  `newpair rd[ 0; 1];I
(IS-NEWPAIR)
typeof(C(l)) = 8[ 
0] `     
0
C;  `jd l
(IS-JD)
 (r) = 8[ 
0] `     
0
C;  `jmp r
(IS-JMP)
Although the details of the type system are certainly important, the key thing to be
understood here is just that we are able to encode the syntactic judgment forms of XTAL
well-formedness in the FPCC logic and prove soundness in Wright-Felleisen style [93].
We will then refer to these judgments in CAP assertions during the process of proving
machine code safety.
4.3.3 External Code Stub Interfaces
XTAL can pass around pointers to arrays in its data heap but has no built-in operations
for allocating, accessing, or modifying arrays. These are provided through code stubs:
81newarray 7! stub [f r0:int; r1:int; r7:(8[fr0:arrayg]) g]:;
arrayget 7! stub [f r0:array; r1:int; r7:(8[fr0:intg]) g]:;
arrayset 7! stub [f r0:array; r1:int; r2:int; r7:(8[fr0:arrayg]) g]:;
newarray expectsa lengthandinitial value as arguments, allocates and initializes a new
array accordingly, and then jumps to the code pointer in r7. The accessor operations sim-
ilarly expect an array and index arguments and will return to the continuation pointer in
r7 when they have performed the operation. As is usually the case when dealing with
external libraries, the interfaces (code types) dened above do not provide a complete
specication of the operations (such as bounds-checking issues). Section 4.4.3 discusses
how we deal with this in the context of the safety of XTAL programs and the nal exe-
cutable machine code.
4.3.4 Soundness
As usual, we need to show that our XTAL type system is sound with respect to the oper-
ational semantics of the abstract machine. This can be done using the standard progress
andpreservationlemmas. However,in thepresenceofcodestubs,thecompletesemantics
of a program is undened, so at this level of abstraction we can only assume that those
typing rules are sound. In the next section, when compiling XTAL programs to the real
machine and linking in code for these libraries and stubs, we will need to prove at that
point that the linked code is sound with respect to the XTAL typing rules. Let us dene
the state when the current XTAL program is jumping to external code:
Denition 4.4 (External call state) Wedenethecurrentinstructionofaprogram, (C;H;R;I),
to be an external call if I 2 fjd l; jmp r; bgt:::; bgti:::g and C(l) = stub [ ]:; or C(R(r)) =
stub [ ]:;, as appropriate.
Now we can state qualied versions of the standard soundness lemmas:
82Theorem 4.5 (XTAL Progress) If ` P and the current instruction of P is not an external
call then there exists P0 such that P 7! P0.
Theorem 4.6 (XTAL Preservation) If ` P and P 7! P0 then ` P0.
Thesetheoremsareprovedbyinductiononthewell-formedinstructionpremise(C;  `
I) of the top level typing rule (` P). Of course the proof of these must be done entirely in
the FPCC logic in which the XTAL language is encoded.
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how to get from these proofs of soundness
directly to the FPCC safety proof. However, now we have an extra level to go through
(the CAP system) in which we will also be linking external code to XTAL programs, and
we must ensure safety of the complete package at the end.
Coq code: axtalp.v contains the denitions and proofs for an alternate version of
XTAL than that presented here. The version in the le does not actually include the
newpair instruction, but it does include primitive arrays as described in this section and
also supports polymorphic code types, some of the details of which are more involved
and will be covered in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.4 Compilation and Linking
In this section I rst dene how abstract XTAL programs will be translated to, and laid
out in, the real machine state (the runtime memory layout). I also dene the necessary
library routines as CAP code (the runtime system). Then, after compiling and linking an
XTAL program to CAP, I must show how to maintain the well-formedness of that CAP
state so that we can apply Theorem 4.3 to obtain the nal FPCC proof of safety.
4.4.1 The Runtime System
In my simple runtime system, memory is divided into three sectionsa static data area
(usedfor global constantsandlibrary datastructures),a read-onlycodearea (which might
83be further divided into subareas for external (E) and program (C) code), and the dynamic
heap area, which can grow indenitely in our idealized machine. I use a data allocation
framework where a heap limit, stored in a xed allocation pointer register,5 designates
a nite portion of the dynamic heap area as having been allocated for use. (The safety
policy could use this to specify the denition of readable and writeable memory.)
4.4.2 Translating XTAL Programs to CAP
I now outline how to construct (compile) an initial CAP machine state from an XTAL
program. Given an initial XTAL program, we need the following (partial) functions or
mappings to produce the CAP state:
 AC : label * Word  a layout mapping from XTAL code heap labels to CAP machine
addresses.
 AD : label * Word  a layout mapping from XTAL data heap labels to CAP machine
addresses. Both the domain and range of the two layout functions should be dis-
joint. I use A without any subscript to indicate the union of the two: A = AC [ AD.
 E : Word * CmdList  Pred  the external (from XTAL's point of view) code blocks
and their CAP preconditions for well-formedness. Proving that these blocks are
well-formed according to the preconditions will be a proof obligation when verify-
ing the safety of the complete CAP state. The range of AC may overlap with the
domain of E  these addresses are the implementation of XTAL code stubs.
With these elements, the translation from XTAL programs to CAP is quite straight-
forward. As in Chapter 3, I describe the translation by a set of relations and associated
inference rules (Figures 4.5 and 4.6). Register les and word values translate fairly di-
rectly between XTAL and the machine. XTAL labels are translated to machine addresses
using the A functions. Every heap value in the code and data heaps must correspond to
5XTAL source programs use fewer registers than the actual machine provides.
84WORD VALUES A ` v ) w
A ` l ) A(l)
(TR-LAB)
A ` i ) i
(TR-INT)
INSTRUCTION SEQUENCES (selected rules) AC ` I ) C
AC ` I ) C
AC ` add rd;rs;rt;I ) add rd;rs;rt;C
(TR-ADD)
AC ` I ) C
AC ` movi rd;i;I ) movi rd;i;C
(TR-MOVI)
AC(l) = w AC ` I ) C
AC ` movl rd;l;I ) movi rd;w;C
(TR-MOVL)
AC(l) = w
AC ` jd l ) jd w
(TR-JD)
AC ` I ) C
AC ` newpair rd[ 0; 1];I ) Cnewp;C
(TR-NEWPAIR)
HEAP VALUES AC ` h ) W A ` h ) W
AC ` I ) C C = Map(Dc;W)
AC ` code [ ]:I ) W
(TR-CODE)
A ` [i0;:::;in] ) n;i0;:::;in
(TR-ARRAY)
A ` vi ) wi i 2 f0;1g
A ` hv0;v1i ) w0;w1
(TR-PAIR)
where
Cnewp = mov rd;rap;addi rap;rap;2;st rd(0);r0;st rd(1);r1
Figure 4.5: XTAL to CAP translation (1 of 2).
85REGISTER FILE, HEAPS, AND PROGRAM
A ` R(r) ) R(r) for all r 2 Dom(R)
A ` R ) R
(TR-RF)
AC ` C(l) ) W Flatten(W;M;AC(l)) for all l 2 Dom(C)
AC ` C ) M
(TR-CHEAP)
A ` H(l) ) W Flatten(W;M;A(l)) for all l 2 Dom(H)
AD(l) + length(W) < R(rap) DLytConsist(AD;H)
A;R ` H ) M
(TR-HEAP)
AC ` C ) M A ` H )R M
A;R ` (C;H) ) M
(TR-HEAPS)
A;R ` (C;H) ) M A ` R ) R AC ` I ) W Flatten(W;M;pc)
9l:C(l) = code [ ]:I0 ^ I tail I0 ^ pc=AC(l) + jI0j   jIj
8w 2 Dom(E):Flatten(Fst(E(w));M;w)
CLytConsist(AC;AD;C;E)
E;A ` (C;H;R;I) ) (M;R;pc)
(TR-PROG)
where
CLytConsist(AC;AD;C;E) = onetoone(AC) ^ Dom(AC) = Dom(C)
^ Dom(AC) \ Dom(AD) = ;
^ C(l) = code [ ]:I ! AC(l) = 2 Dom(E)
^ C(l) = stub [ ]:; ! AC(l) 2 Dom(E)
DLytConsist(AD;H) = 8l;l0 2 Dom(H): (l 6= l0 ^ A ` H(l) ) W)
! (AD(l) + length(W) < AD(l0))
Figure 4.6: XTAL to CAP translation (2 of 2).
86an appropriately translated sequence of words in memory. All XTAL instructions trans-
late directly to a single machine command except newpair which translates to a series of
commands that adjust the allocation pointer to make space for a new pair and then copy
the initial values from r0 and r1 into the new space. The stubs in the XTAL code heap
translation are handled in the top-level translation rule (when E is Flatten'ed).
Thetop-levelrules(Figure4.6) alsoenforce thesetofnecessaryconsistencyconstraints
on the layout functions and external code blocks. CLytConsist ensures (1) that the code
layout mapping is one-to-one,6 (2) that the domains of the code heap and the code heap
mapping are exactly the same, (3) the code heap and data heap labels are distinct, and (4)
that the external code library does not provide code for those addresses that are already
associated with XTAL blocks. DLytConsist simply ensures that all data heap entities will
be mapped to non-overlapping sections of memory.
4.4.3 Generating the CAP Proofs
In this section I proceed in a top-down manner by rst stating the main theorem we need
to establish. The theorem says that for a given runtime system, any well-typed XTAL
program that compiles and links to the runtime will result in an initial machine state that
is well-formed according to the CAP typing rules. Applying Theorem 4.3, we would then
be able to produce an FPCC package certifying the safety of the initial machine state.
Theorem 4.7 (XTAL-CAP Safety Theorem) For some specied external code
environment E, and for all P and A, if ` P (in XTAL) and E;A ` P ) S, then `  S (in
CAP, recalling that  indicates a trivial global safety predicate).
To prove that the CAP state is well-formed (using the (CAP-STATE) rule, Figure 4.2),
we need a code heap specication, , and a top-level precondition, P, for the command
sequence at the current program counter. The code specication is generated as follows:
6Such a strong constraint might not be strictly necessary but it makes the proofs easier, because one does
not have to worry about the case of two distinct XTAL code heap values, with potentially different types,
mapping to the same CAP code.
87 = CpGen(E;AC;C), where
CpGen(E;AC;C)(w)
=
8
> <
> :
CpInv(AC;C; ) if w = 2 Dom(E) and 9l:AC(l) = w ^ C(l) = (code [ ]:I)
Snd(E(w)) if w 2 Dom(E)
That is, for external code blocks, the precondition comes directly from E, while for
code blocks that have been compiled from XTAL, the CAP preconditions are constructed
by the following predicate generator:
CpInv(AC;C; ) = S:9AD;	;H;R: (`C) ^ (`H:	) ^ (C;	 ` R: )
^ (A;S:R ` (C;H) ) S:M) ^ (A ` R ) S:R)
For any given program, the code heap and layout (C and AC) must be unchanged,
therefore they are global parameters of these predicate generators. CpInv captures the fact
that at a particular machine state there is a well-typedXTAL memory and registerle that
syntactically corresponds to it. We only need to specify the register le type as an argu-
ment to CpInv because the XTAL typing rules for the well-formed register le and heap
will imply all the necessary restrictions on the data heap structure. One of the main in-
sights of this work is the denition of CpInv, which allows us to both establish a syntactic
invariant on CAP machine statesas well as denethe interface betweenXTAL and library
code at the CAP level. CpInv is based on a similar idea as the global invariant dened in
the previous chapter but instead of a generic, monolithic safety proof using the syntactic
encoding of the type system, CpInv makes clear what the program-specic preconditions
are for each command (instruction) and allows for relatively easy manipulation and rea-
soning thereupon, as well as interaction with other type system-based invariants.
Returning to the proof of Theorem 4.7, if we dene the top-level precondition of the
(CAP-STATE) rule to be CpInv(AC;C; ), then it is trivially satised on the initial state S by
the premises of the theorem. We now have to show well-formedness of the code at the
current program counter,  `  fPgC, and, in fact, proofs of the same judgment form must
88be provided for each of the code blocks in the heap, according to the (CAP-CDSPEC) rule.
The correctness of the CAP code memory is shown by the theorem:
Theorem 4.8 (XTAL-CAP Code Heap Safety) For a specied E, and for any XTAL
program state (C;H;R;I), layout functions A, and machine state (M;R;pc), such that
` (C;H;R;I) and E;A ` (C;H;R;I) ) (M;R;pc), if  = CpGen(E;AC;C), then `  M : .
This depends in turn on the proof that each well-typed XTAL instruction sequence
translated to machine commands will be well-formed in CAP under CpInv:
Theorem 4.9 (XTAL-CAP Instruction Safety) For a specied E, and for all AC, C, I,  ,
and C (where  = CpGen(E;AC;C)), if (a) C;  `I and (b) AC ` I ) C, then (c)
 `  fCpInv(AC;C; )gC.
Proof sketch The proof proceeds by induction on I. I outline here the proof of three
cases. The complete proof, especially the mechanized one, is of course somewhat
involved so I try here to just cover the high-level, intuitive ideas.
Case movl rd;l;I0: From (a) and inversion on the typing rule for movl we can derive that
typeof(C(l)) = 8[ 0] and 	; frd:8[ 0]g `I0. Then from (b) and rule (TR-MOVL), we get
AC(l) = w, AC ` I ) C0, and C = movi rd;w;C0.
We can now apply (CAP-PURE) with Q = CpInv(AC;C; frd:8[ 0]g). The premises of
(CAP-PURE) require that we show three premises hold - that Q holds on Step(S), that
SP(S), and that C0 is well-formed under Q. The latter follows by the induction
hypothesis. Our global safety predicate here is trivial (SP = S:True). Thus, the
remaining obligation is to show that given CpInv(AC;C; )(S) and the fact that the
current CAP command is a movi command, then Q(Step(S)). The state of our proof here
can be illustrated as follows:
89` Pmovl
(translate) +3 S
(
S
t
e
p
) 
(?)
translate ?
+3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Step(S)
That is, CpInv essentially captures the proposition that a well-formed XTAL program
translates to a CAP state.7 By the premise of this theorem, we have the top arrow in the
diagram above, and by our instantiation of Q, we must provide an XTAL program (or at
least the heap and register le) to ll in the question mark and show that it corresponds
to the new CAP state. Just as in the previous chapter, the idea is to use the formalized
XTAL soundness lemmas to obtain a well-typed XTAL program to ll in the question
mark. Then, the diagram above becomes very similar to that of Figure 3.10. In this case,
however, we don't explicitly care about the relationship between the two XTAL
programs. This part of the proof now has the same structure as the Preservation proof
described in Section 3.2.3.
Case newpair rd[ 0; 1];I0: I will outline this case diagrammatically. Translating a single
XTAL new pair instruction, we get a sequence of four machine commands. Thus,
consider the following gure:
7Actually CpInv does not use the complete judgment ` P, only the well-formedness of the heaps and
register le, but I abuse the notation in these diagrams for the sake of conciseness.
90` Pnewpair
(translate) +3 S0
(
S
t
e
p
) 
Q1(?)
(?) +3 S1
(
S
t
e
p
) 
. . .
(
S
t
e
p
) 
Q4(?)
translate ?
+3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Step 4(S0)
As in the previous case, we are able to determine by the semantics of the XTAL new pair
operation and the CAP commands implementing it that, in fact, the last predicate of the
sequence can be
Q4 = CpInv(AC;C; frd: (r0)   (r1)g)
because we have ended up in a state where the destination register is now pointing to a
pair in memory. Notice that unlike the previous case, when we need to instantiate the
new heap and heap type of the Q4 predicate (expanding the denition of CpInv), they
will now be instantiated with modied versions to reect that the XTAL data memory
now contains a new pair in it.
Now the question remains as to the intermediate pre/post-conditions. A simple way to
deal with these is to thread along the relationship between Pnewpair and the initial CAP
state, keeping track of updates in each step. So, each of the predicates, for i 2 f1;2;3g,
will be of the form:
Qi = Si: 9S: CpInv(AC;C; )(S) ^ Si = updi(S)
At each step, I keep track of the changes made so far from the original CAP state that
corresponded to a XTAL program with a current newpair instruction. The updi function,
91describing the updates to the new state, can be simply generated from the strongest
postcondition given the current CAP command. By the fourth command, the update
function will have described the appropriate changes to memory and register le to
allow the CAP machine state to once again correspond to the next well-formed XTAL
program state and instruction sequence.
Case jd l: By examination of the translation rules, we know here that C = jd w where
AC(l) = w. Also, by inversion on the XTAL typing rule (IS-JD), we get that
typeof(C(l)) = 8[ 0]. It follows therefore that either C(l) = code [ 0]:I0 for some I0, or else
C(l) = stub [ 0]:;. In the rst case, we are jumping to other XTAL code; in the second, we
are jumping to code external to the actual XTAL program. We have to apply the (CAP-JD)
rule to prove the well-formedness of C. This mainly requires showing that there exists
some Q0 to which (w) is mapped8 such that Q0(Step(S)).
In the rst subcase, let Q0 = CpInv(AC;C; 0). We know that
(w) = CpInv(AC;C; 0) = Q0 by the denition of CpGen (page 88) and the fact that
AC(l) = w and C(l) = code [ 0]:I0. Since the Q0 here has the form of a CpInv predicate, the
reasoning for the remainder of this subcase follows the two previous instruction cases,
where we are just lling in pieces of the diagram.
In the second subcase, we can determine from the translation (see the CLytConsist
predicate in Figure 4.6) that AC(l) 2 Dom(E). Thus, let Q0 = Snd(E(w)). Now, to show
that Q0 is satised by the jump command, we use the result of Proof Obligation 4.11
below. Proof Obligation 4.11 enforces that the XTAL type specication of an external
code block is consistent with its actual precondition in E. Thus, we are once again
returned to showing that the CpInv predicate holds after the jump. Notice that CpInv does
not require anything of the program counter or current instruction sequence so in this
case of a jump command, CpInv(AC;C; 0)(S) ! CpInv(AC;C; 0)(Step(S)).
Hence, one of the main components for each case of this theorem's proof is to show that
8Actually (w) maps to a pair (n;Q
0) but I ignore the n here.
92a correspondence similar to that of Figure 3.10 holds. 
Finally, establishing the theorems above dependson satisfying some proof obligations
with respect to the external library code and its interfaces as specied at the XTAL level.
First, we mustshowthat the external library codeis well-formed according toits supplied
preconditions:
Proof Obligation 4.10 (External Code Safety) For a given E, if  = CpGen(E;AC;C) for
any AC and C, then  `  fSnd(E(w))gFst(E(w)), for all w 2 Dom(E).
For now, we assume that the proofs of this lemma are constructed semi-automatically
using the rules for well-formedness of CAP commands. This lemma is utilized in the
proof of Theorem 4.8.
Secondly, when linking the external code with a particular XTAL program, where cer-
tain labels of the XTAL code heap are mapped to external code addresses, we have to
show that the typing environment that would hold at any XTAL program that is jumping
to that label implies the actual precondition of that external code:
Proof Obligation 4.11 (Interface Correctness) For a given E, AC, and C, and for all l such
that C(l) = stub [ ]:; and AC(l) = w, if CpInv(AC;C; )(S) then Snd(E(w))(S).
These properties must be proved for each instantiation of the runtime system E. With
them, the proofs of Theorems 4.9, 4.8, and, nally, 4.7 can be completed.
4.4.4 arrayget Example
Asa concreteexample ofthe processdiscussedin theforegoingsubsection,let usconsider
arrayget. The XTAL type interface is dened in Section 4.3.3. A CAP machine implemen-
tation of this function could be:
Caget = [ld r8;r0(0); addi r1;r1;1; bgt r1;r8;bnderr; add r0;r0;r1; ld r0;r0(0); jmp r7]
93The runtime representation of an array in memory is a length eld followed by the actual
array of data. We assume that there is some exception handling routine for out-of-bounds
accesses with a trivial precondition dened by E(bnderr) = (Cbnderr;Qbnderr).
Before describing the CAP assertions for the safety of Caget, notice that the code re-
turns indirectly to an XTAL function pointer. Similarly, the arrayget address can be passed
around in XTAL programs as a rst-class code pointer. While the syntactic type system
handles thesecode pointers quite easily using the relevant XTAL types,dealing with code
pointers in a Hoare logic-based setup like CAP requires a little bit of machinery.
We can thus proceed to directly dene the precondition of Caget as,
Qaget = CpInv(AC;C;f r0:array; r1:int; r7:(8[fr0:intg]) g)
for some AC and C. Then we certify the library code in CAP by providing a derivation
of ( `  fQagetgCaget) . We do this by applying the appropriate rules from Figure 4.2 to
track the changes that are made to the state with each command. When we reach the
nal jump to r7, we can then show that CpInv(AC;C;fr0 : intg) holds, which must be the
precondition specied for the return code pointer by (S:R(r7)) (see the denition of  in
the beginning of Section 4.4.3). The problem with this method of certifying arrayget, how-
ever, is that we have explicitly included details about the source language type system
in its preconditions. In order to make the proof more generic, while at the same time be
able to leverage the syntactic type system for certifying code pointers, I follow a similar
approach as in [97]: First, I dene generic predicates for the pre- and postconditions, ab-
stractingoveran arbitrary externalpredicate,Paget. Theactual requirementsofthearrayget
code are minimal (for example, that the memory area of the array is readable according
to the safety policy). The post-condition predicate relates the state of the machine upon
exiting the code block to the initial entry state:
94Pre = Paget:S: Paget(S) ^ SafeToRead(S:M; S:R(r0); S:R(r1)+1)
Post = (M;R;pc): (M0;R0;pc0): M0 = M ^ pc0 = S:R(r7)
^ R0(r0) = M(R(r0)+R(r1)+1) ^ :::
Now we certify the arrayget code block, quantifying over all Paget and complete code
specications , but imposing some appropriate restrictions on them:
8;Paget: (bnderr) = Qbnderr ^ (8S;S0:Pre(Paget)(S) ^ Post(S)(S0) ! (S:R(r7))(S0))
!  ` SP fPre(Paget)gCaget
Thus, under the assumption that the Pre predicate holds, we can again apply the in-
ference rules for CAP commands to show the well-formedness of the Caget code. When
we reach the nal jump, we show that the Post predicate holds and then use that fact with
the premise of the formula above to show that it is safe to jump to the return code pointer.
Thearrayget codecan thusbe certiedindependentof any typesystem,byintroducing
the quantied Paget predicate. Now, when we want to use this as an external function for
XTAL programs, we instantiate Paget with Qaget above. We have to prove the premise of
the formula above, (8S;S0:Pre(Qaget)(S) ^ Post(S)(S0) ! (S:R(r7))(S0)). Proving this is
not difcult, because we use propertiesof the XTAL type system to show that from a state
satisfying the precondition i.e. there is a well-formed XTAL program whose register le
satises the arrayget typeinterface the changes described by the Post predicate will result
in a state to which there does correspond another well-formed XTAL program, one where
the register r0 is updated with the appropriate element of the array.
Hence, we can let E(arrayget) = (Caget;Pre(Qaget)) and we have satised Proof Obliga-
tion 4.10. Proof Obligation 4.11 follows almost directly given the denition of Qaget.
954.5 Summary
I have shown in this chapter thedesignof a typedassembly language supportingforeign
function calls to external code. Programs written in this language will be safe if the
external code operates according to the type specication. I have then shown how to
certify the external (or runtime library) codeindependentof the source language. In order
to handle code pointers, I simply assume their safety as a premise; then, when using the
library with a particular source language type system, instantiate with a syntactic well-
formedness predicate in the form of CpInv and use the facilities of the type system for
checking code pointers to prove the safety of indirect jumps.
By associating typed assembly language programs with the compiled machine code
state, in a purely syntactic manner, a large part of the safety proof has the same struc-
ture as the FPCC Preservation and Progress lemmas discussed in the previous chapter.
However, by inserting the CAP specication language between the type system and the
compiled machine code, I have been able to break the global invariant of the previous
chapter into more local invariants, allowing greater control over integration with external
code. Although I have not demonstrated the interoperation of code from two different
type systems in the current work, the same approach can be used to achieve certied
interoperability between code compiled from different high-level type systems.
In the next chapter, I describe an application of this approach to a more realistic type
system  one that uses regions and capabilities to manage memory allocation and deallo-
cation.
96Chapter 5
A Certied Memory-Management
Framework
Most, if not all, software systems need to provide facilities for memory reuse. In the pre-
vious chapters, we have seen languages which only support allocation of memory. Since
the ideal machine I am working with has an innite memory, this does not cause any
problems. However, in real machines, the amount of memory is nite and there must be
mechanisms to allocate areas of memory for use in a computation, and then free them for
reuse after the computation is nished.
One way to categorize memory management schemes is into implicit and explicit
frameworks. The latter would t well with the languages I have presented in the earlier
chapters and usually consists of having a runtime garbage collector. In such a frame-
work, the programmer only worries about allocating new memory. Whenever a request
is made for a new object in memory, the runtime system checks to see if there is enough
memory to satisfy the request. If there is not enough memory left, then the garbage col-
lector looks through all the previously allocated objects to determine which of them are
garbage  that is, unreachable from a set of root pointers (usually the registers). The
collector then automatically frees the space being consumed by the unreachable objects
and tries again to satisfy the request for a new object. This collection does not need to
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of when to run the collector [91] and how to manage used and free memory areas [92].
Addinga garbage collector to theXTALlanguage in theprevious chapter, for instance,
would require that an XTAL newpair instruction translate to a sequence of commands that
check if there is enough memory for the new object, and if not then a call to a garbage
collector would be made. Adding this to the XTAL runtime library would then require
certing the safety of the entire collector. While this is doable (as results by [10] indicate),
it is quite an undertaking and I have chosen to take a simpler rst step for this thesis.
An alternative to using implicit memory management schemes is to allow the pro-
grammer explicit control, through language constructs and the runtime system, over the
allocation and deallocation of objects in memory. The C language offers this facility
through malloc and free system calls. However, the C runtime system is generally
not certied correct and certainly the C language type system does not ensure that these
functions are used properly by programmers. One approach that has been developed to
provide type safe memory management is that of region-based type systems [80, 81, 85].
In this chapter, I adopt a region-based memory management framework for the typed
assembly languages presented in previous chapters. The actual primitives for manag-
ing regions will be provided as an external runtime library, while the type system of the
language, RgnTAL, provides facilities for tracking the use of regions.
The type system I use for RgnTAL is essentially the capability calculus of Walker, et
al. [85]. In the following sections, I will present the syntax and semantics, along with
details of the Coq encoding. I will then discuss the translation from well-typed RgnTAL
programs to certied CAP machine code, which follows the same structure as the dis-
cussion in Section 4.4. I will also give some details about the implementation of one of
the region management primitives, which has been completely certied in Coq. At the
time of writing this thesis, the other main primitive is still in the process of being certied
correct using the proof assistant.
This chapter does not introduce any new features to the theoretical framework devel-
98oped in the previous two chapters. What it does is demonstrate the technical details of a
complete development using a more realistic example of a typed assembly language and
runtime system.
5.1 Typed Assembly Language with Regions
5.1.1 RgnTAL Syntax
The syntax of my region-based typed assembly language is given in Figure 5.1. Note,
this region-based TAL is not a new contribution, since [75, 85] have already designed
such a system, although its details have not been published. However, as with FTAL,
my contribution is the encoding of this system in a formal logic, along with the proofs of
soundness,and the provision of a certied runtime library implementing the region-based
memory management primitives. In previous works, the region primitives have still been
part of the trusted computing base.
Terms. Beginning from the bottom of Figure 5.1, the abstract machine state of RgnTAL
is made up of a static code memory and a dynamic program state. As in XTAL, the code
memory maps code labels, f, to either code blocks (sequences of instructions) or stubs.
The code types are now a bit more complex, to account for polymorphism and capability
constraints, discussed in more detail below. The code memory does not change for the
entire execution of a program.
The dynamic program state is made up of a data memory, register le, and current
instruction sequence. The data memory is a nite mapping of region names, , to heap
regions, where a region is a block of memory in which a collection of individual objects
maybestored. Regionswill becreatedatruntimeusinganewrgnlibraryfunctionanddata
will be allocated within regions using an alloc library function. Furthermore, a freergn
library function will allow regionsto be deletedfrom thedata memory(effectively freeing
up space in the data memory for reuse). In this version of the language, I have restricted
the actual data that can be stored in regions (the data heap values) simply to pairs. Data
99(kinds)  ::= Type j Rgn j Cap
(constructors) c ::=  j g j A
(types)  ::=  j int j g handle j h1   2i at g j 8[](A; ) j :
(regions) g ::=  j 
(capabilities) A ::=  j ; j fg1g j fg+g j A 1  A 2 j A
(con. contexts)  ::=  j ;: j ;A
(register le types)   ::= fr0:0;:::;r7: 7g
(region types)  ::= fl0: 0;:::;ln: ng
(memory types) 	 ::= f0:0;:::;n:ng
(labels) l;f ::= 0 j 1 j :::
(user registers) r ::= r0 j r1 j ::: j r7
(word values) v ::= i j :l j f j handle () j v[c] j foldv as
(register le) R ::= fr0 7! v0;:::;r7 7! v7g
(data heap values) h ::= (v1;v2)
(heap region) H ::= fl0 7! h0;:::;ln 7! hng
(data memory) D ::= f0 7! H0;:::;n 7! Hng
(instructions)  ::= add rd;rs;rt j addi rd;rs;i j sub rd;rs;rt j subi rd;rs;i
j mov rd;rs j movi rd;i j movf rd;f j ld rd;rs(i)
j st rd(i);rs j bgt rs;rt;f j bgti rs;i;f j tapp r[c]
j fold r[] j unfold r
(instr. sequences) I ::= ;I j jd f j jmp r
(code heap values) h ::= code [](A; ):I j stub [](A; ):;
(code memory) C ::= ff0 7! h0;:::;f n 7! hng
(program) P ::= (D;R;I)
Figure 5.1: RgnTAL syntax.
100is read from, or stored to, regions using the ld and st instructions.
The word values of the language are integers, data heap addresses given by a pair
of a region name and label (:l), code labels, region handles, type applications, and fold
annotations for recursive data structures. Region names and handles are distinguished
in order to maintain a phase distinction between compile-time and run-time entities. The
names are important at compile-time for they are used to ensure statically that a given
memory address is safe to load or store from. However, they have no run-time signi-
cance. On the other hand, region handles are the run-time data structures necessary to
manipulate regions. The handles are used during allocation, to increment the region's
allocation pointer, and when freeing a region, to return the region memory onto a free list.
(Section 5.3.3 describes the underlying representation of region handles and the library
functions that operate on them.)
Types. At the type level we now have, besides types of kind Type, two other kinds
of constructors  regions and capabilities. The types include type constructor variables,
the basic integer type, the type of region handles, pairs, code types, and recursive types.
Notice that the type of a pair not only gives the type of its two elements but also the
region in which the pair is stored. The code type, which can now be made polymorphic
over types, regions, or capabilities, also species a set of region capabilities, A, which
must be satised before jumping to the code block. I use the metavariables  and  for
variables of kind Rgn and Cap, respectively, and use the metavariable  for type variables
and constructor variables in general. For convenience, the types, regions, and capabilities
are merged into a single syntactic category of constructors, distinguished by kinds.
Type contexts, , keep track of quantied constructor variables as well as bounded
quantication over capability sets. Registerle typesand heap region typesmap registers
and labels, respectively, to types; and the data memory type keeps track of all the regions
in memory. The data memory type maps region names to their types.
Capabilities. The real novelty in the region type system is the presence of capabilities.
Capabilities, A, indicate the set of regions that are currently valid to access and also keep
101track of aliasing information, or more accurately, non-aliasing or uniqueness. For details
of how capabilities are used, I refer the reader to Walker's thesis [84] or [85].
In short, a set of capabilities contains a collection of valid region names, each one
taggedwithoneoftwomultiplicities: fg+g simplyindicatesthecapability toaccessregion
g, while fg1g adds the additional information that g is unique  that is, g is different from
anyotherregionsappearingina setofcapabilities formedusingfg1g. Theuniquenessof a
region is important for the purpose of freeing (deleting) a region from memory, because it
ensuresthat thereare no otherregionhandles in usethat are aliases of theonebeing freed.
Providing the ability to safely free regions is the main purpose of having capabilities in
the RgnTAL type system. Capabilities can also include variables  which indicate access
to an unspecied set of regions.
In order to get a feel for the use of capabilities, I summarize here a series of examples
from [85], modied for the context of my particular version of the region type system.
Suppose we have a function that simply needs to access data values stored in some re-
gions. The type of such a code block could be something like:
8[1;2;](f+
1 g  f+
2 g  ;fr1 : hint  inti at 1; r2 : hint  inti at 2; :::g)
This function is parameterized over two regions (which may or may not be aliased) and
an unspecied set of capabilities. When jumping to this code block, the region variables
1 and 2 may be instantiated with the same region name, or with different region names.
Now, if instead the code block needs to free one of the regions, it will require knowl-
edge that the region variable is unique among the entire set of capabilities. If the region
variable is aliased with another in the set of capabilities, the type system would not be
able to prevent an illegal access to data in that region once the aliased region is freed. So,
for example, suppose the function will want to free the region 1 after processing its data.
102The type must then specify uniqueness:
8[1;2;](f1
1g  f+
2 g  ;f:::g)
In thiscase, it will notbe possibleto instantiate 1 and 2 with thesame region name upon
jumping to this code.
Suppose,instead,thatthecodeblockcreates anewregionandallocates datainitbefore
jumping to its continuation. In that case, the type of the continuation will indicate this:
8[](;f:::; r7 : 8[](f1g  ;fr0 :  handle;r1 : hint  inti at ;:::g)g)
Here,thecontinuationin r7 expectsthecreationof a new,uniqueregion, with thehandle
to that region and a pointer to some data allocated in the region in the registers r0 and r1.
Finally, suppose we hold a unique capability f1g and a code block f has type:
8[1;2](f+
1 g  f+
2 g;f:::; r7 : 8[](f+
1 g  f+
2 g;:::)g)
Since f again does not care about aliasing between 1 and 2, we can instantiate both
variables with . But what if we want to be able to recapture the uniqueness of the region
variable in the continuation of f so that it can be freed later on? It would be too restrictive
to change the strengthen the capability of the continuation in r7 to just f1
1g because then
f would not be able to call it.
We could try using a capability variable to recover the uniqueness information so that
f is given type:
8[1;2;](;f:::; r7 : 8[](;:::)g)
Now, we could instantiate  with the unique capability we hold, f1g, and then f would
be able to call its continuation and the continuation would have the unique capability
necessary to free the region. Unfortunately, now f is unable to actually access any data
103in the regions 1 and 2 because its own capability  is completely abstract  there is no
relationship between the region variables and . The solution to this problem is to use
bounded quantication to relate 1, 2, and . Using this feature, we can give f the type:
8[1; 2; f+
1 g  f+
2 g](;f:::; r7 : 8[](;:::)g)
In this type, we can instantiate 1 and 2 with  and  with f1g. This instantiation
works because f1g  f+
1 g  f+
2 g according to the denition of the subcapability
relation. Furthermore, the continuation will possess the unique capability f1g allowing
it to free the region, and the body of f will be able to access data in the region through
either of the handles, 1 or 2. In general, the bounded quantication allows one to hide
some privileges when jumping to a code block, and then regain those privileges in the
continuation. I have sketched here the intuitive use of regions, capabilities, and bounded
quantication. The precise typing rules for the system will be given later in this chapter,
but again, for complete details the reader is referred to the earlier works on this type
system.
I have included a fuller example of a RgnTAL program to compute pairs of Fibonacci
numbers in Appendix C.
Coq encoding
Figure 5.2 details the denition in the Coq logic of RgnTAL regions and capabilities. Re-
gions are identied with natural numbers (dened inductively), and thus a decidable
equality predicate can be dened for them. I then represent a set of region capabilities as
a function from regions to multiplicities. To model a partial function, I dene three multi-
plicities, one to indicate the lack of a capability (noC) and the other two as discussedin the
previous section. I then encode the denition of capabilities in Figure 5.1 as appropriate
function terms. There is, however, one complication. On paper, it is easy to implicitly re-
quire through denitions of equality and other type system rules that unique capabilities
104(* regions and decidable equality *)
Definition rgn : Set := nat.
Definition beq_rgn : rgn -> rgn -> bool := ...
(* capability multiplicities and decidable equality *)
Inductive accap : Set := noC : accap | uniC : accap | mulC : accap.
Definition beq_accap : accap -> accap -> bool := ...
(* set of capabilities *)
Definition capset := rgn -> accap.
Definition nullcap : capset := fun r => noC.
Definition uniqcap : rgn -> capset
:= fun rk r => if (beq_rgn r rk) then uniC else noC.
Definition multcap : rgn -> capset
:= fun rk r => if (beq_rgn r rk) then mulC else noC.
Definition disjcap : capset -> capset -> Prop :=
fun A1 A2 => forall p, (A1 p = noC) \/ (A2 p = noC).
Definition pluscap : forall (A1 A2:capset), (disjcap A1 A2) -> capset :=
fun A1 A2 D r => if (beq_accap (A1 r) noC) then (A2 r) else
if (beq_accap (A2 r) noC) then (A1 r) else noC.
Definition barcap : capset -> capset
:= fun A r => match (A r) with uniC => mulC | _ => (A r) end.
Figure 5.2: Coq encoding: RgnTAL regions and capabilities
105are not duplicated. We generally need to avoid the situation of having a union of two ca-
pabilities takes place where each capability is for the same, unique region  fg1g  fg1g.1
I have found for my purposes that the most convenient way to work this in the Coq en-
coding, in order to keep the proofs simple, is to syntactically enforce that a union of two
capability setsmaynotmentionduplicateregions. Hencethedenitionofdisjcap,which
is used by pluscap to enforce this syntactic restriction. Every union of two capability sets,
A 1  A 2, must be provided with a proof that the domains of the two sets A1 and A 2 are
disjoint.
Notice that in the Coq encoding I have dened capabilities such that the equalities
which must be axiomatized in [85] are directly derivable in the logic. We shall see this in
the section on RgnTAL static semantics.
The encoding of labels, registers, and RgnTAL types is shown is Figure 5.3. Here,
again, labelsare identiedwithnatural numbers,andregistersaredenedasanappropri-
ate inductive denition. In the inductive denition of type constructors (omega), integer,
region handle, and pair types are dened directly. The encoding of code types, however,
deviates somewhatfrom the presentationin Figure 5.1.2 Tobegin with, I separate the type
constructorsfor polymorphismand thecodetype. Thecode typeconstructor(tcode)sim-
ply species a capability constraint and the expectedtype of the register le. I then have a
number of constructors which provide polymorphism over the various kinds of the type
system. Region and capability polymorphism is handled using a form of higher-order ab-
stract syntax (HOAS).3 However, due to constraints on the shape of inductive denitions
intheCoqlogic,onecannotdeneaconstructorofthetype(omega -> omega) -> omega,
which would be the HOAS encoding of type abstraction. Hence, I have had to use a
rst-order encoding (deBruijn indices) of polymorphism over constructors of kind Type.
The deBruijn index encoding of types utilizes a mirror image denition of omega, called
1Again, to avoid lengthening this thesis beyond its scope, I refer the reader to [84, 85] for a discussion of
why this must be avoided.
2The existence of these discrepancies and the lack of adequacy in the encoding is discussed later in Sec-
tion 6.3.
3See Section 6.2.
106Definition label := nat.
Inductive regt : Set := r0 : regt | r1 : regt | ... | r7 : regt.
Inductive omega : Set :=
| tint : omega (* int *)
| thandle : rgn -> omega (* p handle *)
| tpair : omega -> omega -> rgn -> omega (* t1 x t2 at p *)
| tcode : capset -> (regt -> omega) -> omega (* code A,G *)
| tabsr : (rgn -> omega) -> omega (* \/ p:Rgn. t *)
| tabsc : (capset -> omega) -> omega (* \/ c:Cap. t *)
| tabscb : (capset -> omega) -> capset -> omega (* bounded poly over cap *)
| tabscd : forall (c1 c2:capset), ((disjcap c1 c2) -> omega) -> omega
| tabst : (omegaV 1) -> omega (* \/ t:Type. t' *)
| trec : (omegaV 1) -> omega (* \mu t:Type. t' *).
Inductive constr : Set :=
| c_rgn : rgn -> constr
| c_cap : capset -> constr
| c_disj : forall c1 c2, disjcap c1 c2 -> constr
| c_type : omega -> constr.
Definition rftype : Set := regt -> omega.
Definition rgntype : Set := fmap label omega.
Definition memtype : Set := fmap rgn rgntype.
Figure 5.3: Coq encoding: RgnTAL types
107omegaV, which may have free type variables in the body of type constructors. The encod-
ing keeps track of the maximum number of free type variables using a dependent type.
Hence at the top level of a type abstraction (tabst), only one free type variable may be
introduced, as captured by the denition in Figure 5.3. The details of the deBruijn encod-
ing will be described in Section 6.2. Recursive types (trec) also use the deBruijn index
notation for type variables.
The motivation for having two versions of omega is that during all the proof devel-
opments related to the soundness of RgnTAL and its translation to certied CAP code,
we are always working at the top-level of typing derivations so there are never any free
type variables in the context. Hence, the proofs are much simpler to manage using the
top-level denition of omega dened in Figure 5.3, as opposed to the denition of omegaV
with variables and lift terms described in Section 6.2, where we would continuously have
to eliminate the applicability of those cases.
At the bottom of Figure 5.3 are dened the constructors of the type system (region
names, capabilities, disjunction of capability sets, and types), as well as the register le,
region, and data memory types. fmap is dened as
Definition fmap : Set -> Set -> Set = fun A B => A -> option B
and used to encode partial functions. I have developed a complete library for reasoning
about partial functions using this denition.
Encoding the remainder of RgnTAL syntax is fairly straightforward and is shown in
Figure 5.4. One major difference from the presentation in Figure 5.1 is that there are sep-
arate instructions and word values for handling the different kinds of type application.
Furthermore,having denedthe basic form of instruction sequences,iseq, the ciseqdef-
inition allows themto be parameterized over a set of constructorvariables, corresponding
to the code type in the syntax.
108Inductive wordval : Set :=
| wi : nat -> wordval (* i *)
| wl : rgn -> label -> wordval (* p.l *)
| wf : label -> wordval (* codeptr(f) *)
| wh : rgn -> wordval (* handle(p) *)
| wappr : wordval -> rgn -> wordval (* v[p] *)
| wappc : wordval -> capset -> wordval (* v[A] *)
| wappcd : forall (c1 c2:capset),
wordval -> (disjcap c1 c2) -> wordval
| wappt : wordval -> omega -> wordval (* v[t] *)
| wfold : wordval -> omega -> wordval (* fold v as t *).
Inductive instr : Set :=
| iadd : regt -> regt -> regt -> instr
| iaddi : regt -> regt -> nat -> instr
| imov : regt -> regt -> instr
| imovi : regt -> nat -> instr
| imovf : regt -> label -> instr
| ild : regt -> regt -> nat -> instr
| ist : regt -> nat -> regt -> instr
| ibgt : regt -> regt -> label -> instr
| ibgti : regt -> nat -> label -> instr
| iappr : regt -> rgn -> instr
| iappc : regt -> capset -> instr
| iappcd : forall c1 c2, regt -> (disjcap c1 c2) -> instr
| iappt : regt -> omega -> instr
| ifold : regt -> omega -> instr
| iunfold : regt -> instr.
Inductive iseq : Set :=
| icons : instr -> iseq -> iseq
| ijd : label -> iseq
| ijmp : regt -> iseq.
Inductive ciseq : Set :=
| cibase : iseq -> ciseq
| ciabsr : (rgn -> ciseq) -> ciseq
| ciabsc : (capset -> ciseq) -> ciseq
| ciabsd : forall c1 c2, ((c1 |-| c2) -> ciseq) -> ciseq
| ciabst : (omega -> ciseq) -> ciseq.
Inductive codeval : Set :=
| cvcode : omega -> ciseq -> codeval
| cvstub : omega -> codeval.
Inductive heapval : Set :=
| hvpair : wordval -> wordval -> heapval.
Definition heap := fmap label heapval. (* heap regions *)
Definition datamem := fmap rgn heap.
Definition regfile := regt -> wordval.
Definition codemem := fmap label codeval.
Definition progstate := datamem * regfile * iseq.
Figure 5.4: Coq encoding: RgnTAL abstract machine
109C ` (D;R;I) 7 ! P where
if I = then P =
add rd;rs;rt;I0 (D;Rfrd 7! R(rt) + R(rs)g;I0)
addi rd;rs;i;I0 (D;Rfrd 7! R(rs) + ig;I0)
sub rd;rs;rt;I0 (D;Rfrd 7! R(rt)   R(rs)g;I0)
subi rd;rs;i;I0 (D;Rfrd 7! R(rs)   ig;I0)
mov rd;rs;I0 (D;Rfrd 7! R(rs)g;I0)
movi rd;i;I0 (D;Rfrd 7! ig;I0)
movf rd;f;I0 (D;Rfrd 7! fg;I0)
ld rd;rs(i);I0 (D;Rfrd 7! vig;I0) where R(rs) = :l, i 2 f0;1g,
and D(R(rs)) = (v0;v1)
st rd(i);rs;I0 (DfR(rs) + i 7! h0g;R;I0) where R(rd) = :l, D(R(rd)) = (v0;v1),
and h0 = (R(rs);v1) if i = 0 or h0 = (v0;R(rs)) if i = 1
bgt rs;rt;f;I0 (D;R;I0) when R(rs)  R(rt); and
(D;R;C(f)) when R(rs) > R(rt)
bgti rs;i;f;I0 (D;R;I0) when R(rs)  i; and
(D;R;C(f)) when R(rs) > i
tapp rd[c];I0 (D;Rfrd 7! R(rd)[c]g;I0)
fold rd[];I0 (D;Rfrd 7! foldR(rd)asg;I0)
unfold rd;I0 (D;Rfrd 7! vg;I0) where R(rd) = foldv as
jd f (D;R;I0) where C(f) = code [](A; ):I0
jmp r (D;R;I0) where C(R(r)) = code [](A; ):I0
Figure 5.5: Operational semantics of RgnTAL.
5.1.2 Dynamic Semantics
The operational semantics of RgnTAL is dened in Figure 5.5. There is very little differ-
ence from FTAL or XTAL semantics of previous chapters. Note that I use the notation
D(:l) as an abbreviation for address lookup D()(l). Because the region management
primitives for allocating and freeing regions will be provided as external library func-
tions, the base instruction set and dynamics semantics of RgnTAL is quite simple.
Coq encoding
The encoding of RgnTAL operational semantics is completely straightforward. For each
row of Figure 5.5, there is a constructor of the inductive denition:
110Judgment Meaning
 ` c 1 = c 2 :  constructor equality
 ` A 1  A 2 subcapability relation
C;	 ` v :  well-formed word value
C;	 ` h at  :  well-formed data heap value in region
C;	 ` H at  :  well-formed heap region
C ` D : 	 well-formed data memory
C;	 ` R :   well-formed register le
C;;A;  ` I well-formed instruction sequence
C ` h well-formed code heap value
` C well-formed code memory
	 ` A sat memory typecapability satisability
C;	;A;  ` (D;R) well-formed program state
C ` (D;R;I) well-formed program
Figure 5.6: Static judgments of RgnTAL.
Inductive rt_eval : codemem -> progstate -> progstate -> Prop :=
| ev_iadd
: forall CM DM R IS rd rs rt s t,
let i:=(iadd rd rs rt) in
let R':=(rf_upd R rd (wi (plus s t))) in
(R rs)=(wi s) ->
(R rt)=(wi t) ->
(rt_eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM, R', IS))
| ...
5.1.3 Static Semantics
As in previous chapters, the static semantics of RgnTAL is dened by a series of typ-
ing judgments, summarized in Figure 5.6. Since I am encoding the denition of Rgn-
TAL within the Coq logic, I delegate the judgment of constructor equality to the built-in
equality of the logic. However, since I use a HOAS-inspired encoding for some of the
type constructors and partial functions for the capability sets (see denitions of capset in
Figure 5.2 and omega in Figure 5.3), I must also provide for an extensional denition of
equality on those constructors. For instance,
111A 1(g) = A 2(g); for all g
 ` A 1 = A 2 : Cap
Definition eqcap (A1 A2:capset) : Prop := forall g, (A1 g)=(A2 g).
 1 =  1
 `  1 =  2 : Type
 ` A 1 = A 2 : Cap  `  1(r) =  2(r) : Type; for all r
 ` 8[](A 1; 1) = 8[](A 2; 2) : Type 
Inductive eqtype : omega -> omega -> Prop :=
| eqrefl : forall t1, eqtype t1 t1
| eqcode : forall A1 A2 G1 G2,
eqcap A1 A2 ->
(forall r, eqtype (G1 r) (G2 r)) ->
eqtype (tcode A1 G1) (tcode A2 G2)
. . .
The denition of eqtype contains more constructors which handle the various cases
of abstraction over constructors. With the above denitions of equality and my encoding
of capability sets, the various equality rules that are axiomatized in Walker's presenta-
tion [85] are derivable in my encoding. These rules are listed in Figure 5.7. Briey, the
equality rules allow one to rearrange the structure of a capability set and to duplicate ca-
pabilities of multiplicity +. We use these rearrangements within typing rules for jumping
to a code block in order to match the current capability with the specication of the code
block. Another necessary feature is the ability to lift unique capabilities (fg1g) to dupli-
catable ones (fg+g). The former should provide all the privileges of the latter, although
they are not the same. Thus, the region type system species a subtyping relation which
allows uniquenessinformation to be forgotten. In my Coq encoding, I dene subtyping
on multiplicities and use that to dene the subcapability relation:
` 1  1 ` +  + ` 1  +
Inductive subaccap : accap -> accap -> Prop :=
| subaccap_refl : forall c, subaccap c c
| subaccap_mult : subaccap uniC mulC.
` A 1(g)  A 2(g); for all g
 ` A 1  A 2
112 ` c : 
 ` c = c : 
(EQ-REFLEX)
 ` c 2 = c 1 : 
 ` c 1 = c 2 : 
(EQ-SYMM)
 ` c 1 = c 2 :   ` c 2 = c 3 : 
 ` c 1 = c 3 : 
(EQ-TRANS)
 ` A 1 = A0
1 : Cap  ` A 2 = A0
2 : Cap
 ` A 1  A 2 = A0
1  A0
2 : Cap
(EQ-CONGR-PLUS)
 ` A = A0 : Cap
 ` A = A0 : Cap
(EQ-CONGR-BAR)
 ` A : Cap
 ` ;  A = A : Cap
(EQ-;)
 ` A 1 : Cap  ` A 2 : Cap
 ` A 1  A 2 = A 2  A 1 : Cap
(EQ-COMM)
 ` A i : Cap; for 1  i  3
 ` (A 1  A 2)  A 3 = A 1  (A 2  A 3) : Cap
(EQ-ASSOC)
 ` A : Cap
 ` A = A  A : Cap
(EQ-DUP)  ` ; = ; : Cap
(EQ-BAR-;)
 ` g : Rgn
 ` fg1g = fg+g : Cap
(EQ-FLAG)
 ` A : Cap
 ` A = A : Cap
(EQ-BAR-IDEM)
 ` A 1 : Cap  ` A 2 : Cap
 ` A 1  A 2 = A 1  A 2 : Cap
(EQ-DISTRIB)
Figure 5.7: RgnTAL static semantics: equality (derivable rules).
113Definition subcap : capset -> capset -> Prop
:= fun A1 A2 => forall p, subaccap (A1 p) (A2 p).
Once again, the set of subcapability rules that are axiomatized in [85, Fig. 5] can be
easily derived from my encoding.
The next ve judgment forms in Figure 5.6 cover the rules for typechecking data val-
ues and memory. The rules for these are given in Figure 5.8. The rule for integers is
trivial, and data pointers are given the type assigned to the address in memory. (V-PAIR)
allows pointers to be given a type even after their region has been deallocated. Although
such dangling pointers can exist in a program, the type system will not allow them to be
dereferenced. The rule for region handles ties together the dynamic (run-time) and static
(compile-time) entities. Code pointers are given their type as assigned in the code mem-
ory specication. The rules for constructor application and folding a recursive type are
standard, with (V-SUB) taking into account the bounded quantication over capabilities.
The data heap only contains pairs and thus we only have one rule for heap values. Re-
gions, the data memory, and the register le all make sure that their respective elements
are well-typed.
The remaining RgnTAL typing rules are given in Figure 5.9. Many of the instruction
typing rules are the same as our previous avors of TAL, such as the (I-MOV) rule. One
difference is that the store and load instructions must make sure that there exists a capa-
bility to read or write from a tuple in memory. Also the rules for jumps will make sure
that the capability specication matches the current capability set, as well as checking that
the register le specications are compatible. Finally, RgnTAL has rules for constructor
application. The (I-APPCB) handles the case of bounded quantication over capabilities.
The typing rules for instructions are used to type code values in the code heap. As before,
we simply assume at this stage that all stubs are well-typed.
Thetop-levelrulesbringtogetherthewell-formednessofthecodememory,datamem-
ory, and register le, along with a judgment that a capability A satises the data memory
type 	. The (SAT) rule ensures that the capabilities being used to type check memory
114C;	 ` v : 
C;	 ` i : int
(V-INT) 	(:l) = 
C;	 ` :l : 
(V-ADDR)
 = 2 Dom(	)
C;	 ` :l : h 1   2i at 
(V-PAIR)
C;	 ` handle () :  handle
(V-HNDL) typeof(C(f)) = 
C;	 ` f : 
(V-CODE)
C;	 ` v : 8[;:](A; ) ` c : 
C;	 ` v[c] : 8[](A; )[c=]
(V-TYPE)
C;	 ` v : 8[;A00](A0; )  ` A  A00
C;	 ` v[A] : 8[](A0; )[A=]
(V-SUB)
C;	 ` v : [:=]
C;	 ` foldv as: : :
(V-FOLD)
C;	 ` h at  : 
C;	 ` v1 :  1 C;	 ` v2 :  2
C;	 ` (v1;v2) at  : h 1   2i at 
(H-PAIR)
C;	 ` H at  : 
Dom(H) = Dom()
C;	 ` H(li) at  : (li) for all li 2 Dom()
C;	 ` H at  : 
(REGION)
C ` D : 	
Dom(D) = Dom(	) ` 	
C;	 ` D(i) at i : 	(i) for all i 2 Dom(	)
C ` D : 	
(DMEM)
C;	 ` R :  
C;	 ` R(r) :  (r) for all r
C;	 ` R :  
(REGFILE)
Figure 5.8: RgnTAL static semantics: Data values, memory, and register le.
115C;;A;  ` I
C;;A; frd 7!  (rs)g ` I
C;;A;  ` mov rd;rs;I
(I-MOV)
 (rd) = h 1   2i at g  (rs) =  i
 ` A  A0  fg+g C;;A;  ` I
i 2 f0;1g
C;;A;  ` st rd(i);rs;I
(I-ST)
 (r) = 8[;A00](A0; 
0)  ` A 0  A00 C;;A; fr : 8[](A0; 
0)[A 0=]g ` I
C;;A;  ` tapp r[A 0];I
(I-APPCB)
 (r) = 8[](A0; 
0)  `   =  
0  ` A  A0
C;;A;  ` jmp r
(I-JMP)
C ` h
C;;A;  ` I
C ` code [](A; ):I
(C-CODE) C ` stub [](A; ):;
(C-STUB)
` C
C ` C(f) for all f 2 Dom(C)
` C
(CMEM)
	 ` A sat C;	;A;  ` (D;R) C ` (D;R;I)
 ` A = f0
'0g  :::  fn
'ng : Cap 0;:::;1 distinct
f0:0;:::;n:ng ` A sat
(SAT)
` C C ` D : 	 C;	 ` R :   	 ` A sat
C;	;A;  ` (D;R)
(STATE)
C;	;A;  ` (D;R) C;;A;  ` I
C ` (D;R;I)
(PROG)
Figure 5.9: RgnTAL static semantics: Instructions (selected), code, and top-level rules.
116accesses accurately reect the regions that exist in memory.
For each judgment form, the rules in Figures 5.8 and 5.9 are encoded in the Coq logic
using inductively dened predicates. Thus we have, corresponding to the judgments in
Figure 5.6:
wf_wordval : codemem -> memtype -> wordval -> omega -> Prop
wf_heapval : codemem -> memtype -> heapval -> rgn -> omega -> Prop
wf_heap : codemem -> memtype -> heap -> rgn -> rgntype -> Prop
wf_datamem : codemem -> datamem -> memtype -> Prop
wf_regfile : codemem -> memtype -> regfile -> rftype -> Prop
wf_iseq : codemem -> capset -> rftype -> iseq -> Prop
wf_codeval : codemem -> codeval -> Prop
wf_codemem : codemem -> Prop
sat_cap_memtype : memtype -> capset -> Prop
wf_state : codemem -> memtype -> capset -> rftype -> datamem -> regfile -> Prop
wf_program : codemem -> progstate -> Prop
Notice thatconstructorcontextsare implicit (in thetypingjudgmentfor instruction se-
quences) because I use a HOAS-style encoding for constructor variables other than types;
thus RgnTAL variables are represented using metavariables of the logic. For types, as
mentioned earlier and described in Section 6.2, I use a lifted version of the type encoding
that utilizes deBruijn indices to track type variables.
5.2 Soundness
As for XTAL, I cannot prove a complete soundness theorem for the RgnTAL type system
with the presence of stub values in the code heap. However, for each individual instruc-
tion, I prove the standard progress and preservation lemmas. That is, given a well-typed
RgnTAL program, it is possible to execute the current instruction, resulting in another
well-typed program state. For example, the Coq statements of these lemmas in the case
of a simple move instruction are:
If C;	;A;  ` (D;R) and C;;A;  ` mov rd;rs;I, then there exists a program P such that
C ` (D;R;I) 7 ! P.
117Lemma progress_imov
: forall CM M R MT A G rd rs Is,
let curIs := (icons (imov rd rs) Is) in
wf_state CM MT A G M R ->
wf_iseq CM A G curIs ->
exists P, rt_eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
If C;	;A;  ` (D;R), C;;A;  ` mov rd;rs;I, and C ` (D;R;I) 7 ! (D0;R0;I0), then
there exists some data memory type, 	0, such that C;	0;A; frd :  (rs)g ` (D0;R0).
Lemma preserv_imov
: forall CM M R MT A G rd rs Is M' R' Is',
let curIs := (icons (imov rd rs) Is) in
let P := (M', R', Is') in
wf_state CM MT A G M R ->
wf_iseq CM A G curIs ->
rt_eval CM (M, R, curIs) P ->
exists MT',
wf_state CM MT' A (rft_upd G rd (G rs)) M' R'.
I have generalized the statements of these lemmas so that they have about the same
form for everyinstruction. In thecase ofmov above, we couldactually prove thepreserva-
tion lemma using 	0 = 	. The instructions that deal with memory are more complicated
to prove, as are the instructions involving type application, but overall the formalized
proofs in Coq are essentially the same as the soundness proofs presented in [85], after
taking into account differences in my Coq encoding.
5.3 Compilation and Runtime Library
5.3.1 Specifying the Translation of Programs to Machine States
The compilation of well-typed RgnTAL programs to CAP with safety proofs is somewhat
more complicated that the compilation of XTAL in the previous chapter, mainly because
of the reasoning about memory that is needed. In order to keep the memory reasoning
tractable, I have encoded the primitives of separation logic [67] in Coq, along with a li-
brary of derived lemmas. Some of the basic operators that I use are listed in the following
table. (In this table, memory refers to a partial function mapping integer addresses to
integer words. In the Coq encoding, separation logic assertions have the type mempred.)
118Sep. log. primitive My Coq encoding Describes
emp emptymp an empty memory area
e 7! e0 e |-> e' memory containing one cell at address e
which contains e'
e 7! e |-> ? memory containing one cell at address e
which contains some unspecied value
p*q p && q memory that can be split into two disjoint
parts in which p and q hold respectively
9a : b:p `ex fun a:b => p existential quantication
Tocompile RgnTALprogramsintoa CAPmachine state,Idividethemachine memory
into three parts: (1) an area for external code, beginning at address ec_min and of size
ec_size, where the implementation of the external code (runtime library functions) will
be, (2) an area for the compiled program code, at address cm_minand of size cm_size, and
(3) an area for program data, at address dm_min and of size dm_size, which may expand
dynamically. In the next few subsections, I describe the contents of each of these areas.
Data Memory Area
The data area stores the translated RgnTAL data memory containing regions. It will keep
track of region allocation using a simple memory management scheme involving a free
list of regions. Within each region, allocation of data (RgnTAL pairs) will be handled by
a simple linear allocation scheme that keeps track of the current allocation pointer within
the region. Each RgnTAL region corresponds to a block of memory with a three word
header. In C-like syntax, a region block is dened as:
119Definition mempred := memarea -> Prop.
Fixpoint ptrtoanylist (a sz:word) struct sz : mempred :=
match sz with | 0 => emptymp
| (S n) => ((a |-> ?) && (ptrtoanylist (a+1) n))
end.
Definition freeblock (a sz nxt:word) : mempred :=
`(a <> nilptr) &
((a |-> sz) && (((a+1) |-> ?) && (((a+2) |-> nxt) && (ptrtoanylist (a+3) sz)))).
Definition newblock (a sz:word) : mempred :=
`(a <> nilptr) &
((a |-> sz) && (((a+1) |-> 0) && (((a+2) |-> ?) && (ptrtoanylist (a+3) sz)))).
Fixpoint fblist (n a:word) struct n : mempred :=
match n with | 0 => `(a=nilptr) & emptymp
| (S n') => `(a<>nilptr)
& (`ex fun sz => `ex fun a' =>
((freeblock a sz a') && (fblist n' a')))
end.
Definition freelist (a:word) : mempred := `ex fun n => (fblist n a).
Figure 5.10: Coq denitions of region blocks and free list.
struct rgnblock {
int size; // size of the block, excluding header
int ap; // allocation pointer within the region
rgnblock* next; // next region in the free list
int* data; // array of [size] integers containing data values (the
// translated RgnTAL heap values)
}
Empty space in the data memory and deallocated regions are kepttrack of in a free list
structure using the next pointer of the region block. The Coq encoding of the rgnblock
data structure and free list is given in Figure 5.10.
The ptrtoanylistpredicate describes a block of memory pointed to by address a and
of size sz which contains arbitrary data values. This denition is used by freeblock,
which adds on the header elds for such a free region. The newblock predicate is what is
returned upon allocation of a new region; notice that its next eld is unspecied and its
allocation pointer eld is set to 0. fblist describes a linked list of n free blocks, and by
existential quantication over the number of free blocks we obtain the denition of the
120freelist.
The free list will describe the unallocated portions of data memory. In order to de-
scribe the allocated portion of data memory, I rst dene, in Figure 5.11, the translation
from RgnTAL word values to machine words (integers). Then tr_heapvalwill translate a
RgnTAL heap value (pair) and its location in the RgnTAL data memory into a separation
logic assertion. The tr_dataptr function maps a RgnTAL pointer into the corresponding
machine address and will be constructed appropriately during the compilation process
by the compiler. tr_dataptr is the equivalent of the AD function for XTAL compilation
in Section 4.4.2. The next function, tr_hvs, translates a RgnTAL region (H:heap) contain-
ing a number of heap values (pairs) into a separation logic assertion describing how the
region will be laid out in the machine memory. Since I model the RgnTAL heap regions
as functions from integer labels to heap values, I make sure the functions are a nite map-
ping by insuring that they have a greatest label in their domain (Lim). Then I recurse from
the value of Lim down to zero to dene a terminating function which will process all the
heap values in the range of H. Finally, the denition of tr_heap at the bottom of the gure
details the complete translation from a RgnTAL region to the actual rgnblock data struc-
ture dened earlier. It uses another layout function, RLyt, which maps RgnTAL region
names to addresses in memory. The three-word header information is laid out, as well
as checks to ensure that the allocated and unallocated amount of data add up to the total
region size. The allocation pointer is set to be exactly the number of allocated words in
the region.
The compilation of RgnTAL instructions to CAP machine commands is fairly simple.
The rst two denitions in Figure 5.12 illustrate this. A RgnTAL instruction sequence cor-
responds to a list of CAP commands as dened by tr_iseq. This denition is then used
by tr_codeval to translate RgnTAL code values to a sequence of words (encoded in-
structions), which are appropriately laid out in memory by tr_codemem. The coversfnat
predicate ensures that the memory area described by the tr_codemem assertion starts at
address cm_min and extends for cm_size words.
121Inductive tr_wordval : wordval -> word -> Prop :=
| tr_wi : forall n, tr_wordval (wi n) n (* Integer *)
| tr_wl : forall p l w,
tr_dataptr p l = Some w ->
tr_wordval (wl p l) w (* RgnTAL pointer to address w *)
| tr_wlnop : forall p l w,
notindomf DMLyt p ->
tr_wordval (wl p l) w (* Dangling pointer *)
| tr_wf : forall f w,
fmaplook CMLyt f w ->
tr_wordval (wf f) w (* Code pointer *)
| tr_wappt : forall v t w,
tr_wordval v w ->
tr_wordval (wappt v t) w (* Type application (type info
is erased) *)
| ... (* other cases of constructor application similar *)
Definition tr_heapval (p:rgn) (l:nat) (a:word) (hv:heapval) : mempred :=
match hv with [v0,v1] => `ex fun w0 => `ex fun w1 =>
`(tr_dataptr p l = (Some a)) & `(tr_wordval v0 w0) &
`(tr_wordval v1 w1) & ( (a |-> w0) && ((a+1) |-> w1))
end.
Fixpoint tr_hvs (p:rgn) (a:word) (Lim:word) (H:heap) struct Lim : mempred :=
match Lim with | 0 => (`(nulldomf H) & (@emptyfp _ _))
| (S m) => match (H Lim) with
| None => tr_hvs p a m H
| Some hv => ((tr_heapval p Lim a hv) &&
(tr_hvs p (2+a) m (fmapdelN _ H Lim)))
end
end.
Definition tr_heap : rgn -> heap -> mempred :=
fun p H => `ex fun a => `ex fun hplim => `ex fun rsize => `ex fun diff =>
`(a <> nilptr) & (* region address cannot be null *)
`(fmaplook RLyt p a) & (* map region name to address *)
`(@limitf heapval H hplim) & (* region has finite domain *)
`((hvlist_size hplim H)+diff = rsize) & (* allocated and unallocated
space in the region
add up to the size *)
(((a |-> rsize) && (* first header word: size *)
(((a+1) |-> (hvlist_size hplim H)) && (* header word: alloc ptr *)
((a+2) |-> ?))) && (* header word: next ptr *)
((tr_hvs p (a+3) hplim H) && (* actual region data *)
(ptrtoanylist (a+3+(hvlist_size hplim H)) diff))). (* unused space *)
Figure 5.11: Coq encoding of RgnTAL heap values and region translation.
122Inductive tr_instr : cmdlist -> instr -> cmdlist -> Prop :=
| tr_iadd : forall Cs rd rs rt,
tr_instr Cs (iadd rd rs rt) (add rd rs rt :: Cs)
| tr_iaddi : forall Cs rd rs t,
tr_instr Cs (iaddi rd rs t) (addi rd rs t :: Cs)
| ...
Inductive tr_iseq : iseq -> cmdlist -> Prop :=
| tr_icons : forall i Is cs Cs,
tr_iseq Is Cs -> tr_instr Cs i cs -> tr_iseq (icons i Is) cs
| tr_ijd : forall f w, fmaplook CMLyt f w -> tr_iseq (ijd f) (jd w :: nil)
| tr_ijmp : forall r, tr_iseq (ijmp r) (jmp r :: nil).
Inductive tr_codeval : codeval -> wordlist -> Prop :=
| tr_cvcode : forall G Is Cs Ws,
tr_ciseq Is Cs -> Cs = map Dc Ws -> tr_codeval (cvcode G Is) Ws
| tr_cvstub : forall G, tr_codeval (cvstub G) nil.
Definition tr_codemem (CM:codemem) : mempred :=
fun M => (coversfnat _ M cm_min (cm_min+cm_size)) /\
(forall f cv, fmaplook CM f cv ->
exists Ws, exists a, fmaplook CMLyt f a /\ tr_codeval cv Ws
/\ ((wordsinmem Ws a) && truemp) M).
Figure 5.12: Coq encoding of RgnTAL code values and code memory translation.
Finally, thetop-leveltranslationrelationsarespeciedbythedenitionsinFigure5.13.
tr_datamem brings together the translation of all the regions in the RgnTAL data memory
(using an auxiliary denition, tr_datamem_aux, not shown) with the freelist specica-
tionto form a separationlogic assertiondescribingall of thedata area of machine memory
(which starts at address dm_min and extends to size dm_size). Also, the rst address in
the data area points to the size of the entire data area, and the second word is a pointer
to the freelist structure. The next two denitions handle the layout of external code
in the appropriate area of the machine memory. tr_memstate_aux and tr_memstate de-
scribe the combined layout of the RgnTAL code and data memories. Notice also that they
specify that address 0 in the machine memory is not used, and that addresses 1 and 2 are
pointers to the beginning of code and data memory areas. With the register le and pro-
gram counter translation, I obtain a complete translation predicate (tr_program) relating
a RgnTAL program (codemem and progstate) to a Coq machine state (state).
123Definition tr_datamem (DM:datamem) dm_min dm_size : mempred :=
`ex fun dmlim =>
`ex fun fp => (* free list pointer *)
(fun M => coversfnat _ M dm_min (dm_min+dm_size)) &
`(limitf _ DM dmlim) &
((dm_min |-> dm_size) &&
(((dm_min+1) |-> fp) && ((tr_datamem_aux dmlim DM) && (freelist fp)))).
Definition extcode_in_ec : Prop :=
(forall a Cs Pcs, ExtCode a = someT (Cs,*Pcs) ->
(ec_min <= a /\ a+(length Cs) < ec_min+ec_size)).
Definition tr_extcode : codemem -> mem -> Prop :=
fun CM MM => exists M,
(extcode_in_ec) /\
(coversfnat _ M ec_min (ec_min+ec_size)) /\
(forall f w G Is, fmaplook CMLyt f w -> fmaplook CM f (cvcode G Is)
-> ExtCode w = noneT _) /\
(forall a Cs Pcs, ExtCode a = someT (Cs,*Pcs) -> cmdsinmem Cs a M) /\
(appliesto M MM).
Definition tr_memstate_aux (CM:codemem) (DM:datamem) : mempred :=
`ex fun dm_min => `ex fun dm_size =>
`(eqdomf _ _ _ CMLyt CM) & `(eqdomf _ _ _ DMLyt DM)
& (((0 |-> ?) && ((1 |-> cm_min) && ((2 |-> dm_min))))
&& ((tr_codemem CM) && (tr_datamem DM dm_min dm_size))).
Definition tr_memstate (CM:codemem) (DM:datamem) (MM:mem) : Prop :=
exists M, tr_memstate_aux CM DM M /\ (appliesto M MM).
Definition tr_regfile (Rf:regfile) (R:rfile) : Prop :=
forall r v w, Rf r = v -> R r = w -> tr_wordval v w.
Definition tr_pc (CM:codemem) (Is:iseq) (pc:word) : Prop :=
exists f, exists G', exists Is', exists w, exists n,
fmaplook CM f (cvcode G' Is') /\
subseqis Is Is' n /\
fmaplook CMLyt f w /\
pc = n + w.
Inductive tr_program : codemem -> progstate -> state -> Prop :=
| tr_prog :
forall CM DM R Is MM RR pc,
tr_extcode CM MM ->
tr_memstate CM DM MM ->
tr_regfile R RR ->
tr_pc CM Is pc ->
tr_program CM (DM,R,Is) (MM,RR,pc).
Figure 5.13: Coq encoding of RgnTAL memory, register le, and program translation.
1245.3.2 Safety Policy, Invariants, and Proofs
For the system described in this chapter, I use a slightly more realistic safety policy when
certifying the compiled code. It states that for any memory reads or writes, the address
being accessed must lie within the data area of memory, or else the program counter must
be in the external code area of memory. The reasoning is that RgnTAL code should only
access memory within its data area, while the external code (runtime library functions)
may access memory anywhere but it will have the burden then of proving that any writes
to memory will maintain basic type safety. In Coq syntax,
Definition MySP (St:state) :=
match St with (M,R,pc) =>
let dm_min := (M 2) in
let dm_size := (M dm_min) in
match (curcmd St) with
| ld rd rs n => let a:=(R rs)+n in dm_min < a < (dm_min+dm_size)
\/ (ec_min <= pc < (ec_min+ec_size))
| st rd n rs => let a:=(R rd)+n in dm_min < a < (dm_min+dm_size)
\/ (ec_min <= pc < (ec_min+ec_size))
| _ => True
end
end.
I also specify in Coq the generation of CAP code preconditions from RgnTAL code
typesandcodememoryspecication. Thus,correspondingtoXTAL'sCpInv(Section4.4.3),
I dene the following for the RgnTAL system:
Definition cpinv (CM:codemem) (T:omega) : pred :=
fun St =>
match St with (MM,RR,pc) =>
exists DLyt, exists RLyt, (* data ptr and region ptr mappings *)
exists DM, exists RF, exists MT, exists Ts, exists A, exists G,
instcodetype T Ts (tcode A G) /\
wf_state CM MT A G DM RF /\
tr_memstate DLyt RLyt CMLyt cm_min cm_size CM DM MM /\
tr_regfile DLyt RLyt CMLyt RF RR
end.
Astheinvariant CpInv is importanttounderstandtheconnectionbetweentheRgnTAL
type system and CAP predicates, it might be more convenient to view it in typeset form:
125CpInv(AC;C;8[](A0; 0))
= S:9AD;AR;D;R;	;~ c;A; : 8[](A0; 0)[~ c=] = 8[](A; )
^ C;	;A;  ` (D;R)
^ A ` (C;D) ) S:M
^ A ` R ) S:R
This version of CpInv is very similar to the one for XTAL. One difference here is an
additional layout function mapping region names to addresses,AR. Anotherdifference is
that RgnTAL code types support polymorphism. Thus, CpInv states that there must exist
some list of constructors,~ c (or Ts in the Coq version above), with which the code type can
be instantiated. Theconjuncts onthelower threelines are thereal essenceof CpInv. Again,
they state that CpInv holds on a machine state S if there exists some well-typed RgnTAL
program such that the memory and register le components of that program correspond
to the memory and register le of the machine state according to the translation relations
dened in the previous section.
Given the denition of CpInv, I dene the generation of the complete CAP code spec-
ication (CpGen) given an external code library, RgnTAL code memory, and code layout
function, just as in Section 4.4.3. Thus, in Coq I dene a predicate that describes the for-
mation of an appropriate CAP code specication:
Definition iscpgen : extcodety -> codelyt -> codemem -> cdspec -> Prop
:= ...
Now, I prove the same sequence of safety theorems as for XTAL (Theorems 4.9, 4.8,
4.7). Among the lemmas that are used to develop theseproofs are a set of lemmas, one for
each RgnTAL instruction, that prove the preservation of CpInv over one step of execution.
As a few representative examples,
126Lemma cpinv_preserv_add :
forall CM A G rd rs rt Is St
(D0 : cpinv CM (tcode A G) St)
(D1 : wf_iseq CM A G (icons (iadd rd rs rt) Is))
(D2 : curcmd St = (add rd rs rt)),
cpinv CM (tcode A (rft_upd G rd tint)) (Step St).
Lemma cpinv_preserv_ld :
forall CM A G rd rs n Is St
(D0 : cpinv CM (tcode A G) St)
(D1 : wf_iseq CM A G (icons (ild rd rs n) Is))
(D2 : curcmd St = (ld rd rs n)),
exists t, exists t1, exists t2, exists g,
(n = 0 /\ t = t1 \/ n = 1 /\ t = t2) /\
G rs = tpair t1 t2 g /\
cpinv CM (tcode A (rft_upd G rd t)) (Step St).
Lemma cpinv_preserv_appr :
forall CM A G r p Is St
(D0 : cpinv CM (tcode A G) St)
(D1 : wf_iseq CM A G (icons (iappr r p) Is))
(D2 : curcmd St = (mov r r)),
exists Fr,
G r = tabsr Fr /\
cpinv CM (tcode A (rft_upd G r (Fr p))) (Step St).
These are directly used to prove the well-formedness of translation from RgnTAL in-
structions to CAP commands:
Lemma rgntal2wfcapcmds :
forall ExtCode CMLyt CT CM Is T Ws Cs
(D0 : iscpgen ExtCode CMLyt CT CM) (* CT = CpGen(..., CM) *)
(D1 : extcode_in_ec ExtCode ec_min ec_size) (* ExtCode is valid *)
(D2 : tr_codeval CMLyt (cvcode T Is) Ws) (* Ac |- Is => Ws *)
(D3 : Cs = map Dc Ws)
(D4 : forall Ts A G, instcodetype T Ts (tcode A G) (* CM; A; G |- Is *)
-> wf_iseq CM A G Is),
WFCapCmds MySP CT (cpinv CM T) Cs.
Thatis, ifa well-typedRgnTALinstructionsequenceIs(withcodetypeT)translatesto
a list of CAP commands Cs, then thelist of commands is well-formed undertheCAP code
specication CT (generated from the RgnTAL code memory type CM) and precondition
cpinv CM T.
Well-formednessoftheindividual compiledinstructionsequencesleadstowell-formedness
of the entire code memory (the extcode_wf premise corresponds to Proof Obligation 4.10
in the XTAL context),
127Lemma rgntal2wfcapcdspec :
forall ExtCode CMLyt DLyt RLyt CT CM DM R Is MM RR pc
(D0:iscpgen ExtCode CMLyt CT CM)
(D1:wf_program (CM, (DM,R,Is)))
(D2:tr_program ExtCode DLyt RLyt CMLyt CM (DM,R,Is) (MM,RR,pc))
(extcode_wf: forall f Cs P,
ExtCode f = someT (Cs ,* P) ->
forall CT', iscpgen ExtCode CMLyt CT' CM -> WFCapCmds MySP CT' P Cs),
WFCapcdspec MySP MM CT.
which in turns leads to the nal safety theorem,
Theorem rgntal2cap :
forall ExtCode CMLyt DLyt RLyt CT CM DM R Is St
(D0:iscpgen ExtCode CMLyt CT CM)
(D1:wf_program (CM, (DM,R,Is)))
(D2:tr_program ExtCode DLyt RLyt CMLyt CM (DM,R,Is) St)
(extcode_wf: forall f Cs P,
ExtCode f = someT (Cs ,* P) ->
forall CT', iscpgen ExtCode CMLyt CT' CM -> WFCapCmds MySP CT' P Cs),
WFCapstate MySP St.
This states that given a well-typed RgnTAL program that translates to a CAP machine
state St, such that the necessary proof obligations are satised on external code, and the
code specication is generatedproperly, we can prove that the CAP machine state is well-
formed for the memory safety policy MySP.
5.3.3 Region-based Memory Management Library
The development in the previous section establishes an assembly language with a region-
based type system but does not provide the primitives for creating and deleting regions,
or for allocating new data values in a region. For that purpose, I design a runtime library
that will link in with RgnTAL code providing the necessary external functions to support
region management.
Figures 5.14 and 5.15 illustrate my implementation of region library in C-like syntax.
The library provides three main functions and has three utility functions that are used by
those. The primary functions of the library are: freergn,which takes a pointer to a region
(rgnblock*) and returns it to the freelist; newrgn, which returns a new region ready to
128// region data structure
struct rgnblock {
int size; // size of the block, excluding header
int ap; // allocation pointer within the region
rgnblock* next; // next region in the free list
int* data; // array of [size] integers containing data values (the
// translated RgnTAL heap values)
}
// data structure allocated within regions
struct pair {
int fst, snd;
}
const int BASESIZE = 10;
const rgnblock* NULLPTR = 0;
rgnblock* freelist; // assume it is appropriately initialized somehow
int dm_min, dm_size; // same for these (defined in the previous section)
void freergn(rgnblock* p) {
p.next = freelist;
freelist = p;
}
rgnblock* newrgn() {
if (freelist != NULLPTR) {
rgnblock* p = freelist;
freelist = freelist.next;
return p;
} else {
rgnblock* p = moremem(BASESIZE);
return p;
}
}
pair* alloc(int v1, int v2, rgnblock* p) {
if (p.ap > p.size) { // check if there is space in the region
rgnblock* p' = growrgn(p, p.size + p.size);
return alloc(v1, v2, p');
} else {
pair* s = p + p.ap;
p.ap = p.ap + 2;
s.fst = v1;
s.snd = v2;
return s;
}
}
Figure 5.14: Region library functions (C-like implementation)
129rgnblock* moremem(int nsize) {
rgnblock* p = dm_min + dm_size; // end of the data memory area
p.size = nsize;
p.ap = 0;
p.next = NULLPTR;
dm_size += nsize + 3; // increase the limit of data area
return p;
}
rgnblock* growrgn(rgnblock* p, int nsize) {
rgnblock* p' = moremem(nsize);
p'.ap = p.ap;
copyrgn(p, p', 0);
freergn(p);
return p';
}
void copyrgn(rgnblock* p, rgnblock* p', int elem) {
if (elem >= p.ap) return;
p'.data[elem] = p.data[elem];
copyrgn(p, p', elem+1);
}
Figure 5.15: Region library utility functions (C-like implementation)
be used, taking it from the freelist if it is non-empty and otherwise allocating space for
the region by adjusting the size of the data area of memory; and alloc, which creates a
new pair of data in a region, again resizing the region as necessary if there is not enough
space.
Notice that these functions are (albeit simplistic) realistic, efcient C implementations
of a library. They do not introduce any extra checks for safety. The RgnTAL type system
will guarantee proper use of the API; for example, that free'd region pointers are not
passed to the alloc function. At the time of this writing, I am in the process of mech-
anizing the proofs of safety for this library. I will discuss in this section, therefore, only
one of the functions, freergn, for which the formal Coq proofs have been almost entirely
completed. The process of certifying the other functions in the library is similar to the
description for freergn below although, of course, the details of the specications and
interface types will be different.
130Certifying freergn in CAP
Tobegin with, I manually translatethe freergncode in Figure 5.14 into a CAP codeblock.
The result is the following command list:
Definition freergn_cmds : cmdlist :=
(movi r8 2) :: (* address 2 points to dm_min *)
(ld r8 r8 0) :: (* r8 := dm_min *)
(ld r9 r8 1) :: (* r9 := freelist *)
(st r0 2 r9) :: (* p.next := freelist *)
(st r8 1 r0) :: (* freelist := p *)
(jmp r7).
In standard Hoare-triple notation, we would specify pre- and post-conditions for this
set of commands as follows:
{ Pre } freergn_cmds { Post };
However, because CAP programs are written in continuation-passing style, and also
becauseit is difcult in thesimple Hoarelogic systemtohandlethejumptoa codepointer
(the last command in the sequence), the actual process of certifying this code in CAP is a
bit more convoluted. Specically, corresponding to assertions of the Hoare-triple above, I
specify a predicate on what constraints the CAP precondition of the freergn_cmds block
should satisfy:
freergn req(;Pfree) = S:Pfree(S) ! Pre(S) ^
9Q:((S:R(r7)) = Q ^ (8S0:Post(S0) ! Q(S0)))
I will prove the safety of freergn_cmds using a quantied precondition, Pfree, which
must imply a concrete precondition, Pre, and which must also imply that there exists a
return code pointer in r7 the precondition of which (Q) is implied by Post. The predi-
cates Pre and Post are used to reason about the changes in memory and register le that
are effected by the series of commands up till the jump. Such reasoning is pure rst order
reasoning,as wewill see,andIuseseparationlogic todenethesetwopredicatesandrea-
son the intermediate steps. The higher-order quantication over Pfree and the denition
131of freergn_req then allows reasoning about the safety of the nal jump while maintain-
ing modularity of the library's safety proof (because it is not instantiated with a predicate
particular to one type system).
Let us now examine the denitions of Pre and Post. Pre is dened in Coq as:
fun St => match St with ((MM,RR),pc) =>
ec_min <= pc /\ (pc + (length freergn_cmds)) < ec_min+ec_size (* 1 *)
/\
exists M, exists PmemA, exists PmemB,
exists dmmin, exists dmsize, exists fp, exists rsize, exists nxt,
(appliesto M MM) /\ (* 2 *)
(PmemA && (* 3 *)
(2 |-> dmmin)) && (* 4 *)
((fun Md => (forall a, indomf Md a -> ~(iscodearea CT a 1))) & (* 5 *)
(fun Md => (coversfnat _ Md dmmin (dmmin+dmsize))) & (* 6 *)
(PmemB && (freeblock (RR r0) rsize nxt) (* 7 *)
&& (dmmin |-> dmsize) (* 8 *)
&& ((dmmin+1) |-> fp) (* 9 *)
&& (freelist fp))) M. (* 10 *)
This species on line (1) that the entire code block of freergn_cmds should lie within
the external code area. The remaining lines specify the required layout of memory when
freergn is called. MM is the representation of the entire CAP machine memory (a function
with innite domain) while M is a nite mapping from addressesto words. Theappliesto
predicate (2) ensures that the contents of M and MM are consistent and then I use a separa-
tion logic assertion to specify the contents of M. M is broken into three disjoint portions.
On one portion (3), an arbitrary predicate, PmemA, will hold and this part of memory will
not be modied (PmemA will hold in the postcondition as well and the area of memory
that it holds on is actually the external code and RgnTAL code areas). Next, address 2 in
memory points to the beginning of the data area of memory. Lines (5) and (6) state that
there is no code in this data area of memory and that it has size dmsize. The last four
lines describe the parts of memory that freergn will actually manipulate. Within the data
memory, there is a freelist (10) and freergn also expects a pointer to a rgnblock data
structure in register r0 (7). The code may also need to access the size of the data area (8)
and the pointer to the freelist (9). Finally, the remaining portions of the data memory
will remain unchanged as described by another abstract predicate PmemB (7).
132The postcondition of freergn, namely the state of memory and register le just be-
fore the nal jump, is described by the following predicate, which takes the PmemA, PmemB
predicates of the precondition as parameters and also the state of the register le at the
beginning of the function. The postcondition species that the registers used by RgnTAL
programs (the rst 8 registers) will be unchanged by the end of this function. Also, mem-
ory will be mostly the same except that the region that was to be freed has been added
to the freelist and therefore the freeblock assertion that appeared on line (7) above is
gone:
fun PmemA PmemB RR =>
fun St' => match St' with ((MM',RR'),pc') =>
(eqonregs talregs RR RR')
/\
exists M', exists dmmin, exists dmsize, exists fp,
(appliesto M' MM') /\
(PmemA && (2 |-> dmmin)) &&
((fun Md => (forall a, indomf Md a -> ~(iscodearea CT a 1))) &
(fun Md => (coversfnat _ Md dmmin (dmmin+dmsize))) &
(PmemB && (dmmin |-> dmsize)
&& ((dmmin+1) |-> fp)
&& (freelist fp))) M'.
Putting all the pieces together, then, we have the complete denition of freergn_req
in Figure 5.16. Now, the freergn code block can be certied safe as a Coq lemma stating
that for any precondition Pfree satisfying the constraints of freergn_req, the command
sequence will be well-formed:
Lemma 5.1 (Well-formedness of freergn cmds)
Lemma freergn_wfcap : forall CT Pfree,
freergn_req CT Pfree -> WFCapCmds MySP CT Pfree freergn_cmds.
Proving this lemma just involves application of the appropriate CAP inference rules
in Figure 4.2. For most commands the postcondition (Q in the inference rules) is simply
generated by computing the strongest postcondition based on the operational semantics
of the CAP machine. For example, the postcondition of the rst command, movi r8 2, is:
fun (St2:state) => match St2 with ((MM2,RR2),pc2) =>
MM2 = MM /\ RR2=(updatereg RR r8 2) /\ pc2=(S pc) end.
133(* postcondition requirements for the final jump *)
Definition freergn_jmp_req (CT:cdspec) (PmemA PmemB:mempred) RR dmmin dmsize
: Prop :=
exists n, exists Q, CT(RR r7) = someT (n,*Q) /\
forall (M:fmap word word) (MM:mem) RR' fp,
(eqonregs talregs RR RR') /\
(appliesto M MM) /\
(PmemA && (2 |-> dmmin)) &&
((fun Md => (forall a, indomf Md a -> ~(iscodearea CT a 1))) &
(fun Md => (coversfnat _ Md dmmin (dmmin+dmsize))) &
(PmemB && (dmmin |-> dmsize)
&& ((dmmin+1) |-> fp)
&& (freelist fp))) M
-> Q(MM,RR',RR r7).
(* constraints on the precondition of freergn_cmds *)
Definition freergn_req : cdspec -> pred -> Prop :=
fun CT Pfree =>
forall St, Pfree(St) ->
match St with ((MM,RR),pc) =>
ec_min <= pc /\ (pc + (length freergn_cmds)) < ec_min+ec_size
/\
exists M, exists PmemA, exists PmemB,
exists dmmin, exists dmsize, exists fp, exists rsize, exists nxt,
(appliesto M MM) /\
(PmemA && (2 |-> dmmin)) &&
((fun Md => (forall a, indomf Md a -> ~(iscodearea CT a 1))) &
(fun Md => (coversfnat _ Md dmmin (dmmin+dmsize))) &
(PmemB && (freeblock (RR r0) rsize nxt)
&& (dmmin |-> dmsize)
&& ((dmmin+1) |-> fp)
&& (freelist fp))) M /\
(freergn_jmp_req CT PmemA PmemB RR dmmin dmsize)
end.
Figure 5.16: Complete pre- and post-condition specication for freergn
134By the time we have reached the second store command, just before the jump, the
state of the memory has been modied in such a way that it is possible to show that the
postconditionPost describedabove issatised. Then,toshowthatthejumpissafe, weuse
the fact that Post holds, along with the denition of freergn_req,to satisfy the premise of
the (CAP-JMP) rule in Figure 4.2.
The RgnTAL Interface to freergn
Now that the freergn function has been certied in CAP we must dene the interface
through which RgnTAL programs can access it. This involves giving the function a Rgn-
TAL type, which is fairly easy to do:
freergn type = 8[;;1;:::;6](f1g  ; fr0: handle;r1:1;:::;r6:6;
r7:8[0;7](;fr0:0;r1:1;:::r7:7g)
freergn in RgnTAL expects register r0 to contain a pointer to a region for which a
uniquecapability is held(f1g) and registerr7 shouldcontain a returncontinuation which
expects region  to have been removed from the capability set. Having dening the Rgn-
TAL code type, I now instantiate the Pfree predicate of the previous section using the
code invariant generator, CpInv (see its denition on page 125):
Pfree = CpInv(AC;C;freergn type)
When proving well-formedness of a complete RgnTAL program that links to freergn,
we will need to apply Lemma 5.1, which in turn requires showing that this denition of
Pfree satises the constraints of freergn_req. A nal Coq lemma therefore is:
Definition Pfree (CMLyt:heaplyt) (CM:codemem) : pred :=
fun St => (cpinv CMLyt CM freergn_type).
Lemma freergn_type_satisfies_req : forall ExtCode CMLyt CT CM,
iscpgen ExtCode CMLyt CT CM -> freergn_req CT (Pfree CMLyt CM).
1355.4 Summary
A language with certied region management operations is the rst step towards a run-
time system with garbage collection. One of the most common sources of program error
and security holes today is code that accesses and manages memory improperly. In this
chapter, I have shown how to integrate the memory-safety propertiesprovided by a high-
level type system with low-level proofs of runtime system correctness. By continuing
this line of research it may eventually be possible to eliminate most or all of the security
breaches that occur due to faulty memory management. The details in this chapter may
seem overwhelming but in fact the approach is fairly straightforward. As I am applying
tools (e.g. the CiC calculus and Coq proof assistant) in a domain where they have not
been used much before, the notation and development is still primitive. Yet the progress
so far is encouraging and opens up future research areas in streamlining the production
and presentation of such systems for integrating veried code.
136Chapter 6
Tools and Techniques
During the process of mechanizing the framework described in the preceding chapters,
I (and others working on related research) have encountered a variety of issues some
interesting, some disappointing with which we have had to deal. In this chapter, I touch
on a few of the more major hurdles that we have addressed using an assortment of tools
and techniques. I also point out some of the insights gained in reasoning about the safety
of our machine code.
6.1 Proof Development and Automation
One of the major challenges of this research is producing the necessary formalized proofs
of safety. For instance, as mentioned earlier, the region-based runtime library of Chapter 5
has not been completely formalized in Coq yet. There is no apparent difculty in the
theoretical aspects but the main issue is the technical detail, time, and tedium required for
building the proofs.
I have adopted the Coq proof assistant, which implements CiC the logic on which
my framework is based. One of the primary motivating factors for the use of CiC as
opposed to other frameworks (such as those mentioned in Related Work, Chapter 7) has
been its strong support for inductive denitions, making it very convenient to encode
137language syntax and develop syntactic proofs of soundness. Nonetheless, the Coq tool
has been developed and used primarily for purposes other than the proof-carrying code
framework described in this thesis. Thus, its level of automation for the sort of reasoning
I have been using it is somewhat primitive.
Coq provides, in addition tobasic concretesyntax for CiC termsand types(i.e. thelog-
ical language), a tactic language, Ltac [79], which allows interactive development of proof
terms. Coqcomesequippedwithsomebuilt-intacticsandalsoallowsuser-programmable
tactics. Let us examine a proof script for a very small lemma, one that states that if a data
heap value is well-typed in RgnTAL, then its type will not be a code type (because only
pairs are stored in the data heap). In Coq, we state the lemma and then start the proof
script by performing case analysis on the heap value hv:
Lemma wf_heapval_not_tcode
: forall CM MT hv p t A G,
(wf_heapval CM MT hv p t) -> t <> (tcode A G).
Proof.
induction hv; intros.
Coq returns to us the following state at this point (the terms above the double line are
our premises or derived propositions and our goal is to prove that which is below the
line):
1 subgoal
CM : codemem
MT : memtype
w : wordval
w0 : wordval
p : rgn
t : omega
A : capset
G : regt -> omega
H : wf_heapval CM MT [w, w0] p t
============================
t <> tcode A G
Here we can perform backwards reasoning on the H hypothesisand the typingrule for
pairs to determine that t must be a pair type:
inversion H; auto.
138The proof state becomes:
...
H6 : tpair t1 t2 p = t
============================
tpair t1 t2 p <> tcode A G
Based on injectivity of constructors of an inductive denition, we can prove this in-
equality using a built-in tactic:
discriminate. Qed.
Notice that for termswhich one doesnot specify a name, Coq introducesthem into the
proof contextwith automatically generatednames, like H, H0, H1, .... The tactics thenrefer
to these hypotheses by the introduced name. When developing large proofs that have
many of these automatically generated names, the proof script may contain references to
a number of hypotheses Hi. During the development, one might discover the need for an
additional hypothesis, or delete an unnecessary one. This causes the order of introduced
names to change and the tactic commands in the proof script are all referring to the wrong
names, requiring one to go through and update the entire proof script manually. This
is a major problem and I have addressed it by trying to redene the tactics so that one
would refer to the judgment wf_heapval in the proof script instead of the arbitrary name
H. Hence, instead of inversion H above, I use mcinv wf_heapval (mc for match-in-the-
context). Not only does this relieve one from editing the entire proof script if the order of
hypotheses change, it makes the proof script slightly more intelligible.
Writing such a tactic as mcinv is not hard in Coq but it seems to be awkward given
the tactic language design. Coq provides a general matching construct that allows pat-
tern matching on terms in the goal or (hypotheses) context. However, it does not support
matching on curried application so the denition of mcinv ends up looking like the fol-
lowing:
139Ltac mcinv t :=
match goal with
| H:t |- _ => inversion H; auto
| H:(t _) |- _ => inversion H; auto
| H:(t _ _) |- _ => inversion H; auto
| H:(t _ _ _) |- _ => inversion H; auto
| H:(t _ _ _ _) |- _ => inversion H; auto
| H:(t _ _ _ _ _) |- _ => inversion H; auto
| H:(t _ _ _ _ _ _) |- _ => inversion H; auto
end.
Thus, the tactic only matches constructors with up to 6 arguments. There is no way
to pattern match on the head of the constructor in general, regardless of its number of
arguments. For mcinv this is not so bad but for other tactics it leads to verbose matching
constructs. At any rate, I have redened a number of the primitive tactics to match the
headsoftermsinsteadofhypothesisnames,includingrewrite,elimination, injection,clear
(removing unnecessary hypotheses) and unfold (expand a denition) tactics.1
Returning to the lemma example above, it would be nice once we have proved this
simple lemma for Coq to automatically try and apply it whenever we have a goal that
matchesitsconclusion. Coqdoesallow onetoaddlemmas tothedatabase foritsautoand
eautotactics. Howevertheseautotacticsoftenfail toapplylemmaslikewf_heapval_not_tcode
because there are variables in the premises which do not appear in the goal and the tac-
tics are not always able to infer them automatically from a context. There are many other
situations when it seems that it should be possible to automatically infer proofs terms or
perform simple proof search to establish a goal but the standard Coq tactics do not pro-
vide that facility. There is the possibility of implementing such advanced tactics in the
underlying OCAML implementation of Coq, and this has been done for tactics related to
arithmetic reasoning, for example, but I have not yet had the opportunity to dig deeply
into the data structures and proof representation of the implementation.
One constructthat has been usedheavily in my implementation is thepartial function,
which I dene as:
Definition fmap (A,B:Set) := A -> option B.
1Most of such tactics will be found in the Coq le mystuff.v of my developments.
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tensional) equality and disjointness, which are used especially in the encoding of separa-
tion logic primitives. I have then developed a large library, including lemmas and tactics,
for reasoning about these various operations, which is available in the fmap.v source le
of the Coq developments of Chapters 4 and 5.
6.2 InductiveTypes, Impredicativity,andEncoding Polymorphism
Typed assembly languages do not have term-level variables because one works only with
a xed set of registers. Therefore, encoding the term language of TAL in Coq does not
present a problem because we can simply use a rst-order representation. However, the
type system for realistic TALs, as for RgnTAL in Chapter 5, will include features such as
polymorphism, existentials, and recursive types. This requires us to deal with TAL type
variables and related issues like substitution in the logical encoding. An elegant way to
handle binding constructs and variables is higher-order abstract syntax (HOAS) [63]. The
basic idea of HOAS is to represent object level (e.g. TAL) binding constructs and variables
using the functional types and metavariables of the logical system (e.g. Coq). The benet
of doing so is that we avoid having to reason properties about the binding constructs of
the object language, such as variable substitution, renaming, and scope all the necessary
properties are inherited from the logic itself.
Let us look again, then, at my encoding of RgnTAL types, from Figure 5.3:
Inductive omega : Set :=
| tint : omega (* int *)
| thandle : rgn -> omega (* p handle *)
| tpair : omega -> omega -> rgn -> omega (* t1 x t2 at p *)
| tcode : capset -> (regt -> omega) -> omega (* code A,G *)
| tabsr : (rgn -> omega) -> omega (* \/ p:Rgn. t *)
| tabsc : (capset -> omega) -> omega (* \/ c:Cap. t *)
| tabscb : (capset -> omega) -> capset -> omega (* bounded poly over cap *)
| tabscd : forall (c1 c2:capset), ((disjcap c1 c2) -> omega) -> omega
| tabst : (omegaV 1) -> omega (* \/ t:Type. t' *)
| trec : (omegaV 1) -> omega (* \mu t:Type. t' *).
141Notice in the tabsr and tabsc constructors that abstraction over RgnTAL region and
capability variables is represented by a Coq function from the appropriate set to omega.
Then, constructor application in RgnTAL corresponds directly to application in the logic
we do not need a separate denition of substitution, variable renaming, etc. However,
HOAS has not been used in the tabst case  for abstraction over RgnTAL types them-
selves. It would have been nice to be able to dene the tabst constructor as well to have
type (omega -> omega) -> omega, but the leftmost omega in this expression represents
a negative occurrence, which is not allowed in CiC for the inductive type that is being
dened. This restriction on inductive type denitions is necessary to enforce consistency
of the logic [79].
One approach to try and bypass this restriction is to use the impredicativity of the
CiC universe Set. That is, instead of dening separate constructors for abstraction over
regions, capabilities, and types, we dene a single constructor which captures abstraction
over any Set. Since omega is itself in Set, we could then instantiate this constructor with
omega:
Inductive omega : Set :=
...
| tabs : forall (j:Set), (j -> omega) -> omega
Thus, for example, the RgnTAL type 8[:Type](A; ) would be represented as
(tabs omega (fun (t:omega) => (tcode A G)))
for appropriate A and G.
This approach had been used previously in [74]. However, it turns out that this trick
does not work for my purposes. By dening omega in this way, we have built a so-called
large inductive denition on which additional restrictions apply for elimination, again in
order to maintain consistency of the logic [78]. In particular, we cannot write projection
functions that return the rst or second arguments of tabs. This limitation is quite un-
fortunate because we would need such projections to prove injectivity of the constructors
when developing the syntactic soundness proof for the type system.
[74] was not interested in proving soundness of the encoded type system in Coq itself
142and therefore did not run into this problem. Nonetheless, the latest version of Coq has
removed the impredicativity of the sort Set in order to have a more consistent logical
system in the eyes of the intuitionistic mathematician community. Therefore, the default
conguration of the Coq proof checker will not even allow large inductive denitions
such as the one above any more.2
Inanyevent,itseemstobedifcult torepresentRgnTALtypeabstraction usingHOAS
and so I have utilized a deBruijn index representation for type variables. In order to keep
theeffectsofthedeBruijnrepresentationlocalizedfromthemaindevelopmentandproofs,
I dene a lifted version of omega as follows:
Inductive omegaV : nat -> Set :=
| tvvar : forall i, omegaV (S i)
| tvlift : forall i, omegaV i -> omegaV (S i)
| tvint : omegaV 0
| tvhandle : rgn -> omegaV 0
| tvpair : forall i, omegaV i -> omegaV i -> rgn -> omegaV i
| tvcode : forall i, capset -> (regt -> omegaV i) -> omegaV i
| tvabsr : forall i, (rgn -> omegaV i) -> omegaV i
| tvabsc : forall i, (capset -> omegaV i) -> omegaV i
| tvabscb : forall i, (capset -> omegaV i) -> capset -> omegaV i
| tvabscd : forall i, forall (c1 c2:capset),
((disjcap c1 c2) -> omegaV i) -> omegaV i
| tvabst : forall i, omegaV (S i) -> omegaV i
| tvrec : forall i, omegaV (S i) -> omegaV i.
This denintion keeps track of the number of free type variables in the term. Thus
(omegaV 1) is the kind of an encoded RgnTAL type which may have up to one free type
variable in it. The rst two constructors of omegaV are for the deBruijn representation
the rst is for the actual type variables and the second is to lift the degree of a type. That
is, a type with up to i free variables in it can also be treated as a type with up to i+1
free variables. The remaining constructors of omegaV are simply mirror images of the
omega denition that propagate the number of free type variables. Notice that the tvabst
constructor (and the tvrec) binds a type variable it takes a type with i+1 free variables
and binds the topmost one to produce a type with only i free variables.
2Although the feature may be restored in the current version of Coq using a command-line argument.
143Fixpoint subst_aux (i:nat) (t:omegaV i) struct t
: forall j, i=(S j) -> omegaV j -> omegaV j
:= match
t as X in (omegaV i) return (forall j (p:i=S j) (e':omegaV j), omegaV j)
with
| tvvar n => fun j _ e' => e'
| tvlift n t' => fun j (p:S n=S j) _ =>
eq_rec n _ t' j (myeqaddS n j p)
| tvint => fun j (p:0=S j) _ => O_S_set _ j p
| tvhandle _ => fun j (p:0=S j) _ => O_S_set _ j p
| tvpair n t1 t2 p'
=> fun j (p:n=S j) e' =>
tvpair j (subst_aux n t1 j p e')
(subst_aux n t2 j p e') p'
| tvcode n A G => fun j (p:n=S j) e' =>
tvcode j A
(fun r => (subst_aux n (G r) j p e'))
| tvabsr n Fr => fun j (p:n=S j) e' =>
tvabsr j
(fun p' => (subst_aux n (Fr p') j p e'))
| tvabsc n Fc => fun j (p:n=S j) e' =>
tvabsc j
(fun c => (subst_aux n (Fc c) j p e'))
| tvabscb n Fc A => fun j (p:n=S j) e' =>
tvabscb j
(fun c => (subst_aux n (Fc c) j p e')) A
| tvabscd n c1 c2 Fcd => fun j (p:n=S j) e' =>
tvabscd j c1 c2
(fun D =>
(subst_aux n (Fcd D) j p e'))
| tvabst n t' => fun j (p:n=S j) e' =>
tvabst j
(subst_aux (S n) t' (S j)
(myfequal _ _ S _ _ p)
(tvlift j e'))
| tvrec n t' => fun j (p:n=S j) e' =>
tvrec j
(subst_aux (S n) t' (S j)
(myfequal _ _ S _ _ p)
(tvlift j e'))
end.
Figure 6.1: Substitution for the encoding of RgnTAL types.
144ThedeBruijnrepresentationmeansthatIdonotneedtoworryaboutalpha-equivalence
in the encoding of types. However, I do need to explicitly dene the substition operation.
The denition of omegaV allows the use of dependent types to enforce the correctness of
substitution. Hence, I can dene a function,
Definition substV : omegaV 1 -> omegaV 0 -> omegaV 0
:= fun T t => (subst_aux _ T _ (refl_equal 1) t).
which takes a type with one free variable T and a type with no free variables t and
substitutes t for the variable in T to return a type with no free variables. The function
actually makes use of a more generalized version shown in Figure 6.1. The Coq syntax
needed to code this function is somewhat opaque,3 but it basically takes a type t, with
j+1 (= i) free variables, and a type e', with one less free variable, and substitutes e' for
the topmost free variable in t.
In the tvvar case, we have found the free variable which is to be substituted so we
replace it with e'. In tvlift we know that the lifted term does not contain the variable
we are substituting for so we simply return t'. However, it is necessary to cast the type
of t' from (omegaV n) to (omegaV j) where i = j + 1 = n + 1, using the elimination
operator on equality eq_rec. The simple constructors such as tvint should not have
to be considered because they will not contain any free type variables (they have kind
omegaV 0); thus the lemma O_S_set eliminates these cases based on the absurd proof p
that O = j + 1. In the remaining cases, the substitution is simply propagated through
the constructors as necessary.
After substitution, I dene functions using similar techniques which convert between
the two versions of omega and also a function to unfold a recursive type (by substituting
itself for the free variable in its body):
Definition unliftV0 : omegaV 0 -> omega := ...
Definition lifttoV : omega -> omegaV 0 := ...
Definition unfoldV : omegaV 1 -> omega
:= fun t:(omegaV 1) => unliftV0 (substV t (tvrec _ t)).
3Much credit goes to Valery Trifonov for working out the way to write this function in Coq.
145As mentionedearlier in this section, the useof two versionsof omegakeepsthereason-
ing about deBruijn encodings out of most of the proofs. The reason should be clear from
the standard statements of the preservation and progress lemmas for showing soundness
of a type system in the syntactic method (see Section 5.2 for example): in these proofs
we need to reason about well-typed programs at the top-level, where the type variable
context is empty. The only time that it is necessary to deal with type variables is when the
current instruction is a jump or branch to another code block whose specication may be
a polymorphic type. At this point, we need to instantiate the variables of the code block
type context with types of the correct kind from our top-level context, but once that is
done, we have immediately again a type with no free variables.
Theotherplace inthetypesystemwheretypevariables areintroducedintothecontext
is the typing rule for code heap values. For example, in RgnTAL we had:
C;;A;  ` I
C ` code [](A; ):I
(C-CODE)
I encode this rule using a hybrid scheme of HOAS and deBruijn substitution:
Inductive wf_codeval : codemem -> codeval -> Prop :=
| wf_cvcode : forall CM (t:omega) Is,
(forall (Ts:list constr) A G,
instcodetype t Ts (tcode A G) ->
wf_iseq CM A G Is) ->
wf_codeval CM (cvcode t Is)
The instcodetype relation corresponds to substitution of a list of constructors for the
variables in a RgnTAL type context: [~ c=] = 8[](A; ). Thus, in wf_cvcode I use the
idea of HOAS to introduce a set of Coq variables Ts and then substitute them into the
deBruijn encoding to obtain a code type where the variables of the object language are, in
fact, represented as variables of the meta-language.
One nal detail in this method of encoding RgnTAL variables is that I end up need-
ing to specifyan extensionaldenitionof equality on typesbecause of theuseof functions
(for HOAS) in the constructorsrepresentingabstraction over regionsand capabilities cou-
146pledwith the representationof typeabstraction usingrst-orderabstract syntax(deBruijn
indices).
The need for deBruijn indices certainly has an effect on the elegance and convenience
of encoding the RgnTAL type system in Coq and reasoning about it. Furthermore, I can-
not derive in my type systems the immediate benets of the impredicative alternative
described above for the purposes detailed in [74, 82]. Nonetheless, I do manage to have
an encoding of the TAL type systems for which the necessary proofs can be developed to
satisfy the needs of the FPCC framework. As future work, it will be benecial to explore
the use of alternate logical frameworks, such as the Twelf framework, instead of Coq,
which would allow the proper use of HOAS, thus simplifying much of the effort involved
in formalizing the binding constructs of the type system. On the other hand, the benet
of using Coq is that we reuse the Coq logic for the assertions of our actual object language
(CAP). If we use a logical framework like Twelf, then we will also need to encode the
assertion logic and perhaps prove its properties that are gotten for free by reusing Coq.
This will not necessarily be difcult, but will require a new denition of CAP and some
reorganization of the overall framework.
6.3 Coq Encodings and Adequacy
The handling of type abstraction and variables described in the previous section will per-
haps be somewhat disturbing for the reader familiar with logical frameworks and the use
of HOAS. The issue that may be raised is the one of adequacy. That is, does the Coq encod-
ing accurately capture the syntax and semantics of the language as dened, for example,
in Figures 5.1, 5.5, and 5.6. In fact, as it should be clear from the presentation of Coq de-
tails, the encoding is not adequate with respect to the typeset description of the RgnTAL
language.
I have, for the most part, implemented a shallow embedding of RgnTAL in Coq. That is,
I usetheunderlyingbinding mechanism of thelogic torepresentthebinding constructsof
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can arise from the use of a shallow embedding. One is that the usual induction principles
over the structure of terms is lost. This has not been a problem with Coq since the gener-
ated induction principles for omega are sufcient for my purposes. Another problem that
can arise is that reasoning on the syntax becomes more difcult. For example, it would
be hard or impossible to dene a function that counts the number of free region variables
in a omega term because there are no bound variables at the object level they have been
lifted to Coq variables and the logic cannot be used to reason about itself in that way.
Nonetheless, I have not had a need to perform such reasoning on the syntax of RgnTAL
and so this also is not a problem.
Finally, the major issue with shallow embeddings is the difculty in preserving the
adequacy of the encoding. This exhibits itself in the ability to dene exotic terms terms
that do not encode any valid term of the language according to the BNF description. For
example, in Coq I can dene the following very strange omega term, which does not cor-
respond to any valid RgnTAL type according to Figure 5.1:
Definition exotic : omega
:= tabsr (fun r => match r with
| 0 => tint
| _ => (thandle r) end).
The occurrence of such exotic terms in the RgnTAL encoding is compounded by the
fact that I have represented type abstraction using a rst-order encoding (deBruijn in-
dices), described in the preceding section of this chapter. Thus, one could dene a term
that performs strange manipulations on the deBruijn index representing a type variable.
When using HOAS to encode an object language, one usually either uses a logical
framework that does not exhibit such problems, or else one would dene a valid predi-
cate on omega terms to somehow prevent the formation of such exotic terms. However, in
my case, I do not need to do this. The reason is that even if the encoded language does
not adequately represent the original, I have still proven formally the type soundness of
the system. Therefore, even if exotic terms are somehow introduced into a well-typed
148program, they will not affect the soundness of the language and the translation into CAP
will still satisfy the safety policy.
The normal use of logical frameworks is to encodean object language and prove prop-
erties about the encoding that will be applicable to the object language. Usually, in such
a situation, one implements a type-checker or compiler for the object language separate
from thelogical encodingandit isthereforenecessarytobesurethattheproofsdeveloped
for the logical encoding will also hold for the implementation. In my case, the logical en-
coding is also the implementation and therefore, even if the encoding actually captures
a more complex language than what is initially on paper, it is irrelevant as long as the
necessary safety proofs can be generated in the end.
Note, though, that there is one aspect of the encoding that must be adequate in my
framework. That is the encoding of the machine semantics in Section 2.1. Ultimately, I am
proving the safety property for the machine encoding. If the encoding in Coq does not
match the actual behavior of the machine, then the Coq proofs are useless. Adequacy in
this situation is fairly easy to establish, however, because the machine encoding is sim-
ply rst-order and can be directly checked against the specications of the hardware's
operation.
In summary of the discussion in this section and the previous two, then, I can list the
major advantages and disadvantages of using the Coq tool to develop my prototypes.
Most of these are actually issues with the Coq logic CiC as opposed to the actual soft-
ware implementation. The advantages are:
 The inductive types, along with base logic of CC, provide a very expressive sys-
tem in which to encode systems and reason about them. (Unfortunately, this great
expressiveness plays a part in some of the disadvantages listed below.)
 By using the logic at different layers, we are able to directly embed the entire rea-
soning power of CiC into the assertions of our object language, CAP. In dening the
syntax of CAP, the assertions are arbitrary CiC predicates on state (another instance
149of the use of shallow embedding). That means that CAP assertions can easily refer
to the RgnTAL encoding and use its properties to certify safety of its own code.
On the other hand, the main disadvantages that I have encountered are:
 Proof automation is very primitive. Because of the expressiveness of the logic, and
especially the presence of inductive types, the search space seems to be too large to
handle much automated searching for proof terms. Thus, one must use primitive
tactics when developing proofs and there is not a reasonably good way to compose
more effective tactics for a given proof development without resorting to program-
ming in the underlying OCaml implementation.
 The fragility of Coq proof scripts, which are sequences of tactic commands, means
that making a change to some part of the object encoding may potentially affect a
major part of the scripts, requiring manual editing, to adjust the order of operations,
or to rename hypotheses, for example. This is not even taking into account the
changes in syntax or the behavior of tactics that occur with new releases of the Coq
tool. Explicitly building the proof terms, instead of using the tactics, is not much
more use because again when a change is made to the system being encoded, the
proof terms have to be edited to reect that.
 The limited ability for using higher-order abstract syntax in encodings means that
one mustresorttoreasoning about termswith deBruijn indices or somesimilar rst-
order representation. Not an enjoyable task for a human being, even if the amount
of such reasoning needed is limited, as I have tried to do. Eventually, programs that
are even as complex as the Fibonacci example in Appendix C result in one having to
manage quite large proof terms in order to build a type checking derivation. While
doable for a prototype implementation, this quickly becomes too tedious for a hu-
man to handle, and should be handled by an automated tool built for that purpose.
 In addition to the deBruijn indices, another area of reasoning that becomes cumber-
150some in Coq is that of equality. Because of the dependent types that are used in the
encodings, it sometimes becomes complex to reason about equality between terms.
Figure 6.1 demonstrates a simple example of this.
These issues certainly indicate that there is much future work to be engaged in, in-
cluding the evaluation of alternate frameworks for reasoning than Coq or CiC.
6.4 Function Pointers, Mutable Memory, and Reection
The discussion in this section may perhaps be best viewed as future work but I include it
here since it might throw some light on how the syntactic approach to FPCC that I have
developed handles tough language features like function pointers and mutable memory.
In a recent paper, Reynolds makes the following observation about Hoare logic:
Even as a low-level language, the simple imperative language axiomatized by
Hoare is decient in making no provision for the occurrence in data structures
of addresses that refer to machine code. Such code pointers appear in the
compiled translation of programs in higher-order languages such as Scheme
or SML, or object-oriented languages such as Java or C#. Moreover, they also
appearinlow-level programsthatusethetechniquesofhigher-orderorobject-
oriented programming.[67]
Thedifculty of handling rst-class code pointersin Hoare logic arisesimmediately in
proof-carrying code frameworks because they are usually based on proving safety using
Hoare logic-style reasoning with pre- and post-conditions for each machine command.
Besides having to deal with rst-class code pointers, programs compiled from the TALs
presented in this thesis will also have blocks of code that make recursive calls to each
other indirectly. Suppose we have a CAP program with the following command block in
memory:
l2 7! C2;jmp r2
151To prove this code safe, we would need to specify somehow that the address in r2 is a
pointer to code that requires, for example, r1 = 1 before jumping to it.4 In CAP, therefore,
the code specication for code address l2 would be given by something like:
(l2) = fcodeptr(r2;fr1 = 1g)g
where codeptr is a predicate that somehow species the precondition of r2 to be fr1 =
1g. Dening codeptr for this can already be tricky but it gets much more complicated
with recursive functions. Consider another code block in memory that may be mutually
recursive with l2:
l2 7! C2;jmp r2
l3 7! C3;jmp r3
At runtime the register r3 may contain l2 and r2 may contain l3. One way to handle this
would be to analyze the whole program to nd out all possible targets of these jumps and
then build a specication which is a disjunction of these concrete target labels. However,
this does not allow for very modular specication and checking of code blocks. What we
want to be able to specify is something like:
(l2) = f(r2) ^ codeptr(r2;(r2))g
(l3) = f(r3) ^ codeptr(r3;(r3))g
Namely, for l2, there is some precondition of r2 specied in  which holds at the point
that the jump from l2 takes place. Of course, this cannot be dened in Coq because we are
trying to use  in its own denition.
It is interesting that Reynolds, following the statement quoted at the beginning of this
section, goes on to suggest the introduction of a reection operator to handle such code
pointers. Reection, in general, refersto an entity's(theentityusually being an executable
4More accurately, I should write R(r1) = 1, where the specication is a predicate on machine state, but for
simplicity I leave the state components implicit in these examples.
152program) ability to represent and operate on itself in the same way it deals with its other
constituents [21]. Notice that in the specications of l1 and l2 above,  is trying to reect
on its own contents.
It seems that the manner in which the syntactic approach to FPCC handles rst-class
code pointers is similar to the use of reection and especially the related process of rei-
cation. In terms of executable programs, reication is the provision of a mechanism for
encoding execution state as data. Once the execution state has been represented as data
somehow,thedatacan beinspectedormodiedandreintroducedintotheexecutionstate.
In a similar way, we may view the TAL code types as reied data which are reected into
the denition of the CAP code specication. The CpInv function in Section 4.4.3 denes
the relationship between syntactic data structures (the encoding of the TAL language and
type system) and the predicates on state which make up the code specication of CAP
through CpGen. During the process of proving safety, we know that the specications for
code compiled from TAL are based on the syntactic terms that encode the syntax of TAL.
In other words, we know that the CAP preconditions, which can potentially be predi-
cates of arbitrary form, have been generated from the TAL encoding and therefore we can
reason about their properties and interaction based on the structure of TAL syntax. The
syntactic encoding, in turn, has appropriate typing rules for handling recursive code and
the encoded soundness proof of the language shows by induction one step at a time that
the typing rules are meaningful. Therefore circularity in the reasoning about specica-
tions is eliminated.
The way mutable memory is dealt with in the syntactic framework is also similar to
code pointers. Recall from the Introduction, Section 1.3, that the semantic approach tries
to verify the store instruction by introducing an allocset. The allocset mapping keeps track
of the typesat each location in memory in order to maintain consistencyin thepresenceof
aliasing. In the semantic framework, however, types are predicates in the logic, which in
turn depend on the allocset. This introduced a troublesome circularity in the denitions.
153In the syntactic approach, instead of using an allocset that maps to predicates, I am
essentially mapping addresses to syntactic terms (again, the inductive denition of TAL
types) that describe the layout of memory. Since these terms are simply rst-order objects
in the logic, it is easy to reason about them, in particular, to ensure that the description
of memory is consistent in the presence of aliasing. Then I dene how to interpret these
syntactic terms (i.e. reect them) as predicates, which again takes place in the denition
of CpInv.
The use of CpInv thus enforces a number of constraints on the CAP predicates which
are useful for proving the safety theorems. However, many of the issues are still meshed
together and I hope in future work to separate the handling of mutable memory from
code pointers, for example. Even as we went from a monolithic invariant in Chapter 3 to
the local construction of CpInv for individual instructions in Chapter 4, I hope to further
distill the components of CpInv. This could lead to a better understanding of how to
produce foundational PCC and allow for more general support of interaction between
different type systems.
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Related Work
The development of this thesis has taken place in the context of a great number of related
works. Not only have I found useful ideas in older researches, there are a number of
contemporary developments in various areas which complement my framework. In this
chapter, I give an overview of related work in several areas that my research has touched
and benetted from.
7.1 Proof-Carrying Code
I have already given some overview of the development of proof-carrying code in the
Introduction. Here I summarize the lines of research as they have developed historically
and continue to do so. The idea of PCC was introduced by Necula and Lee and applied
in several case studies [56, 54, 58, 57]. The original framework was also used to build a
certifying compiler for Java, described in Colby, et al. [15].
More recently, there have been ongoing efforts to reduce the trustedcode base of these
traditional PCC systems, which have mostly focused on removing parts of the VCGen
from the TCB while maintaining the scalability and industrial-strength engineering qual-
ity that marked the rst implementations. To this end, Necula and Schneck have pre-
sented a series of incremental improvements to their PCC framework [59, 70, 60]. In their
155latest work, the PCC code producer is responsible not only for supplying the machine
code but also a verier which proves the code safe. The verier is an actual executable in-
stead of being a static proof. This untrusted verier interacts with a smaller, trusted, core
VCGen to prove safety of the code. The system is intended to be more secure and exible
by removing a large part of theoriginal VCGen from thetrustedbase, but in doing sothey
have begun to encounter the technical issues that arise in foundational PCC, such as the
handling of code pointers. In his thesis, Schneck [69] also begins to address the issue of
interoperation between different languages in the PCC system. The Open Verier frame-
work, as it is called, is still under development but appears to be approaching a solution
similar to my use of the CAP specication system. Currently, the integration seems to be
somewhat limited in nature, with programs being able to interoperate only if their mem-
ory areas are completely disjoint. The Open Verier does not use a language like CAP as
a common intermediate level, but it does involve specifying invariants (preconditions) of
each machine instruction which are based on the syntactic encoding of the typesystem,as
Ihave developed. Itmay be therefore,thattheselinesof research will mergeat somepoint
in the future, or at least produce results that are mutually benecial for each approach.
In another line of research, Bernard and Lee [9] investigated the use of temporal logic
toremovetheVCgeneratorfrom theTCB.Inparticular, theideaistousetemporallogic as
the basis for a formal security-policy language, instead of having the security policy and
enforcement mechanism built-in to a trusted VCGen. This work also may be viewed as
complementary tootherPCC research. Furthermore,another groupof researchers [90, 89]
have been using the Isabelle/HOL framework to verify the VC generator component of
a traditional proof-carrying code system. They currently have developed a prototype
framework with a generic VCGen that can be instantiated with a particular programming
language, safety policy, and safety logic.
In the meantime, Appel, et al. have introduced the notion of foundational proof-
carryingcode[4, 48, 5, 3]. Asdiscussedalsoin theIntroduction,theirFPCCprojectaims to
provide a more exible and secure PCC framework by developing proofs using only the
156foundations of mathematical logic. In particular, this system uses Church's higher-order
logic with axioms for arithmetic. The complexities of the semantic approach followed by
this FPCC group meant several years of developing models for various type system fea-
tures  the troublesome mutable references, recursive types, and code pointers. Ahmed
produced a stratied semantic model for handling mutable memory references [2]. A
low-level framework for typed machine language is being developed to encapsulate the
complex portions of the semantic model by serving as a general compilation target from
high-level typed assembly languages [76, 14]. Appel, et al. have also investigated the de-
velopment of a minimal TCB, producing one that includes less than 2,700 lines of code [6],
as well as work on minimizing the size of transmitted FPCC proofs [94].
Taking inspiration from the initial developments of FPCC, I have introduced a frame-
work based on syntactic soundness proofs. While I have concentrated on the use of the
CiC logic, Crary and others have adopted the syntactic FPCC approach to the Twelf [65]
metalogical framework [18, 19]. In the metalogical approach, the operational semantics of
the architecture and encodings of object languages are specied in one logic, while safety
proofs are supplied as metatheorems in the metalogic. The advantage of this system is
ease of development, as illustrated in the design of an expressive typed assembly lan-
guage [18] targeted at a real machine architecture (the Intel IA-32, or x86). One tradeoff,
however, is that the logical system is more complicated and thus may result in a larger
TCB. This research has also produced a low-level language with a type system that is
capable of expressing the interface of a realistic garbage collector [83]. This is similar in
nature to my provision of a region library through code stubsin the TAL heap, exceptthat
it is not as general since the interface is built into the type system. Also, while the inter-
face has been specied, the actual implementation of the garbage collector has not been
certied and therefore does not link together to provide a proof of safety of the complete
application, as the region library does in my case.
Finally, in work predating the developmentof proof-carrying code, Burstall and McK-
inna introduced the notion of deliverables a program paired with a proof of correctness.
157Despite the correspondence to the idea of PCC, this research was focused on a categorical
approach to program development, did not support programs with effects (i.e. impera-
tive programs), and does not seem to have been carried on beyond the simple framework
given in McKinna's thesis [47].
7.2 Typed Assembly Languages and Region Type Systems
One of the complementary and, in fact, enabling technologies of PCC has been the devel-
opment of typed assembly languages. Morrisett, et al. [52, 50] introduced the design of
a low-level, statically typed assembly language aimed at being more suitable than other
targets (such as Java bytecode) for supporting a wide variety of source languages and op-
timizations. There have been a great number of variants of the original TAL (three in this
dissertation!), each incorporating some interesting feature into the type system. In most
cases, it would be possible to utilize the syntactic approach to FPCC to compile programs
from these TAL variants into certied machine code. A related project that grew out from
TAL is the development of a safe dialect of C, called Cyclone [43]. Cyclone enforces safety
through advanced type system features, while at the same time providing compatibility
with C and retaining its low-level control and performance. Cyclone may potentially be
a good language to use for writing certied system libraries, such as the region manage-
ment library, and then compiling it down to a version of TAL. Cyclone provides support
for a number of different memory management mechanisms [31, 36] including regions
(a memory management discipline introduced by Tofte and Talpin [80, 81]) and garbage
collection.
The type system I use for RgnTAL is based on the capability calculus of Walker, et
al. [85, 20] for typed memory management. This work in turn was based on earlier re-
search [75, 86] using a linear type system to track pointer aliasing and destructive op-
erations on memory objects. I have left out many of the details and background of the
development of a region-based type system in this dissertation because I have, for the
158most part, directly adopted the work of [85, 84] in this regard.
7.3 Encoding Object Languages with Variable Binding
As discussed in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, one important issue that must be faced with when
encoding object languages is how to encode binding constructs and variables of the lan-
guage. One option is to take a rst-order approach resulting in a deep embedding: one en-
codesthevariables andbindersin theframeworkby explicit deningthetypeof variables
(e.g. inductive, as natural numbers), and the necessary concepts of alpha-equivalence,
beta-reduction, etc. . This approach allows us full reasoning power over the object lan-
guage but at the expense of a great deal of machinery to implement the necessary con-
cepts. Some representative examples of this approach in the Coq framework are those of
Huet, who formalized the lambda-calculus [41] using a deBruijn representation, and Bar-
ras, who also used a deBruijn representation to prove the correctness of the Coq kernel in
Coq itself [7].
A more elegant and convenient approach is to use a higher-order abstract syntax
(HOAS)[63]andashallow embedding, wherethebindingconstructsoftheobjectsystemare
represented using the binding constructs of the logic itself. However, as discussed in the
earlier chapter, this approach has difculties in a formal system of inductive denitions
like Coq. There is some ongoing research on how to adapt Coq to the HOAS approach,
among them [23, 22], which introduce a specic (non-inductively dened) type for vari-
able identiers that delegates alpha-conversion to the metalanguage, while eliminating
the possibility of so-called exotic terms. However, the drawback of this approach is that
the denition of substitution must still be encoded in the logic. In a separate line, [24, 72]
develop a new logic by extending the simply typed lambda-calculus with primitive re-
cursive constructs that allow the programming of adequate HOAS encodings. The goal
is to synthesis the methodology of HOAS used in a logical framework like LF [35] with
systems based on induction principles such as Coq.
159Another approach to reasoning with HOAS in logics such as Coq is to axiomatize the
necessary theory needed for reasoning about such encodings. This axiomatic approach
has been adopted and developed as the Theory of Contexts by [68, 38, 39, 49]. The issue
here of course is that one begins adding axioms to the base logic, which we would like
to avoid for FPCC, even though much effort has been put into proving their consistency.
[1, 30] also develop an axiomatic approach to reasoning about lambda calculi identied
up to alpha-conversion. A similar work to these others has been presented in [26] which
involves a two-level axiomatic methodologyfor reasoning about object languages. In this
approach, a specication logic is encoded in Coq as an inductive denition and then the
object logic is encoded in the specication logic.
7.4 Low-level Reasoning and Separation Logic
As in the other areas of related work, there are a great number of developmentsin reason-
ing about safety at a low level in the language hierarchy. I only try to list here those that I
have found most relevant to my work. Some common features of most, if not all, of these
works are that they involve (1) semi-automatic (i.e. human assisted) generation of proofs
or other form of certication for the low-level code, because of the very intricate nature of
reasoning required, and (2) they only concentrate on certifying or reasoning about code
at one level. My work also exhibits the former feature but in respect of the latter, I have
developeda framework to allow code certied using different methods,at different levels
of abstraction, to interoperate safely.
Historically, advancements in proving program properties have been spurred by the
works of McCarthy [46], Floyd [29], and Hoare [37]. Much of the research projects in
the last couple of decades have focused on formal, mechanical verication of high-level
language programs, as opposedto low-level machine code verication. Of the few excep-
tions, Yu and Boyer [100, 11] mechanically check the correctness of object code programs
for the Motorola MC68020 microprocessor. A substantial piece of research, they veri-
160ed implementations of a number of well-knowing searching, sorting, and string library
operations. In the process, they had to deal with some of the same issues that I have men-
tioned in this thesis. For functional parameters (i.e. code pointers), they essentially end
up hardcoding the addresses of code blocks into their correctness specications. This is
similar to what we would do if we were programming and certifying code in CAP with-
out reference to predicates related to a syntactic type system. Much of Yu's work also
involved reasoning about memory operations, which was quite complicated for them be-
cause they did not benet from the developmentof separation logic primitives (discussed
below) for that purpose. Finally, their approach was to compile high-level code and then
specify and reason about the object code correctness unlike my approach where I can
start with high-level code that has been certied correct (according to a type system) and
then compile to machine code, possibly linking into other machine code that has been
certied correct directly at the object code level.
There has been some use of the Coq proof assistant itself for low-level program ver-
ication. Much work has been done in the VeriCard project at INRIA (France) in the
context of certifying programs for smartcards running the JavaCard virtual machine, for
example [8]. This project in general is very specic to the Java VM language, deals with
high-level specications of safety and/or correctness, and also focuses on developing
proofs using a proof-assistant (as opposed to fully automatically during a compilation
process). The WHY system developed by Filli atre [28, 27] is a software certication tool
that produces proof obligations for annotated imperative programs. The imperative lan-
guage used is a high-level language and the proof obligation generator resembles the VC
generator of PCC. It is not clear, however, if the tool can really be extended to support the
necessary low-level reasoning for PCC.
For the purposes of reasoning about low-level manipulation of memory, I have en-
coded the separation logic primitives of Reynolds [67, 66] in Coq. The semantics of the
primitives are dened in terms of the machine memory model and the axioms and infer-
ence rules dened by Reynolds in his works are all derivable within the Coq encoding.
161Moredetailsof theuseofseparationlogic forourFPCC reasoningmay befoundin [97, 98]
or Yu's thesis [96]. Reynolds' work extends earlier work by Burstall [12] and parallels the
independent development of bunched logic by Ishtiaq, O'Hearn, and others [13, 42, 61].
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Future Work and Conclusion
My path to the research culminating in this thesis began with an investigation of Java
reection. Reection, mentioned in Section 6.4, is an advanced language feature that al-
lows programs to examine, adapt to, and modify representations of their own code and
execution state at runtime. As part of the research related to the FLINT project [73] for
developing a common typed intermediate language, League et al. [45] showed a formal
translation of a large subset of Java language features into a variant of the polymorphic
-calculus, F!.
I began to investigate the possibility of extending the FLINT framework to handle the
reection library of Java, which in standard Java compilers is implemented in C. It soon
became apparent that proving that runtime library type-safe required reasoning about
memory in ways that the type system of the intermediate language did not easily sup-
port. I have now developed the syntactic approach to FPCC which, as we have seen in
this thesis, provides a reasonably simple and straightforward approach to generate safe
machine codefrom a typical typedassemblylanguage(such asJava orFLINTmighteven-
tually compile to). Additionally, I have worked out a method in which runtime libraries
(such as the Java reection package) can be certied safe using low-level Hoare logic-style
reasoning and then linked together with the high-level compiled code. Of course, I have
presentedthis workwith very ideal languages, not Java or FLINT,so there is much poten-
163tial for future work. I outline below some of the directions in which this research could
logically proceed.
8.1 Limitations and Future Work
Clearly, a rst practical step will be to apply the framework to a real machine and to a
realistic typed assembly language. As mentioned in the related works, Crary [19, 18] has
already begun applying my syntactic framework, using a different logic framework, to
the Intel family of processors. With others in the FLINT project, I have also been working
on a version of CAP for the Intel x86 architecture. The results of these efforts will allow
for a better comparison of the viability of the syntactic approach with respect to previous
developments of proof-carrying code. Although the idealized machine I have used for
the prototype implementation of this dissertation is quite simplistic, the results should be
scalable to different machine architectures. This will not necessarily be a simple task, but
only because of technical details in different architectures, not because of any fundamen-
tal limitations. As TAL technology is scalable to different architectures so would be the
corresponding syntactic FPCC framework.
In order to produce the deliverable of a realistic certied system, we will have to ex-
tend the research along both the engineering and the theoretical aspects. In the engi-
neering aspect, there is much potential for proof development tools and checkers that are
tuned to the FPCC framework. Coq has been an excellent resource for the prototyping,
but it was obviously developed with different purposes in mind and would therefore be
better supplemented by tools specic for our purposes. For example, as described in Sec-
tion 3.3.5, we will needa compiler that deals directly with thelogical encodings,as well as
the source and target languages, so as to produce the necessary proofs of well-typedness
and the translation relations. When using a realistic language, we will also need to deal
with real operating system libraries, which will potentially be much more complex to cer-
tify, and denitely much larger, than the simple runtime library examples my prototype
164uses.
Along more theoretical paths of research, there is the possibility of investigating the
use of alternate logics for the framework. It is certainly not bound to the CiC logic, al-
though the higher-order reasoning and inductive denitions are very handy for our pur-
poses. Whether CiC is used or another logic, the encoding of type variables will remain
an issue to be dealt with for polymorphic, existential, recursive, and other such complex
types. It is probably also safe to say that the fundamental differences between seman-
tic and syntactic approaches to FPCC are still not well-understood. Future research may
unify the frameworks. Ideas such as those I mention in Section 6.4 could be worked out
to produce a more well-grounded understanding of the underlying relationship between
type systems and Hoare logic.
In addition to the logic used,the syntactic approach toFPCC clearly dependsmuch on
thetypesystemthatisbeingencoded. Notonlydoesthetypesystemhavetobeencodable
in the logic, it must also enforce the constraints specied by the safety policy. The FPCC
proofwill requireacompleterepresentationofthetypingderivationforasourceprogram,
so the type checking algorithm must be decidable as well. That is, if a fancy type system
such as DTAL [95] involves solving a constraint satisfaction problem  NP-complete in
general, but can often be efciently solved in practice  one probably cannot expect to
include the constraint solver in the logical encoding. Of course, it might be possible to use
an external type checker (written in a general-purpose programming language) to solve
the necessary constraints and have that represented in the logical encoding so that the
constraint solution only needs to be veried by the proof checker, not solved. It does not
appear that this would be a serious limitation of the syntactic approach, but nonetheless
will require further investigation and research.
Since most type systems will disallow the writing of some perfectly safe programs,
this also means that such programs may not be immediately certiable for PCC using the
syntactic approach. This may be alleviated somewhat by being able to directly certify the
programs using the low-level CAP layer of reasoning. However, even with CAP, certain
165types of code may not be certiable. An immediate example would be self-modifying or
dynamically generated code. CAP currently will not support such programs because the
CAP code specication must be xed statically at the point of proof-checking. Thus, there
are some aspects of my framework that will bear further research in this respect.
Finally, two more issues that will need to be addressed in a practical development
of such a framework will be the size of proofs that need to be transmitted and the de-
velopment time for proofs. As mentioned earlier in Section 3.3.6, the proofs needed for
a syntactic FPCC framework can be viewed as two portions a static portion and a dy-
namic one. The former, which is also the larger, portion will be composed of the proofs
of soundness for the type system, proofs about the translation of well-typed source pro-
grams, such as the theorems in Section 4.4.3, or proofs certifying the safety of the runtime
library. These proofs are produced semi-automatically by a human being interacting with
a proof assistant (at least in the current framework), but they only need to be developed
once for a given system. On the other hand, the dynamic portion of the FPCC proof will
be composed of the typing derivation for source programs that have been compiled to be
run by the code consumer. The size of these proofs can probably be greatly minimized
and they are produced automatically during the compilation process.
Thus, the issues of proof size and development time (or effort) will need to be ad-
dressed mainly for the static proofs described in the previous paragraph. Since the
mechanized proofs for the syntactic FPCC framework follow very closely the standard
proofs of soundness that are done on paper, the mechanization can be achieved with
reasonable effort, although it may not be entirely trivial. For the developments described
in Chapters 2 and 3, the Coq implementation was complete within half a year by a single
graduate student with no previous experience in Coq or CiC. The proofs of soundness
and correctness of compilation for the region-based system of Chapter 5 were completed
in only a couple of months, although the certication of the runtime library has taken
longer to complete, mainly because of tedious issues such as reasoning with deBruijn in-
dices. It therefore seems that the syntactic approach, in terms of implementation effort,
166is not any harder at the worst than other methods of producing PCC. The issue of proof
sizes is somewhat harder to evaluate at this point because I only have a prototype frame-
work. The Coq proof scripts for Chapter 3 are about 10,000 lines of specications and
proof tactics.
8.2 Conclusion
It seems at times that I have introduced more new problems than I have solved. Yet the
progress is promising. The work described in this thesis goes a good way towards the
realistic goal of laying a foundation for certifying safety of the whole code. More than
ever, codes that are written and compiled from varying levels of the language hierarchy
need to be veried for safe interoperation. It is becoming less and less desirable to allow
infrastructure code, such as operating systems and runtime libraries, to remain in the
trusted computing base of software systems. In summary then, my main contributions
have been:
 Developmentofthesyntacticapproachtofoundationalproof-carryingcode,inwhich
syntactic soundness proofs of a type system are mechanized in a formal logic and
used to produce a safety proof for the compiled machine code.
 A framework for FPCC supporting interoperation between code compiled from
high-leveltypesystemsandcodeforlow-levelruntimelibrariescertiedsemi-automatically
at the machine or assembly level.
 Initial development of a certied region-based memory management library that
links together with a typed assembly language incorporating region capabilities in
its type system.
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Coq Files for the Syntactic Approach
to Foundational Proof-Carrying Code
This chapter lists the Coq code for the system described in Chapter 3. Proofs of all the
lemmas and theorems listed here have been completed. (I have omitted the actual Coq
proof scripts, composed of long sequences of tactic commands, from these listings as well
as some of the utility libraries and lemmas.)
A.1 An Idealized Machine for FPCC
Machine state
(* Register denitions and utilities *)
Load tisreg.
Denition word := nat.
Denition mem := word ! word.
Denition rle := reg ! word.
Denition state := (mem  rle  word)%type.
(* Commands (machine instruction set) *)
Inductive cmd : Set :=
j add : reg ! reg ! reg ! cmd
j addi : reg ! reg ! word ! cmd
j sub : reg ! reg ! reg ! cmd
j subi : reg ! reg ! word ! cmd
168j mov : reg ! reg ! cmd
j movi : reg ! word ! cmd
j bgt : reg ! reg ! word ! cmd
j bgti : reg ! word ! word ! cmd
j jd : word ! cmd
j jmp : reg ! cmd
j ld : reg ! reg ! word ! cmd
j st : reg ! word ! reg ! cmd
j ill : cmd.
(* Decode utilities *)
Denition icoded (w : word) : nat := mod w 8.
Denition r1argd (w : word) : nat := mod (div8 w) 32.
Denition r2argd (w : word) : nat := mod (div32 (div8 w)) 32.
Denition r3argd (w : word) : nat := mod (div32 (div32 (div8 w))) 32.
Denition w1argd (w : word) : nat := div8 w.
Denition w2argd (w : word) : nat := div32 (div8 w).
Denition w3argd (w : word) : nat := div32 (div32 (div8 w)).
(* Decode function *)
Denition Dc (w : word) : cmd :=
match icoded w with
j (1) ) add (nat2reg (r1argd w)) (nat2reg (r2argd w)) (nat2reg (r3argd w))
j (2) ) addi (nat2reg (r1argd w)) (nat2reg (r2argd w)) (w3argd w)
j (3) ) sub (nat2reg (r1argd w)) (nat2reg (r2argd w)) (nat2reg (r3argd w))
j (4) ) subi (nat2reg (r1argd w)) (nat2reg (r2argd w)) (w3argd w)
j (5) ) mov (nat2reg (r1argd w)) (nat2reg (r2argd w))
j (6) ) movi (nat2reg (r1argd w)) (w2argd w)
j (7) ) bgt (nat2reg (r1argd w)) (nat2reg (r2argd w)) (w3argd w)
j (8) ) bgti (nat2reg (r1argd w)) (w2argd w) (w3argd w)
j (9) ) jd (w1argd w)
j (10) ) jmp (nat2reg (r1argd w))
j (11) ) ld (nat2reg (r1argd w)) (nat2reg (r2argd w)) (w3argd w)
j (12) ) st (nat2reg (r1argd w)) (w3argd w) (nat2reg (r2argd w))
j ) ill
end.
Machine semantics
Denition updatereg (R : rle) (rd : reg) (v : word) : rle :=
fun r : reg ) if beq reg r rd then v else R r.
Denition updatemem (M : mem) (a v : word) : mem :=
169fun w : word ) if beq nat w a then v else M w.
Denition Step (St : state) : state :=
match St with
j (M, R, pc) )
match Dc (M pc) with
j add rd rs rs' ) (M, updatereg R rd (R rs + R rs'), S pc)
j addi rd rs w ) (M, updatereg R rd (R rs + w), S pc)
j sub rd rs rs' ) (M, updatereg R rd (R rs - R rs'), S pc)
j subi rd rs w ) (M, updatereg R rd (R rs - w), S pc)
j mov rd rs ) (M, updatereg R rd (R rs), S pc)
j movi rd w ) (M, updatereg R rd w, S pc)
j bgt rs rt w )
if blt nat (R rt) (R rs) then (M, R, w) else (M, R, S pc)
j bgti rs i w )
if blt nat i (R rs) then (M, R, w) else (M, R, S pc)
j jd w ) (M, R, w)
j jmp r ) (M, R, R r)
j ld rd rs w ) (M, updatereg R rd (M (R rs + w)), S pc)
j st rd w rs ) (updatemem M (R rd + w) (R rs), R, S pc)
j ill ) St
end
end.
Fixpoint MultiStep (n : nat) : state ! state :=
match n with
j O ) fun S : state ) S j S m ) fun S : state ) Step (MultiStep m S)
end.
A.2 Featherweight Typed Assembly Language
Syntax
Inductive Reg : Set := r0 : Reg j r1 : Reg j r2 : Reg j r3 : Reg j r4 : Reg
j r5 : Reg j r6 : Reg j r7 : Reg j r8 : Reg j r9 : Reg
j r10: Reg j r11 : Reg j r12 : Reg j r13 : Reg j r14 : Reg
j r15: Reg j r16 : Reg j r17 : Reg j r18 : Reg j r19 : Reg
j r20: Reg j r21 : Reg j r22 : Reg j r23 : Reg j r24 : Reg
j r25: Reg j r26 : Reg j r27 : Reg j r28 : Reg j r29 : Reg
j r30: Reg.
Syntactic Denition label := nat.
Syntactic Denition int := nat.
170Syntactic Denition initag := bool.
(* The allocation pointer register is not merged into the normal register le - it just contains a label
with a special type *)
Denition AP := label.
Inductive APTy : Set := fresh : APTy
j used : nat ! APTy.
(* Lifted types *)
Inductive OmegaL : nat ! Set
:= varL : (i:nat) (OmegaL (S i))
j liftL : (i:nat) (OmegaL i) ! (OmegaL (S i))
j inttyL : (OmegaL O)
j codetyL : (i:nat) (OmegaL Map i) ! APTy ! (OmegaL i)
j tuptyL : (i:nat) (OmegaL List i) ! (list initag) ! (OmegaL i)
j rectyL : (i:nat) (OmegaL (S i)) ! (OmegaL i)
with OmegaL Map : nat ! Set
:= memptyL : (i:nat) (OmegaL Map i)
j melemL : (i:nat) Reg ! (OmegaL i) ! (OmegaL Map i) ! (OmegaL Map i)
with OmegaL List : nat ! Set
:= nilL : (i:nat) (OmegaL List i)
j consL : (i:nat) (OmegaL i) ! (OmegaL List i) ! (OmegaL List i).
Syntactic Denition OmegaR := (OmegaL (S O)).
(* The actual types *)
Inductive Omega : Set := intty : Omega
j codety : (Map Reg Omega) ! APTy ! Omega
j tupty : (list Omega) ! (list initag) ! Omega
j recty : (OmegaL (S O)) ! Omega.
(* deBruijn substitution functions *)
Load rftal.
Syntactic Denition RegFileTy := (Map Reg Omega).
Inductive WordVal : Set
:= wl : label ! WordVal
j wi : int ! WordVal
j wuninit : Omega ! WordVal
j wfold : WordVal ! Omega ! WordVal.
Inductive Instr : Set
:= add : Reg ! Reg ! Reg ! Instr
j addi : Reg ! Reg ! int ! Instr
j alloc : Reg ! (list Omega) ! Instr
171j bgt : Reg ! Reg ! label ! Instr
j bump : int ! Instr
j fold : Reg ! Omega ! Reg ! Instr
j ld : Reg ! Reg ! int ! Instr
j mov : Reg ! Reg ! Instr
j movi : Reg ! int ! Instr
j movl : Reg ! label ! Instr
j st : Reg ! int ! Reg ! Instr
j unfold : Reg ! Reg ! Instr.
Inductive InstrSeq : Set
:= iseq : Instr ! InstrSeq ! InstrSeq
j jd : label ! InstrSeq
j jmp : Reg ! InstrSeq.
Inductive HeapVal : Set
:= tuple : (list WordVal) ! HeapVal
j code : RegFileTy ! APTy ! InstrSeq ! HeapVal.
Denition RegFile := (Map Reg WordVal).
Denition Heap := (WFMap label HeapVal).
Syntactic Denition hunwrap := (unwrapMap label HeapVal).
Syntactic Denition hsize := (msize label HeapVal).
Syntactic Denition hindom := (mindom label HeapVal).
Syntactic Denition hnindom := (mnotindom label HeapVal).
Syntactic Denition hlookup := (mlookup label HeapVal).
Syntactic Denition hupdate := (mupdate label HeapVal).
Syntactic Denition hextend := (mextend label HeapVal).
Syntactic Denition hupdext := (mupdext label HeapVal).
Denition HeapTy := (WFMap label Omega).
Syntactic Denition htunwrap := (unwrapMap label Omega).
Syntactic Denition htsize := (msize label Omega).
Syntactic Denition htindom := (mindom label Omega).
Syntactic Denition htnindom := (mnotindom label Omega).
Syntactic Denition htlookup := (mlookup label Omega).
Syntactic Denition htupdate := (mupdate label Omega).
Syntactic Denition htextend := (mextend label Omega).
Syntactic Denition htupdext := (mupdext label Omega).
Syntactic Denition reglookup := (mlookup ? ?).
Syntactic Denition regupdext := (mupdext ? ?).
Denition Program := (Heap  (RegFile  (AP  InstrSeq))).
172(* Stuff for the heap *)
Syntactic Denition HeapMap := (Map label HeapVal).
Inductive OrdHeap : HeapMap ! Prop
:= ordheap0 : (OrdHeap (mempty ? ?))
j ordheap1 : (l:label; hv:HeapVal; h:(Map label HeapVal))
(msize ? ? h l) ! (OrdHeap h) ! (OrdHeap (melem ? ? l hv h)).
Inductive PropSubHeap : HeapMap ! HeapMap ! Prop
:= propsubh0 : (h:HeapMap; l:label; hv:HeapVal) (PropSubHeap h (melem ? ? l hv h))
j propsubh1 : (h,h':HeapMap; l:label; hv:HeapVal)
(PropSubHeap h h') ! (PropSubHeap h (melem ? ? l hv h')).
Inductive SubHeap : HeapMap ! HeapMap ! Prop
:= subheap0 : (h:HeapMap) (SubHeap h h)
j subheap1 : (h,h':HeapMap) (PropSubHeap h h') ! (SubHeap h h').
(* Length and positions of an instruction sequence and other utilities *)
Inductive ISubDepth : InstrSeq ! InstrSeq ! nat ! Prop
:= isubd0 : (I:InstrSeq) (ISubDepth I I O)
j isubdS : (I,I':InstrSeq; i:Instr; n:nat)
(ISubDepth I' I n) ! (ISubDepth I' (iseq i I) (S n)).
Fixpoint lenInstrSeq [I:InstrSeq] : nat
:= Cases I of (iseq I') ) (S (lenInstrSeq I'))
j ) (S O) end.
Fixpoint getInstrPos [n:nat] : InstrSeq ! InstrSeq
:= [I] Cases n of O ) I
j (S n') ) Cases I of (iseq I') ) (getInstrPos n' I')
j ) I end end.
Inductive ListNth [A:Set] : (list A) ! nat ! A ! Prop
:= listnth0 : (V:(list A); a:A) (ListNth A (cons a V) O a)
j listnth1 : (V:(list A); a,a':A; n:nat)
(ListNth A V n a') ! (ListNth A (cons a V) (S n) a').
Fixpoint makeUninitTup [V:(list Omega)] : (list WordVal)
:= Cases V of nil ) (nil WordVal) j (cons t V') ) (cons (wuninit t) (makeUninitTup V')) end.
Fixpoint makeUninitTupty [V:(list Omega)] : (list initag)
:= Cases V of nil ) (nil initag)
j (cons t V') ) (cons false (makeUninitTupty V'))
end.
Inductive updatetuple
: (list WordVal) ! int ! WordVal ! (list WordVal) ! Prop
173:= updtup0 : (V:(list WordVal); w,w':(WordVal))
(updatetuple (cons w V) O w' (cons w' V))
j updtup1 : (V,V':(list WordVal); w,w':(WordVal); i:int)
(updatetuple V i w' V') !
(updatetuple (cons w V) (S i) w' (cons w V')).
Inductive updatetupty : (list initag) ! int ! (list initag) ! Prop
:= updtpt0 : (V:(list initag); b:initag)
(updatetupty (cons b V) O (cons true V))
j updtpt1 : (V,V':(list initag); b:initag; i:int)
(updatetupty V i V') !
(updatetupty (cons b V) (S i) (cons b V')).
Operational Semantics
Inductive Eval : Program ! Program ! Prop
:= ev add : (H:Heap; R,R':RegFile; r31:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(rd,rs,rs':Reg; rsval,rsval':int)
(reglookup R rs (wi rsval)) !
(reglookup R rs' (wi rsval')) !
(regupdext R rd (wi (plus rsval rsval')) R') !
(Eval (H, (R, (r31, (iseq (add rd rs rs') I'))))
(H, (R', (r31, I'))))
j ev addi : (H:Heap; R,R':RegFile; r31:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; i:int; rsval:int)
(reglookup R rs (wi rsval)) !
(regupdext R rd (wi (plus rsval i)) R') !
(Eval (H, (R, (r31, (iseq (addi rd rs i) I'))))
(H, (R', (r31, I'))))
j ev alloc : (H,H':Heap; R,R':RegFile; r31:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h'))
(rd:Reg; V:(list Omega))
H=(wfmap ? ? h wfh) !
H'=(wfmap ? ? h' wfh') !
(regupdext R rd (wl r31) R') !
(hextend h r31 (tuple (makeUninitTup V)) h') !
(Eval (H, (R, (r31, (iseq (alloc rd V) I'))))
(H', (R', (r31, I'))))
j ev bgt0 : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; r31:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(rs,rt:Reg; l:label; rsval,rtval:int)
(reglookup R rs (wi rsval)) !
174(reglookup R rt (wi rtval)) !
(le rsval rtval) !
(Eval (H, (R, (r31, (iseq (bgt rs rt l) I'))))
(H, (R, (r31, I'))))
j ev bgt1 : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; r31:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(G:RegFileTy; T:APTy; I:InstrSeq)
(rs,rt:Reg; l:label; rsval,rtval:int)
(reglookup R rs (wi rsval)) !
(reglookup R rt (wi rtval)) !
(gt rsval rtval) !
(hlookup (hunwrap H) l (code G T I)) !
(Eval (H, (R, (r31, (iseq (bgt rs rt l) I'))))
(H, (R, (r31, I))))
j ev bump : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; r31:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(i:int; l:nat)
(hsize (hunwrap H) l) !
(Eval (H, (R, (r31, (iseq (bump i) I'))))
(H, (R, (l, I'))))
j ev fold : (H:Heap; R,R':RegFile; r31:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; t:Omega; rsval:WordVal)
(reglookup R rs rsval) !
(regupdext R rd (wfold rsval t) R') !
(Eval (H, (R, (r31, (iseq (fold rd t rs) I'))))
(H, (R', (r31, I'))))
j ev jd : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; r31:AP)
(l:label; G:RegFileTy; T:APTy; I':InstrSeq)
(hlookup (hunwrap H) l (code G T I')) !
(Eval (H, (R, (r31, (jd l))))
(H, (R, (r31, I'))))
j ev jmp : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; r31:AP)
(r:Reg; l:label; G:RegFileTy; T:APTy; I':InstrSeq)
(reglookup R r (wl l)) !
(hlookup (hunwrap H) l (code G T I')) !
(Eval (H, (R, (r31, (jmp r))))
(H, (R, (r31, I'))))
j ev ld : (H:Heap; R,R':RegFile; r31:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; i:int)
(l:label; V:(list WordVal); v:WordVal)
(reglookup R rs (wl l)) !
175(hlookup (hunwrap H) l (tuple V)) !
(ListNth ? V i v) !
(regupdext R rd v R') !
(Eval (H, (R, (r31, (iseq (ld rd rs i) I'))))
(H, (R',(r31, I'))))
j ev mov : (H:Heap; R,R':RegFile; r31:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; v:WordVal)
(reglookup R rs v) !
(regupdext R rd v R') !
(Eval (H, (R, (r31, (iseq (mov rd rs) I'))))
(H, (R',(r31, I'))))
j ev movi : (H:Heap; R,R':RegFile; r31:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(rd:Reg; i:int)
(regupdext R rd (wi i) R') !
(Eval (H, (R, (r31, (iseq (movi rd i) I'))))
(H, (R',(r31, I'))))
j ev movl : (H:Heap; R,R':RegFile; r31:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(rd:Reg; l:label)
(regupdext R rd (wl l) R') !
(Eval (H, (R, (r31, (iseq (movl rd l) I'))))
(H, (R',(r31, I'))))
j ev store : (H,H':Heap; R:RegFile; r31:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h'))
(rd,rs:Reg; i:int; l:label; V,V':(list WordVal); w:WordVal)
H=(wfmap ? ? h wfh) !
H'=(wfmap ? ? h' wfh') !
(reglookup R rd (wl l)) !
(reglookup R rs w) !
(hlookup h l (tuple V)) !
(updatetuple V i w V') !
(hupdate h l (tuple V') h') !
(Eval (H, (R, (r31, (iseq (st rd i rs) I'))))
(H',(R, (r31, I'))))
j ev unfold : (H:Heap; R,R':RegFile; r31:AP; I':InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; v:WordVal; t:Omega)
(reglookup R rs (wfold v t)) !
(regupdext R rd v R') !
(Eval (H, (R, (r31, (iseq (unfold rd rs) I'))))
(H, (R', (r31, I')))).
176Static Semantics
(* Register le subtyping *)
Inductive RegFileSubtype : RegFileTy ! RegFileTy ! Prop
:= weaken : (G,G':RegFileTy)
((r:Reg; t:Omega) (mlookup ? ? G' r t) ! (mlookup ? ? G r t)) !
(RegFileSubtype G G').
(* Subtyping *)
Inductive SubtypeB : initag ! initag ! Prop
:= subb re : (i:initag) (SubtypeB i i)
j subb true : (SubtypeB true false).
Inductive SubtypeBList : (list initag) ! (list initag) ! Prop
:= subb nil : (SubtypeBList (nil ?) (nil ?))
j subb cons : (L1,L2:(list initag); i1,i2:initag)
(SubtypeB i1 i2) ! (SubtypeBList L1 L2) ! (SubtypeBList (cons i1 L1)
(cons i2 L2)).
Inductive Subtype : Omega ! Omega ! Prop
:= reex : (t:Omega) (Subtype t t)
j tuple sub : (ol:(list Omega); il1,il2:(list initag))
(SubtypeBList il1 il2) ! (Subtype (tupty ol il1) (tupty ol il2)).
(* Well-formed word values *)
Inductive WFWordVal : HeapTy ! WordVal ! Omega ! Prop
:= int wval : (HT:HeapTy; i:int) (WFWordVal HT (wi i) intty)
j label wval : (HT:HeapTy; l:label; t,t':Omega)
(htlookup (htunwrap HT) l t') !
(Subtype t' t) !
(WFWordVal HT (wl l) t)
j fold word wval
: (HT:HeapTy)
(w:WordVal; t:OmegaR; t':Omega)
(RUnlift (RUnfold t))=t' !
(WFWordVal HT w t') !
(WFWordVal HT (wfold w (recty t)) (recty t)).
Inductive WFWordValinit : HeapTy ! WordVal ! Omega ! initag ! Prop
:= init : (HT:HeapTy)
(w:WordVal; t:Omega; f:initag)
(WFWordVal HT w t) !
(WFWordValinit HT w t f)
j uninit : (HT:HeapTy)
(t:Omega)
177(WFWordValinit HT (wuninit t) t false).
(* Well-formed instruction sequences *)
Inductive WFInstrSeq : HeapTy ! RegFileTy ! APTy ! InstrSeq ! Prop
:= s add : (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; T:APTy; I:InstrSeq)
(rd,rs,rs':Reg)
(mlookup ? ? G rs intty) !
(mlookup ? ? G rs' intty) !
(mupdext ? ? G rd intty G') !
(WFInstrSeq HT G' T I) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G T (iseq (add rd rs rs') I))
j s addi : (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; T:APTy; I:InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; i:int)
(mlookup ? ? G rs intty) !
(mupdext ? ? G rd intty G') !
(WFInstrSeq HT G' T I) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G T (iseq (addi rd rs i) I))
j s alloc : (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; I:InstrSeq)
(rd:Reg; n:nat; V:(list Omega))
n=(length V) !
(mupdext ? ? G rd (tupty V (makeUninitTupty V)) G') !
(WFInstrSeq HT G' (used n) I) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G fresh (iseq (alloc rd V) I))
j s bgt : (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; T:APTy; I:InstrSeq)
(rs,rt:Reg; l:label)
(mlookup ? ? G rs intty) !
(mlookup ? ? G rt intty) !
(htlookup (htunwrap HT) l (codety G' T)) !
(RegFileSubtype G G') !
(WFInstrSeq HT G T I) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G T (iseq (bgt rs rt l) I))
j s bump : (HT:HeapTy; G:RegFileTy; I:InstrSeq; n:nat)
(WFInstrSeq HT G fresh I) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G (used n) (iseq (bump n) I))
j s fold : (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; T:APTy; I:InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; f:OmegaR; rst:Omega)
(mlookup ? ? G rs rst) !
(RUnlift (RUnfold f))=rst !
(mupdext ? ? G rd (recty f) G') !
(WFInstrSeq HT G' T I) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G T (iseq (fold rd (recty f) rs) I))
178j s jd : (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; T:APTy)
(l:label)
(htlookup (htunwrap HT) l (codety G' T)) !
(RegFileSubtype G G') !
(WFInstrSeq HT G T (jd l))
j s jmp : (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; T:APTy)
(r:Reg)
(mlookup ? ? G r (codety G' T)) !
(RegFileSubtype G G') !
(WFInstrSeq HT G T (jmp r))
j s ld : (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; T:APTy; I:InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; i:int)
(ol:(list Omega); il:(list initag); t:Omega)
(mlookup ? ? G rs (tupty ol il)) !
(ListNth ? ol i t) !
(ListNth ? il i true) !
(mupdext ? ? G rd t G') !
(WFInstrSeq HT G' T I) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G T (iseq (ld rd rs i) I))
j s mov : (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; T:APTy; I:InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; t:Omega)
(mlookup ? ? G rs t) !
(mupdext ? ? G rd t G') !
(WFInstrSeq HT G' T I) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G T (iseq (mov rd rs) I))
j s movi : (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; T:APTy; I:InstrSeq)
(rd:Reg; i:int)
(mupdext ? ? G rd intty G') !
(WFInstrSeq HT G' T I) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G T (iseq (movi rd i) I))
j s movl : (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; T:APTy; I:InstrSeq)
(rd:Reg; l:label; t,t':Omega)
(htlookup (htunwrap HT) l t) !
(Subtype t t') !
(mupdext ? ? G rd t' G') !
(WFInstrSeq HT G' T I) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G T (iseq (movl rd l) I))
j s st : (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; T:APTy; I:InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; i:int;
V,V':(list initag); Ts:(list Omega); t:Omega)
179(mlookup ? ? G rd (tupty Ts V)) !
(mlookup ? ? G rs t) !
(ListNth ? Ts i t) !
(updatetupty V i V') !
(mupdate ? ? G rd (tupty Ts V') G') !
(WFInstrSeq HT G' T I) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G T (iseq (st rd i rs) I))
j s unfold : (HT:HeapTy; G,G':RegFileTy; T:APTy; I:InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; f:OmegaR; unf,rst:Omega)
(mlookup ? ? G rs rst) !
rst=(recty f) !
(RUnlift (RUnfold f))=unf !
(mupdext ? ? G rd unf G') !
(WFInstrSeq HT G' T I) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G T (iseq (unfold rd rs) I)).
Inductive WFWordValinitList
: HeapTy ! (list WordVal) ! (list Omega) ! (list initag) ! Prop
:= wfwvilist0 : (HT:HeapTy)
(WFWordValinitList HT (nil ?) (nil ?) (nil ?))
j wfwvilist1 : (HT:HeapTy;
wl:(list WordVal); tl:(list Omega); il:(list initag))
(w:WordVal; t:Omega; i:initag)
(WFWordValinit HT w t i) !
(WFWordValinitList HT wl tl il) !
(WFWordValinitList HT (cons w wl) (cons t tl) (cons i il)).
Inductive WFHeapVal : HeapTy ! HeapVal ! Omega ! Prop
:= tuple wf : (HT:HeapTy; wl:(list WordVal);
tl:(list Omega); il:(list initag))
(WFWordValinitList HT wl tl il) !
(WFHeapVal HT (tuple wl) (tupty tl il))
j code wf : (HT:HeapTy; G:RegFileTy; I:InstrSeq; T:APTy)
(WFInstrSeq HT G T I) !
(WFHeapVal HT (code G T I) (codety G T)).
Inductive WFHeap : Heap ! HeapTy ! Prop
:= heap wf : (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy)
(EX s j (hsize (hunwrap H) s) ^
(htsize (htunwrap HT) s) ^
((n:label; h:HeapVal)
(hlookup (hunwrap H) n h) ! (lt n s)) ^
180((n:label; t:Omega)
(htlookup (htunwrap HT) n t) ! (lt n s)) ^
((n:label) (lt n s) !
(EX h j (hlookup (hunwrap H) n h))) ^
((n:label) (lt n s) !
(EX t j (htlookup (htunwrap HT) n t))) ^
((n:label; h:HeapVal; t:Omega)
(hlookup (hunwrap H) n h) !
(htlookup (htunwrap HT) n t) !
(WFHeapVal HT h t)) ^
(OrdHeap (hunwrap H))
) !
(WFHeap H HT).
Inductive WFap : HeapTy ! AP ! APTy ! Prop
:= fresh wf : (HT:HeapTy; l:AP)
(htsize (htunwrap HT) l) !
(WFap HT l fresh)
j used wf : (HT:HeapTy; l:AP; n:nat; tl:(list Omega); ol:(list initag))
n=(length tl) !
(htsize (htunwrap HT) (S l)) !
(WFWordVal HT (wl l) (tupty tl ol)) !
(WFap HT l (used n)).
Fixpoint stripWV [w:WordVal] : WordVal
:= Cases w of (wfold w' t) ) (stripWV w')
j ) w
end.
Inductive WFRegFile : HeapTy ! RegFile ! RegFileTy ! Prop
:= regle wf : (HT:HeapTy; R:RegFile; G:RegFileTy)
((r:Reg; t:Omega)
(mlookup ? ? G r t) !
(EX w j (mlookup ? ? R r w) ^ (WFWordVal HT w t))) !
((r:Reg; v:WordVal; l:label; n:nat)
(mlookup ? ? R r v) !
(stripWV v)=(wl l) !
(htsize (htunwrap HT) n) !
(lt l n)) !
(WFRegFile HT R G).
(* Well-formed program *)
181Inductive WFProgram : Program ! Prop
:= program wf : (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; R:RegFile; G:RegFileTy;
l:AP; t:APTy; I:InstrSeq)
(WFHeap H HT) !
(WFRegFile HT R G) !
(WFap HT l t) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G t I) !
(EX l j (EX G' j (EX T' j (EX I' j (EX n 
(hlookup (hunwrap H) l (code G' T' I')) ^
(ISubDepth I I' n)))))) !
(WFProgram (H, (R, (l, I)))).
Soundness Proofs
Utility lemmas
Lemma regle ext eq instr wf
: (I:InstrSeq; HT:HeapTy; G1,G2:RegFileTy; T:APTy)
( (r:Reg; t:Omega) (mlookup ? ? G1 r t) ! (mlookup ? ? G2 r t) ) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G1 T I) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G2 T I).
Lemma wfwordval label lt heap size
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; v:WordVal; l:label; t:Omega; n:nat)
(WFHeap H HT) ! (WFWordVal HT v t) ! (stripWV v)=(wl l) ! (htsize (htunwrap HT)
n) ! (lt l n).
Lemma regle upd wf
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; R,R':RegFile; G,G':(Map Reg Omega))
(rd:Reg; w:WordVal; t:Omega)
(WFHeap H HT) !
(WFRegFile HT R G) !
(WFWordVal HT w t) !
(mupdext ? ? R rd w R') !
(mupdext ? ? G rd t G') !
(WFRegFile HT R' G').
Lemma heap lookup not recty
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; l:label; t:Omega; f:OmegaR)
(WFHeap H HT) !
(htlookup (htunwrap HT) l t) !
:t=(recty f).
Lemma heap lookup not intty
182: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; l:label; t:Omega)
(WFHeap H HT) !
(htlookup (htunwrap HT) l t) !
:t=intty.
(* Canonical forms lemmas *)
Lemma can word forms rec
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; w:WordVal; f:OmegaR)
(WFHeap H HT) !
(WFWordVal HT w (recty f)) !
(EX v j (EX t j w=(wfold v t))).
Lemma can word forms int
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; w:WordVal; t:Omega)
(WFHeap H HT) !
(WFWordVal HT w t) !
(t=intty) !
(EX i j w=(wi i)).
Lemma can reg forms any
: (HT:HeapTy; R:RegFile; G:(Map Reg Omega);
r:Reg; t:Omega)
(WFRegFile HT R G) !
(mlookup Reg Omega G r t) !
(EX w j (mlookup Reg WordVal R r w)).
Lemma can reg forms tuple
: (HT:HeapTy; R:RegFile; G:RegFileTy;
r:Reg; tl:(list Omega); il:(list initag))
(WFRegFile HT R G) !
(mlookup Reg Omega G r (tupty tl il)) !
(EX l j (mlookup ? ? R r (wl l))).
Lemma tupty lists length eq
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; R:RegFile; G:RegFileTy;
r:Reg; l:label; tl:(list Omega); il:(list initag); V:(list WordVal))
(WFHeap H HT) !
(WFRegFile HT R G) !
(mlookup Reg Omega G r (tupty tl il)) !
(mlookup ? ? R r (wl l)) !
(hlookup (hunwrap H) l (tuple V)) !
(length V)=(length tl).
Lemma can heap forms reg tuple
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; R:RegFile; G:RegFileTy;
183r:Reg; l:label; tl:(list Omega); il:(list initag))
(WFHeap H HT) !
(WFRegFile HT R G) !
(mlookup ? ? G r (tupty tl il)) !
(mlookup ? ? R r (wl l)) !
(EX V j (hlookup (hunwrap H) l (tuple V))).
Lemma can heap forms code
: (HT:HeapTy; H:Heap; l:label; G:(Map Reg Omega); T:APTy)
(WFHeap H HT) !
(mlookup nat Omega (unwrapMap nat Omega HT) l (codety G T)) !
(EX I j (mlookup ? ? (unwrapMap ? ? H) l (code G T I))).
Lemma can heap forms code I
: (HT:HeapTy; h:HeapVal; t:Omega; G:RegFileTy; I:InstrSeq; T:APTy)
(WFHeapVal HT h t) !
t=(codety G T) !
h=(code G T I) !
(WFInstrSeq HT G T I).
Lemma can word forms code
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; w:WordVal; G:RegFileTy; T:APTy)
(WFHeap H HT) !
(WFWordVal HT w (codety G T)) !
(EX l j w=(wl l) ^
(EX I j (mlookup ? ? (unwrapMap ? ? H) l (code G T I)))).
Lemma wfwordval in reg
: (HT:HeapTy; R:RegFile; G:RegFileTy)
(r:Reg; w:WordVal; t:Omega)
(WFRegFile HT R G) !
(mlookup ? ? G r t) !
(mlookup ? ? R r w) !
(WFWordVal HT w t).
Lemma wfheapval in heap
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; l:label; h:HeapVal; t:Omega)
(WFHeap H HT) !
(hlookup (hunwrap H) l h) !
(htlookup (htunwrap HT) l t) !
(WFHeapVal HT h t).
(* Reasoning about the heap *)
Lemma size notin wfheap
184: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; h:(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); l:label)
H=(wfmap label HeapVal h wfh) ! (WFHeap H HT) ! (msize ? ? h l) ! (mnotindom ? ?
h l).
Lemma size notin wfheapty
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; ht:(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); l:label)
HT=(wfmap label Omega ht wfht) ! (WFHeap H HT) ! (msize ? ? ht l) ! (mnotindom ?
? ht l).
Lemma wfh ht size eq
: (h:(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); ht:(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); l:nat)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) ! (hsize h l) ! (htsize ht l).
Lemma wfh h size eq
: (h:(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); ht:(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); l:nat)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) ! (htsize ht l) ! (hsize h l).
Lemma makeUninitTupty len eq
: (n:nat; V:(list Omega)) n=(length V) ! n=(length (makeUninitTupty V)).
Lemma makeUninitWF
: (HT:HeapTy; V:(list Omega)) (WFHeapVal HT (tuple (makeUninitTup V)) (tupty V (make-
UninitTupty V))).
Lemma reg tuple ex heaptype
: (ht:(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); R:RegFile; G:RegFileTy; r:Reg; tl:(list Omega);
il:(list initag); l:label)
(WFRegFile (wfmap ? ? ht wfht) R G) !
(mlookup ? ? G r (tupty tl il)) !
(mlookup ? ? R r (wl l)) !
(EX s:Omega j (mlookup nat Omega ht l s) ^ (Subtype s (tupty tl il))).
Heap extension lemmas
Lemma heap ext 6
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h');
ht,ht':(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); wfht':(mWF ? ? ht'))
(t:Omega; l:label)
(wv:WordVal; t':Omega)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(hsize h l) !
(htextend ht l t ht') !
(WFWordVal (wfmap ? ? ht wfht) wv t') !
(WFWordVal (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') wv t').
Lemma heap ext 7
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h');
185ht,ht':(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); wfht':(mWF ? ? ht'))
(t:Omega; l:label)
(wv:WordVal; t':Omega; b:initag)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(hsize h l) !
(htextend ht l t ht') !
(WFWordValinit (wfmap ? ? ht wfht) wv t' b) !
(WFWordValinit (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') wv t' b).
Lemma heap ext 4
: (I:InstrSeq)
(h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h');
ht,ht':(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); wfht':(mWF ? ? ht'))
(t:Omega; l:label)
(R:RegFileTy; A:APTy)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(hsize h l) !
(htextend ht l t ht') !
(WFInstrSeq (wfmap ? ? ht wfht) R A I) !
(WFInstrSeq (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') R A I).
Lemma heap ext 5 aux
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h');
ht,ht':(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); wfht':(mWF ? ? ht'))
(wl:(list WordVal); tl:(list Omega); il:(list initag))
(t:Omega; l:label)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(hsize h l) !
(htextend ht l t ht') !
(WFWordValinitList (wfmap ? ? ht wfht) wl tl il) !
(WFWordValinitList (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') wl tl il).
Lemma heap ext 3
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h');
ht,ht':(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); wfht':(mWF ? ? ht'))
(R,R':RegFile; G,G':(Map Reg Omega))
(rd:Reg; l:nat; tl:(list Omega); il:(list initag))
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(hsize h l) !
(WFRegFile (wfmap ? ? ht wfht) R G) !
(mupdext Reg WordVal R rd (wl l) R') !
(mupdext Reg Omega G rd (tupty tl il) G') !
(mextend nat Omega ht l (tupty tl il) ht') !
186(WFRegFile (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') R' G').
Lemma heap ext 3ap
: (HT,HT':HeapTy; a:AP; tl:(list Omega); il:(list initag); n:nat)
(WFap HT a fresh) !
n=(length tl) !
(mextend nat Omega (unwrapMap nat Omega HT) a (tupty tl il)
(unwrapMap nat Omega HT')) !
(WFap HT' a (used n)).
Lemma heap ext 5
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h');
ht,ht':(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); wfht':(mWF ? ? ht'))
(hv:HeapVal; t,t':Omega; l:label)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(hsize h l) !
(htextend ht l t ht') !
(WFHeapVal (wfmap ? ? ht wfht) hv t') !
(WFHeapVal (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') hv t').
Lemma heap ext 2
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h');
ht,ht':(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); wfht':(mWF ? ? ht'))
(hv:HeapVal; t:Omega; l:label)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(hsize h l) !
(htextend ht l t ht') !
(hextend h l hv h') !
(WFHeapVal (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') hv t) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h' wfh') (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht')).
Lemma heap ext 1
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; ht:(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht);
l:label; t:Omega)
HT=(wfmap label Omega ht wfht) !
(WFHeap H HT) !
(msize ? ? ht l) !
(EX ht' j (EXT wfht' j (EX HT':HeapTy j
HT'=(wfmap label Omega ht' wfht') ^
(mextend ? ? ht l t ht')))).
Heap update lemmas
Lemma subtype update
: (i:int; il1,il1',il0,il0':(list initag))
187(SubtypeBList il1 il0) ! (updatetupty il1 i il1') ! (updatetupty il0 i il0') !
(SubtypeBList il1' il0').
Lemma subtypeb trans
: (b,a,c:initag)(SubtypeB a b) ! (SubtypeB b c) ! (SubtypeB a c).
Lemma subtypeblist trans
: (il2,il1,il3:(list initag))
(SubtypeBList il1 il2) ! (SubtypeBList il2 il3) ! (SubtypeBList il1 il3).
Lemma subtype trans
: (t1,t2,t3:Omega) (Subtype t1 t2) ! (Subtype t2 t3) ! (Subtype t1 t3).
Lemma heap upd 6
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h');
ht,ht':(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); wfht':(mWF ? ? ht'))
(t,s:Omega; l:label)
(wv:WordVal; t':Omega)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(htlookup ht l s) !
(Subtype t s) !
(htupdate ht l t ht') !
(WFWordVal (wfmap ? ? ht wfht) wv t') !
(WFWordVal (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') wv t').
Lemma heap upd 7
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h');
ht,ht':(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); wfht':(mWF ? ? ht'))
(t,s:Omega; l:label)
(wv:WordVal; t':Omega; b:initag)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(htlookup ht l s) !
(Subtype t s) !
(htupdate ht l t ht') !
(WFWordValinit (wfmap ? ? ht wfht) wv t' b) !
(WFWordValinit (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') wv t' b).
Lemma heap upd 4
: (I:InstrSeq)
(h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h');
ht,ht':(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); wfht':(mWF ? ? ht'))
(t,s:Omega; l:label)
(R:RegFileTy; A:APTy)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(htlookup ht l s) !
188(Subtype t s) !
(htupdate ht l t ht') !
(WFInstrSeq (wfmap ? ? ht wfht) R A I) !
(WFInstrSeq (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') R A I).
Lemma heap upd 5 aux
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h');
ht,ht':(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); wfht':(mWF ? ? ht'))
(t,s:Omega; l:label)
(wl:(list WordVal); tl:(list Omega); il:(list initag))
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(htlookup ht l s) !
(Subtype t s) !
(htupdate ht l t ht') !
(WFWordValinitList (wfmap ? ? ht wfht) wl tl il) !
(WFWordValinitList (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') wl tl il).
Lemma heap upd 3
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h');
ht,ht':(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); wfht':(mWF ? ? ht'))
(t,s:Omega; l:label)
(R:RegFile; G:(Map Reg Omega))
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(htlookup ht l s) !
(Subtype t s) !
(htupdate ht l t ht') !
(WFRegFile (wfmap ? ? ht wfht) R G) !
(WFRegFile (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') R G).
Lemma heap upd 3ap
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h');
ht,ht':(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); wfht':(mWF ? ? ht'))
(t,s:Omega; l:label)
(a:AP; at:APTy)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(htlookup ht l s) !
(Subtype t s) !
(htupdate ht l t ht') !
(WFap (wfmap ? ? ht wfht) a at) !
(WFap (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') a at).
Lemma heap upd 5
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h');
189ht,ht':(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); wfht':(mWF ? ? ht'))
(t,s:Omega; l:label)
(hv:HeapVal; t':Omega)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(htlookup ht l s) !
(Subtype t s) !
(htupdate ht l t ht') !
(WFHeapVal (wfmap ? ? ht wfht) hv t') !
(WFHeapVal (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') hv t').
Lemma ord updateheap ord
: (h,h':HeapMap; l:label; hv:HeapVal)
(mupdate ? ? h l hv h') !
(OrdHeap h) !
(OrdHeap h').
Lemma heap upd 2
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h');
ht,ht':(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); wfht':(mWF ? ? ht'))
(t,s:Omega; l:label)
(hv:HeapVal)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(htlookup ht l s) !
(Subtype t s) !
(htupdate ht l t ht') !
(hupdate h l hv h') !
(WFHeapVal (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') hv t) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h' wfh') (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht')).
Cases of the FTAL progress theorem
Lemma progress add : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; I:InstrSeq; a:AP;
rd,rs,rs':Reg)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (add rd rs rs') I))))) !
(EX P' j
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (add rd rs rs') I)))) P')).
Lemma progress addi : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; I:InstrSeq; a:AP;
rd,rs:Reg; i:int)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (addi rd rs i) I))))) !
(EX P' j
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (addi rd rs i) I)))) P')).
Lemma progress jmp : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; r:Reg)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (jmp r))))) !
190(EX P' j
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (jmp r)))) P')).
Lemma progress jd : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; l:label)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (jd l))))) !
(EX P' j
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (jd l)))) P')).
Lemma progress ld : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; I:InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; i:int)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (ld rd rs i) I))))) !
(EX P' j
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (ld rd rs i) I)))) P')).
Lemma progress mov : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; I:InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg)
(WFProgram (H,(R,(a,(iseq (mov rd rs) I))))) !
(EX P' 
(Eval (H,(R,(a,(iseq (mov rd rs) I)))) P')).
Lemma progress movi : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; I:InstrSeq)
(rd:Reg; i:int)
(WFProgram (H,(R,(a,(iseq (movi rd i) I))))) !
(EX P' 
(Eval (H,(R,(a,(iseq (movi rd i) I)))) P')).
Lemma progress movl : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; I:InstrSeq)
(rd:Reg; l:label)
(WFProgram (H,(R,(a,(iseq (movl rd l) I))))) !
(EX P' 
(Eval (H,(R,(a,(iseq (movl rd l) I)))) P')).
Lemma progress unfold : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; I:InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (unfold rd rs) I))))) !
(EX P' j
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (unfold rd rs) I)))) P')).
Lemma progress fold : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; I:InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; t:Omega)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (fold rd t rs) I))))) !
(EX P' j
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (fold rd t rs) I)))) P')).
Lemma progress bgt : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; I:InstrSeq)
(rs,rt:Reg; l:label)
191(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (bgt rs rt l) I))))) !
(EX P' j
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (bgt rs rt l) I)))) P')).
Lemma progress bump : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; I:InstrSeq)
(n:nat)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (bump n) I))))) !
(EX P' j
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (bump n) I)))) P')).
Lemma progress alloc : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; I:InstrSeq)
( rd:Reg; V:(list Omega))
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (alloc rd V) I))))) !
(EX P' j
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (alloc rd V) I)))) P')).
Lemma progress st : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; I:InstrSeq)
(rd,rs:Reg; i:int)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (st rd i rs) I))))) !
(EX P' j
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (st rd i rs) I)))) P')).
Cases of the FTAL preservation theorem
Lemma preserv add : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; I:InstrSeq; a:AP;
rd,rs,rs':Reg; P':Program)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (add rd rs rs') I))))) !
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (add rd rs rs') I)))) P') !
(WFProgram P').
Lemma preserv addi : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; I:InstrSeq; a:AP;
rd,rs:Reg; i:int; P':Program)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (addi rd rs i) I))))) !
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (addi rd rs i) I)))) P') !
(WFProgram P').
Lemma preserv alloc : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; I:InstrSeq; a:AP;
rd:Reg; V:(list Omega); P':Program)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (alloc rd V) I))))) !
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (alloc rd V) I)))) P') !
(WFProgram P').
Lemma preserv bgt : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; I:InstrSeq; a:AP; P':Program)
(rs,rt:Reg; l:label)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (bgt rs rt l) I))))) !
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (bgt rs rt l) I)))) P') !
192(WFProgram P').
Lemma preserv bump : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; I:InstrSeq; a:AP; n:nat; P':Program)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (bump n) I))))) !
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (bump n) I)))) P') !
(WFProgram P').
Lemma preserv fold : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; I:InstrSeq; a:AP; P':Program)
(rd,rs:Reg; t:Omega)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (fold rd t rs) I))))) !
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (fold rd t rs) I)))) P') !
(WFProgram P').
Lemma preserv jmp : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; r:Reg; P':Program)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (jmp r))))) !
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (jmp r)))) P') !
(WFProgram P').
Lemma preserv jd : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; l:label; P':Program)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (jd l))))) !
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (jd l)))) P') !
(WFProgram P').
Lemma preserv ld : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; I:InstrSeq; a:AP; P':Program)
(rd,rs:Reg; i:int)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (ld rd rs i) I))))) !
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (ld rd rs i) I)))) P') !
(WFProgram P').
Lemma preserv mov : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; I:InstrSeq; P':Program)
(rd,rs:Reg)
(WFProgram (H,(R,(a,(iseq (mov rd rs) I))))) !
(Eval (H,(R,(a,(iseq (mov rd rs) I)))) P') !
(WFProgram P').
Lemma preserv movi : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; I:InstrSeq; P':Program)
(rd:Reg; i:int)
(WFProgram (H,(R,(a,(iseq (movi rd i) I))))) !
(Eval (H,(R,(a,(iseq (movi rd i) I)))) P') !
(WFProgram P').
Lemma preserv movl : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; I:InstrSeq; P':Program)
(rd:Reg; l:label)
(WFProgram (H,(R,(a,(iseq (movl rd l) I))))) !
(Eval (H,(R,(a,(iseq (movl rd l) I)))) P') !
(WFProgram P').
193Lemma preserv st aux2
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h'))
(ht:(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht))
(R:RegFile; G:RegFileTy)
(rd,rs:Reg; i:int; l:label; w:WordVal; t:Omega)
(V,V':(list WordVal); Ts:(list Omega);
il,V0,V'0:(list initag))
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(WFRegFile (wfmap ? ? ht wfht) R G) !
(mlookup ? ? R rd (wl l)) !
(mlookup ? ? R rs w) !
(mlookup ? ? h l (tuple V)) !
(updatetuple V i w V') !
(mupdate ? ? h l (tuple V') h') !
(mlookup ? ? G rd (tupty Ts V0)) !
(mlookup ? ? G rs t) !
(ListNth ? Ts i t) !
(updatetupty V0 i V'0) !
(mlookup ? ? ht l (tupty Ts il)) !
(Subtype (tupty Ts il) (tupty Ts V0)) !
(EX ht':(Map nat Omega) 
(EXT wfht':(mWF nat Omega ht') 
(EX il' 
(mupdate nat Omega ht l (tupty Ts il') ht') ^
(updatetupty il i il') ^
(Subtype (tupty Ts il') (tupty Ts V'0)) ^
(Subtype (tupty Ts il') (tupty Ts il )) ^
(WFHeapVal (wfmap ? ? ht' wfht') (tuple V')
(tupty Ts il'))))).
Lemma preserv st : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; I:InstrSeq; a:AP;
rd,rs:Reg; i:int; P':Program)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (st rd i rs) I))))) !
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (st rd i rs) I)))) P') !
(WFProgram P').
Lemma preserv unfold : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; I:InstrSeq; a:AP; P':Program)
(rd,rs:Reg)
(WFProgram (H, (R, (a, (iseq (unfold rd rs) I))))) !
(Eval (H, (R, (a, (iseq (unfold rd rs) I)))) P') !
(WFProgram P').
194A.3 Translation to Machine State
The Safety Policy
Denition SP := [S:State] (let (M,T')=S in (let (R,PC)=T' in (Dc (M PC))= ill )).
Denition Safe := [S:State] (n:nat)(SP (MultiStep n S)).
Translation Relations
(* The Layout function *)
Denition HV size : HeapVal ! nat
:= [hv] Cases hv of (tuple V) ) (length V)
j (code G T I') ) (lenInstrSeq I')
end.
Fixpoint Layout aux [H:(Map label HeapVal)] : label ! Word
:= Cases H of mempty ) ([l':label] O)
j (melem l h H') ) [l':label] (if (blt nat l l')
then (plus (Layout aux H' l') (HV size h))
else (Layout aux H' l'))
end.
Denition Layout : Heap ! label ! Word := [H] (Layout aux (hunwrap H)).
Syntactic Denition LayoutF := (label ! Word).
(* Register translations *)
Require translate ftal aux.
Inductive TrWordVal : LayoutF ! WordVal ! Word ! Prop
:= trwv label : (L:LayoutF; l:label) (TrWordVal L (wl l) (L l))
j trwv int : (L:LayoutF; i:int) (TrWordVal L (wi i) i)
j trwv uninit : (L:LayoutF; t:Omega; l:label) (TrWordVal L (wuninit t) l)
j trwv fold : (L:LayoutF; v:WordVal; t:Omega; w:Word)
(TrWordVal L v w) ! (TrWordVal L (wfold v t) w).
Inductive TrWordValList : LayoutF ! (list WordVal) ! Mem ! Word ! Prop
:= trwvl nil : (L:LayoutF; M:Mem; l:Word)
(TrWordValList L (nil ?) M l)
j trwvl cons : (L:LayoutF; v:WordVal; V:(list WordVal); M:Mem; w,l:Word)
(TrWordVal L v w) !
(M l)=w !
(TrWordValList L V M (S l)) !
(TrWordValList L (cons v V) M l).
Inductive TrInstr : LayoutF ! Instr ! Instr ! Prop
195:= tri add : (L:LayoutF; rd,rs,rt:Reg; rd, rs, rt: Reg)
(TrRegF rd)= rd !
(TrRegF rs)= rs !
(TrRegF rt)= rt !
(TrInstr L (add rd rs rt) ( add rd rs rt))
j tri addi : (L:LayoutF; rd,rs:Reg; rd, rs: Reg; i:int)
(TrRegF rd)= rd !
(TrRegF rs)= rs !
(TrInstr L (addi rd rs i) ( addi rd rs i))
j tri alloc : (L:LayoutF; rd:Reg; rd: Reg; Ts:(list Omega))
(TrRegF rd)= rd !
(TrInstr L (alloc rd Ts) ( addi rd r31 O))
j tri bgt : (L:LayoutF; rs,rt:Reg; rs, rt: Reg; l:label)
(TrRegF rs)= rs !
(TrRegF rt)= rt !
(TrInstr L (bgt rs rt l) ( bgt rs rt (L l)))
j tri bump : (L:LayoutF; i:int)
(TrInstr L (bump i) ( addi r31 r31 i))
j tri fold : (L:LayoutF; rd,rs:Reg; t:Omega; rd, rs: Reg)
(TrRegF rd)= rd !
(TrRegF rs)= rs !
(TrInstr L (fold rd t rs) ( addi rd rs O))
j tri ld : (L:LayoutF; rd,rs:Reg; i:int; rd, rs: Reg)
(TrRegF rd)= rd !
(TrRegF rs)= rs !
(TrInstr L (ld rd rs i) ( ld rd rs i))
j tri mov : (L:LayoutF; rd,rs:Reg; rd, rs: Reg)
(TrRegF rd)= rd !
(TrRegF rs)= rs !
(TrInstr L (mov rd rs) ( addi rd rs O))
j tri movi : (L:LayoutF; r:Reg; r: Reg; i:int)
(TrRegF r)= r !
(TrInstr L (movi r i) ( movi r i))
j tri movl : (L:LayoutF; r:Reg; r: Reg; l:label)
(TrRegF r)= r !
(TrInstr L (movl r l) ( movi r (L l)))
j tri st : (L:LayoutF; rd,rs:Reg; i:int; rd, rs: Reg)
(TrRegF rd)= rd !
(TrRegF rs)= rs !
(TrInstr L (st rd i rs) ( st rd i rs))
196j tri unfold : (L:LayoutF; rd,rs:Reg; rd, rs: Reg)
(TrRegF rd)= rd !
(TrRegF rs)= rs !
(TrInstr L (unfold rd rs) ( addi rd rs O)).
Inductive TrInstrSeq : LayoutF ! InstrSeq ! Mem ! Word ! Prop
:= tris iseq : (L:LayoutF; i:Instr; i: Instr; I:InstrSeq; M:Mem; l:Word)
(TrInstr L i i) !
(Dc (M l)) = i !
(TrInstrSeq L I M (S l)) !
(TrInstrSeq L (iseq i I) M l)
j tris jd : (L:LayoutF; l:label; M:Mem; w:Word)
(Dc (M w)) = ( jd (L l)) !
(TrInstrSeq L (jd l) M w)
j tris jmp : (L:LayoutF; r:Reg; r: Reg; M:Mem; w:Word)
(TrRegF r)= r !
(Dc (M w)) = ( jmp r) !
(TrInstrSeq L (jmp r) M w).
Inductive TrHeapVal : LayoutF ! HeapVal ! Mem ! Word ! Prop
:= trhv tuple : (L:LayoutF; V:(list WordVal); M:Mem; l:Word)
(TrWordValList L V M l) !
(TrHeapVal L (tuple V) M l)
j trhv code : (L:LayoutF; G:RegFileTy; T:APTy; I:InstrSeq; M:Mem; l:Word)
(TrInstrSeq L I M l) !
(TrHeapVal L (code G T I) M l).
Inductive TrHeap : LayoutF ! Heap ! Mem ! Prop
:= trheap : (L:LayoutF; H:Heap; s:nat; M:Mem)
(hsize (hunwrap H) s) !
( (n:nat; h:HeapVal)
(hlookup (hunwrap H) n h) !
(TrHeapVal L h M (L n)) ) !
(TrHeap L H M).
Inductive TrRegFile : LayoutF ! RegFile ! RegFile ! Prop
:= trregle : (L:LayoutF; R:RegFile; R: RegFile)
( (r:Reg; r: Reg; v:WordVal)
(mlookup ? ? R r v) !
(TrRegF r)= r !
(TrWordVal L v ( R r))) !
(TrRegFile L R R).
Inductive TrAP : LayoutF ! AP ! RegFile ! Prop
197:= trap : (L:LayoutF; A:AP; R: RegFile)
( R r31)=(L A) ! (TrAP L A R)
.
Inductive TrProgram : Program ! State ! Prop
:= trprogram : (H:Heap; R:RegFile; A:AP; I:InstrSeq;
M:Mem; R: RegFile; pc:Word; L:LayoutF)
L=(Layout H) !
(TrHeap L H M) !
(TrRegFile L R R) !
(TrAP L A R) !
(EX l j (EX G j (EX T j (EX I' j (EX n j
(hlookup (hunwrap H) l (code G T I')) ^
(ISubDepth I I' n) ^
(TrInstrSeq L I' M (L l)) ^
(plus (L l) n)=pc))))) !
(TrProgram (H,(R,(A,I))) (M,( R,pc))).
FPCC Proofs
The global invariant
Denition Inv := [S:State] (EX P:Program j (WFProgram P) ^ (TrProgram P S)).
FPCC Progress theorem
Theorem Progress : (S:State) (Inv S) ! (SP S).
Cases of the FPCC Preservation theorem
Lemma Preservation add
: (S:State; H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP;
rd,rs,rs':Reg; I:InstrSeq;
P,P':Program)
P = (H,(R,(a,(iseq (add rd rs rs') I)))) !
(WFProgram P) !
(TrProgram P S) !
(Eval P P') !
(WFProgram P') !
(TrProgram P' (Step S)).
Lemma Preservation addi
: (S:State; H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP;
rd,rs:Reg; i:int; I:InstrSeq;
P,P':Program)
P = (H,(R,(a,(iseq (addi rd rs i) I)))) !
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(TrProgram P S) !
(Eval P P') !
(WFProgram P') !
(TrProgram P' (Step S)).
Lemma heap size eq label
: (h:(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h))
(ht:(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht))
(l:label)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(msize ? ? h (S l)) !
(EX hv j (EX h' j h=(melem ? ? l hv h'))).
Lemma heap label eq size
: (l:label; hv:HeapVal; h:(Map label HeapVal))
(wf:(mWF ? ? h); wf':(mWF ? ? (melem ? ? l hv h)); G,G':HeapTy)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wf) G) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? (melem ? ? l hv h) wf') G') !
(msize ? ? h l).
Lemma tr extend layout aux eq preserv
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h'))
(l:label; hv:HeapVal)
h'=(melem ? ? l hv h) !
(msize ? ? h l) !
(Layout aux h l)=(Layout aux h' l).
Lemma tr extend layout aux preserv
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h'))
(l,n:label; hv:HeapVal)
h'=(melem ? ? l hv h) !
(msize ? ? h l) !
(lt n l) !
(Layout aux h n)=(Layout aux h' n).
Lemma tr extend layout preserv
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); wfh':(mWF ? ? h'))
(l,n:label; hv:HeapVal)
(mextend ? ? h l hv h') !
(msize ? ? h l) !
(lt n l) !
(Layout (wfmap ? ? h' wfh') n)=(Layout (wfmap ? ? h wfh) n).
Lemma tr extend heap uninitwordlist
199: (Ts:(list Omega); H:Heap; M:Mem; l:label)
(TrWordValList (Layout H) (makeUninitTup Ts) M l).
Lemma tr extend instr preserv
: (i:Instr; I:InstrSeq; R:RegFileTy; T:APTy;
i: Instr; l:label; Ts:(list Omega);
h,h':(Map label HeapVal))
(wf:(mWF ? ? h); wf':(mWF ? ? h'))
(G,G':HeapTy)
h'=(melem ? ? l (tuple (makeUninitTup Ts)) h) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wf) G) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h' wf') G') !
(WFInstrSeq G R T (iseq i I)) !
(TrInstr (Layout aux h) i i) !
(TrInstr (Layout aux h') i i).
Lemma tr extend instrseq preserv
: (i:InstrSeq; M:Mem; l:label; Ts:(list Omega); h,h':(Map label HeapVal))
(wf:(mWF ? ? h); wf':(mWF ? ? h'))
(m:RegFileTy; a:APTy)
(D:Word)
(G,G':HeapTy)
h'=(melem ? ? l (tuple (makeUninitTup Ts)) h) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wf) G) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h' wf') G') !
(WFInstrSeq G m a i) !
(TrInstrSeq (Layout aux h) i M D) !
(TrInstrSeq (Layout aux h') i M D).
Lemma wordval strip not wfold
: (v,v':WordVal) v'=(stripWV v) ! (EX w j (EX t j v'=(wfold w t))).
Lemma tr wordval strip
: (L:LayoutF; v:WordVal; w:Word)
(TrWordVal L v w) !
(EX v' j v'=(stripWV v) ^ (TrWordVal L v' w)).
Lemma tr wordval strip alt
: (L:LayoutF; v:WordVal; w:Word)
(TrWordVal L v w) !
(TrWordVal L (stripWV v) w).
Lemma tr strip wordval
: (L:LayoutF; v,v':WordVal; w:Word)
v'=(stripWV v) !
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(TrWordVal L v w).
Lemma tr extend wordval preserv aux
: (w:Word; l:label; Ts:(list Omega); h,h':(Map label HeapVal))
(wf:(mWF ? ? h); wf':(mWF ? ? h'))
(wv',wv:WordVal)
(HT,HT':HeapTy)
h'=(melem ? ? l (tuple (makeUninitTup Ts)) h) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wf) HT) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h' wf') HT') !
wv'=(stripWV wv) !
( (l,n:nat) (stripWV wv)=(wl l) ! (msize ? ? (htunwrap HT) n) ! (lt l n))
!
(TrWordVal (Layout aux h) wv' w) !
(TrWordVal (Layout aux h') wv' w).
Lemma tr extend wordvali preserv
: (w:Word; l:label; Ts:(list Omega); h,h':(Map label HeapVal))
(wf:(mWF ? ? h); wf':(mWF ? ? h'))
(wv:WordVal; t:Omega; i:initag)
(G,G':HeapTy)
h'=(melem ? ? l (tuple (makeUninitTup Ts)) h) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wf) G) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h' wf') G') !
(WFWordValinit G wv t i) !
(TrWordVal (Layout aux h) wv w) !
(TrWordVal (Layout aux h') wv w).
Lemma tr extend wordvallist preserv
: (L:(list WordVal); tl:(list Omega); il:(list bool))
(M:Mem; l:label; Ts:(list Omega); h,h':(Map label HeapVal))
(wf:(mWF ? ? h); wf':(mWF ? ? h'))
(D:Word)
(G,G':HeapTy)
h'=(melem ? ? l (tuple (makeUninitTup Ts)) h) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wf) G) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h' wf') G') !
(WFWordValinitList G L tl il) !
(TrWordValList (Layout aux h) L M D) !
(TrWordValList (Layout aux h') L M D).
Lemma tr extend heapval preserv aux
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(wf:(mWF ? ? h); wf':(mWF ? ? h'))
(n:nat; hv:HeapVal; t:Omega)
(G,G':HeapTy)
h'=(melem ? ? l (tuple (makeUninitTup Ts)) h) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wf) G) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h' wf') G') !
(WFHeapVal G hv t) !
(lt n l) !
(TrHeapVal (Layout aux h) hv M (Layout aux h n)) !
(TrHeapVal (Layout aux h') hv M (Layout aux h' n)).
Lemma tr extend heapval preserv
: (M:Mem; l:label; Ts:(list Omega))
(H,H':Heap; G,G':HeapTy)
(n:nat; hv:HeapVal; t:Omega)
(WFHeap H G) !
(WFHeap H' G') !
(hextend (hunwrap H) l (tuple (makeUninitTup Ts)) (hunwrap H')) !
(WFHeapVal G hv t) !
(lt n l) !
(TrHeapVal (Layout H) hv M (Layout H n)) !
(TrHeapVal (Layout H') hv M (Layout H' n)).
Lemma tr heap extend emptytup aux
: (M:Mem; l:label; Ts:(list Omega); h,h':(Map label HeapVal))
(wf:(mWF ? ? h); wf':(mWF ? ? h');
wf:(mWF ? ? (melem ? ? l (tuple (makeUninitTup Ts)) h));
G,G':HeapTy)
h'=(melem ? ? l (tuple (makeUninitTup Ts)) h) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wf) G) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h' wf') G') !
(TrHeap (Layout (wfmap ? ? h wf)) (wfmap ? ? h wf) M) !
(TrHeap (Layout (wfmap ? ? (melem ? ? l (tuple (makeUninitTup Ts)) h) wf)) (wfmap ? ?
(melem ? ? l (tuple (makeUninitTup Ts)) h) wf) M) !
(TrHeap (Layout (wfmap ? ? h' wf')) (wfmap ? ? h' wf') M).
Lemma tr heap extend emptytup
: (M:Mem; l:label; Ts:(list Omega); h:(Map label HeapVal))
(wf:(mWF ? ? h); wf':(mWF ? ? (melem ? ? l (tuple (makeUninitTup Ts)) h));
G,G':HeapTy)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wf) G) !
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? (melem ? ? l (tuple (makeUninitTup Ts)) h) wf') G') !
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(TrHeap (Layout (wfmap ? ? (melem ? ? l (tuple (makeUninitTup Ts)) h) wf'))
(wfmap ? ? (melem ? ? l (tuple (makeUninitTup Ts)) h) wf') M).
Lemma heaplookup wfheapval
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; l:nat; h:HeapVal)
(WFHeap H HT) !
(hlookup (hunwrap H) l h) !
(EX t j (WFHeapVal HT h t)).
Lemma Preservation alloc
: (S:State; H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP;
rd:Reg; Ts:(list Omega); I:InstrSeq;
P,P':Program)
P = (H,(R,(a,(iseq (alloc rd Ts) I)))) !
(WFProgram P) !
(TrProgram P S) !
(Eval P P') !
(WFProgram P') !
(TrProgram P' (Step S)).
Lemma Preservation bgt
: (S:State; H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP;
rs,rt:Reg; l:label; I:InstrSeq;
P,P':Program)
P = (H,(R,(a,(iseq (bgt rs rt l) I)))) !
(WFProgram P) !
(TrProgram P S) !
(Eval P P') !
(WFProgram P') !
(TrProgram P' (Step S)).
Lemma wf wordlist len eq
: (HT:HeapTy; V:(list WordVal); tl:(list Omega); ol:(list initag))
(WFWordValinitList HT V tl ol) !
(length V)=(length tl).
Lemma wf tuple tupty len eq
: (HT:HeapTy; V:(list WordVal); tl:(list Omega); ol:(list initag))
(WFHeapVal HT (tuple V) (tupty tl ol)) !
(length V)=(length tl).
Lemma layout gt eq
: (h:(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h); a:label)
((b:label) (mindom ? ? h b) ! (lt b a)) !
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Lemma wfheap next mindom imp lt
: (l,a,b:label; hv:HeapVal; h,H:(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? H))
(HT:HeapTy)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? H wfh) HT) !
H=(melem ? ? l hv h) !
(msize ? ? h a) !
(mindom ? ? h b) ! (lt b a).
Lemma wfh h size eq
: (h:(Map label HeapVal); wfh:(mWF ? ? h);
ht:(Map label Omega); wfht:(mWF ? ? ht); l:nat)
(WFHeap (wfmap ? ? h wfh) (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) !
(htsize (htunwrap (wfmap ? ? ht wfht)) l) !
(hsize (hunwrap (wfmap ? ? h wfh)) l).
Lemma bump aux
: (H:Heap; HT:HeapTy; a,n:nat; w:Word; tl:(list Omega); ol:(list bool))
(WFHeap H HT) !
(htsize (htunwrap HT) (S a)) !
(Layout H a)=w !
(WFWordVal HT (wl a) (tupty tl ol)) !
n=(length tl) !
(Layout H (S a))=(plus w n).
Lemma Preservation bump
: (S:State; H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP;
i:nat; I:InstrSeq;
P,P':Program)
P = (H,(R,(a,(iseq (bump i) I)))) !
(WFProgram P) !
(TrProgram P S) !
(Eval P P') !
(WFProgram P') !
(TrProgram P' (Step S)).
Lemma Preservation fold
: (S:State; H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP;
rd,rs:Reg; t:Omega; I:InstrSeq;
P,P':Program)
P = (H,(R,(a,(iseq (fold rd t rs) I)))) !
(WFProgram P) !
(TrProgram P S) !
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(WFProgram P') !
(TrProgram P' (Step S)).
Lemma Preservation jmp
: (St:State; H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; r:Reg;
P,P':Program)
P = (H,(R,(a,(jmp r)))) !
(WFProgram P) !
(TrProgram P St) !
(Eval P P') !
(WFProgram P') !
(TrProgram P' (Step St)).
Lemma Preservation jd
: (St:State; H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP; l:label;
P,P':Program)
P = (H,(R,(a,(jd l)))) !
(WFProgram P) !
(TrProgram P St) !
(Eval P P') !
(WFProgram P') !
(TrProgram P' (Step St)).
Lemma trwordvallist i wordval
: (L:LayoutF; M:Mem; V:(list WordVal); i:int; v:WordVal; w:Word)
(TrWordValList L V M w) !
(ListNth ? V i v) !
(TrWordVal L v (M (plus w i))).
Lemma Preservation ld
: (S:State; H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP;
rd,rs:Reg; i:int; I:InstrSeq;
P,P':Program)
P = (H,(R,(a,(iseq (ld rd rs i) I)))) !
(WFProgram P) !
(TrProgram P S) !
(Eval P P') !
(WFProgram P') !
(TrProgram P' (Step S)).
Lemma Preservation mov
: (S:State; H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP;
rd,rs:Reg; I:InstrSeq;
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P = (H,(R,(a,(iseq (mov rd rs) I)))) !
(WFProgram P) !
(TrProgram P S) !
(Eval P P') !
(WFProgram P') !
(TrProgram P' (Step S)).
Lemma Preservation movi
: (S:State; H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP;
rd:Reg; i:int; I:InstrSeq;
P,P':Program)
P = (H,(R,(a,(iseq (movi rd i) I)))) !
(WFProgram P) !
(TrProgram P S) !
(Eval P P') !
(WFProgram P') !
(TrProgram P' (Step S)).
Lemma Preservation movl
: (S:State; H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP;
r:Reg; l:label; I:InstrSeq;
P,P':Program)
P = (H,(R,(a,(iseq (movl r l) I)))) !
(WFProgram P) !
(TrProgram P S) !
(Eval P P') !
(WFProgram P') !
(TrProgram P' (Step S)).
Lemma tr update layout preserv
: (h,h':(Map label HeapVal); l:label; hv,hv':HeapVal)
(mlookup ? ? h l hv) !
(mupdate ? ? h l hv' h') !
(HV size hv)=(HV size hv') !
(Layout aux h)=(Layout aux h').
Lemma layout aux top label plus nonoverlap
: (s,l:nat; h:HeapMap; hv:HeapVal)
(mWF ? ? h) ! (OrdHeap h) !
(msize ? ? h (S s)) !
(mlookup ? ? h l hv) !
(lt l s) !
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Lemma layout aux label plus nonoverlap
: (h:HeapMap; l,l':label; hv:HeapVal)
(mWF ? ? h) ! (OrdHeap h) !
(mlookup ? ? h l hv) !
(mindom ? ? h l') !
(lt l l') !
(le (plus (Layout aux h l) (HV size hv)) (Layout aux h l')).
Lemma layout non overlap
: (L:LayoutF; H:Heap; HT:HeapTy)
(l,l':label; hv,hv':HeapVal)
(WFHeap H HT) !
L=(Layout H) !
(hlookup (hunwrap H) l hv) !
(hlookup (hunwrap H) l' hv') !
:l=l' !
(le (plus (L l) (HV size hv)) (L l'))
_ (le (plus (L l') (HV size hv')) (L l)).
Lemma tr update wordvallist preserv
: (L:LayoutF; M:Mem; l':Word; w:Word)
(V:(list WordVal))
(l:Word)
(le (plus l (length V)) l') _ (lt l' l) !
(TrWordValList L V M l) !
(TrWordValList L V (updatemem M l' w) l).
Lemma tr update instrseq preserv
: (L:LayoutF; M:Mem; l':Word; w:Word)
(IS:InstrSeq)
(l:Word)
(le (plus l (lenInstrSeq IS)) l') _ (lt l' l) !
(TrInstrSeq L IS M l) !
(TrInstrSeq L IS (updatemem M l' w) l).
Lemma Preservation st
: (S:State; H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP;
rd,rs:Reg; i:int; I:InstrSeq;
P,P':Program)
P = (H,(R,(a,(iseq (st rd i rs) I)))) !
(WFProgram P) !
(TrProgram P S) !
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(WFProgram P') !
(TrProgram P' (Step S)).
Lemma Preservation unfold
: (S:State; H:Heap; R:RegFile; a:AP;
rd,rs:Reg; I:InstrSeq;
P,P':Program)
P = (H,(R,(a,(iseq (unfold rd rs) I)))) !
(WFProgram P) !
(TrProgram P S) !
(Eval P P') !
(WFProgram P') !
(TrProgram P' (Step S)).
FPCC Preservation theorem (complete)
Theorem Preservation : (S:State) (Inv S) ! (Inv (Step S)).
FPCC Safety
Theorem Safety aux : (S:State) (n:nat) (Inv S) ! (Inv (MultiStep n S)).
Theorem Safety : (S:State) (Inv S) ! (Safe S).
208Appendix B
Coq Files for Region-Based TAL and
Runtime System
This chapter lists the Coq code for the system described in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.
Proofs of some smaller, tedious lemmas in the translation have not yet been completed.
These mainly involve straightforward reasoning about updates on memory and machine
state.
B.1 The CAP specication layer
Denitions
Denition addr := word.
Denition pred := state ! Prop.
Denition cdspec := word ! optT (prodT nat pred).
Denition cmdlist := list cmd.
Denition wordlist := list word.
Fixpoint atten (Cs : cmdlist) (M : mem) (pc : addr) fstruct Csg : Prop :=
match Cs with
j nil ) True
j c :: Cs' ) Dc (M pc) = c ^ atten Cs' M (S pc)
end.
Denition iscodearea (Ct : cdspec) (w : addr) (n : word) : Prop :=
9 P, (9 f, (9 s, (9 m, Ct f = someT (pairT s P) ^ w + n  f + s ^ w = f + m))).
209Denition curmem (St : state) := let (X, pc):=St in let (M,R):=X in M.
Denition currf (St : state) := let (X, pc):=St in let (M,R):=X in R.
Denition curpc (St : state) := let (X, pc):=St in let (M,R):=X in pc.
Denition curcmd (St : state) := Dc (curmem St (curpc St)).
Denition curcmdp (St : state) (c:cmd) := Dc (curmem St (curpc St)) = c.
Inference rules
Section CAPRules.
Variable SP : pred.
(* Well-formed command sequences *)
Inductive WFCapCmds : cdspec ! pred ! cmdlist ! Prop :=
j wfcapcmd :
8 (Ct : cdspec) (P : pred) c Cs rd rs rt i,
c = add rd rs rt _
c = addi rd rs i _
c = sub rd rs rt _
c = subi rd rs i _
c = mov rd rs _ c = movi rd i _ c = ld rd rs i !
(8 St : state, P St ! curcmdp St c ! SP St) !
(8 St : state,
P St !
curcmdp St c ! 9 Q : pred, Q (Step St) ^ WFCapCmds Ct Q Cs) !
WFCapCmds Ct P (c :: Cs)
j wfcapst :
8 (Ct : cdspec) (P : pred) Cs rd rs i,
let c := st rd i rs in
(8 St : state,
P St ! curcmdp St c ! : iscodearea Ct (currf St rd + i) 1) !
(8 St : state, P St ! curcmdp St c ! SP St) !
(8 St : state,
P St !
curcmdp St c ! 9 Q : pred, Q (Step St) ^ WFCapCmds Ct Q Cs) !
WFCapCmds Ct P (c :: Cs)
j wfcapbgt :
8 (Ct : cdspec) (P : pred) Cs rs rt f,
let c := bgt rs rt f in
(8 St : state, P St ! curcmdp St c ! SP St) !
(8 St : state,
P St !
210curcmdp St c !
currf St rs ¿ currf St rt !
9 n, (9 R, Ct f = someT (pairT n R) ^ R (Step St))) !
(8 St : state,
P St !
curcmdp St c !
currf St rs  currf St rt !
9 Q : pred, Q (Step St) ^ WFCapCmds Ct Q Cs) !
WFCapCmds Ct P (c :: Cs)
j wfcapbgti :
8 (Ct : cdspec) (P : pred) Cs rs i f,
let c := bgti rs i f in
(8 St : state, P St ! curcmdp St c ! SP St) !
(8 St : state,
P St !
curcmdp St c !
currf St rs  i ! 9 Q : pred, Q (Step St) ^ WFCapCmds Ct Q Cs) !
(8 St : state,
P St !
curcmdp St c !
currf St rs ¿ i !
9 n, (9 R, Ct f = someT (pairT n R) ^ R (Step St))) !
WFCapCmds Ct P (c :: Cs)
j wfcapjd :
8 (Ct : cdspec) (P : pred) f,
(8 St : state, P St ! curcmdp St (jd f) ! SP St) !
(8 St : state,
P St !
curcmdp St (jd f) !
9 n, (9 Q, Ct f = someT (pairT n Q) ^ Q (Step St))) !
WFCapCmds Ct P (jd f :: nil)
j wfcapjmp :
8 (Ct : cdspec) (P : pred) r,
(8 St : state, P St ! curcmdp St (jmp r) ! SP St) !
(8 St : state,
P St !
curcmdp St (jmp r) !
9 n,
(9 Q, Ct (currf St r) = someT (pairT n Q) ^ Q (Step St))) !
WFCapCmds Ct P (jmp r :: nil).
211(* Well-formed code specication *)
Denition WFCapcdspec (M : mem) (Ct : cdspec) :
Prop :=
8 f n P,
Ct f = someT (pairT n P) !
9 Cs, atten Cs M f ^ length Cs = n ^ WFCapCmds Ct P Cs.
(* Well-formed machine state *)
Inductive WFCapstate : state ! Prop :=
wfcapstate :
8 M R pc Ct Cs P,
WFCapcdspec M Ct !
atten Cs M pc !
WFCapCmds Ct P Cs !
P (M, R, pc) !
iscodearea Ct pc (length Cs) !
WFCapstate (M, R, pc).
Properties of the CAP system
Lemma iscodearea n Sn :
8 Ct f n, iscodearea Ct f (S n) ! iscodearea Ct (S f) n.
Lemma le Sm 1 : 8 f x l, S (f + x)  l ! S f  l.
Lemma atten noncodeupd :
8 M Ct Cs f x w,
atten Cs M f !
iscodearea Ct f (length Cs) !
: iscodearea Ct x 1 ! atten Cs (updatemem M x w) f.
Lemma WFCapcdspec noncodeupd :
8 M Ct x w,
WFCapcdspec M Ct ! : iscodearea Ct x 1 ! WFCapcdspec (updatemem M x w) Ct.
Lemma CapPreserv : 8 St, WFCapstate St ! WFCapstate (Step St).
Lemma WFCapstate SP : 8 St, WFCapstate St ! SP St.
End CAPRules.
Denitions and proofs for FPCC package production
(* Denition of safety *)
Denition Safe (St : state) (SP : pred) := 8 n, SP (MultiStep n St).
212(* The most basic safety policy *)
Denition SPbase (St : state) := : curcmdp St ill.
(* CAP well-formedness implies basic safety policy *)
Lemma WFCap SPbase : 8 SP St, WFCapstate SP St ! SPbase St.
Lemma WFCap SPadd :
8 (PA SPadd : pred) St,
WFCapstate PA St ! (8 St, PA St ! SPadd St) ! SPbase St ^ SPadd St.
Lemma CapPreservMulti :
8 n (SP : pred) St, WFCapstate SP St ! WFCapstate SP (MultiStep n St).
(* CAP well-formedness implies FPCC Safety *)
Theorem WFCap Safe :
8 (PA SPadd : pred) St,
WFCapstate PA St !
(8 St, PA St ! SPadd St) ! Safe St (fun S ) SPbase S ^ SPadd S).
B.2 RgnTAL Syntax
Regions
(* Region identiers are identied with integers *)
Denition rgn : Set := nat.
(* A decidable equality on region identiers *)
Denition beq rgn : rgn ! rgn ! bool := beq nat.
(* Properties of the equality *)
Denition beq rgn re : 8 p, beq rgn p p = true
:= fun p ) sym eq (beq nat re p).
Denition beq rgn neq : 8 p p', p6=p' ! beq rgn p p' = false
:= fun p p' H ) sym eq (natutil.beq neq false p p' H).
Hint Immediate beq rgn re.
Capabilities
(* Multiplicities are none, unique, or multiple *)
Inductive accap : Set :=
j noC : accap j uniC : accap j mulC : accap.
Denition beq accap : accap ! accap ! bool
:= fun c1 c2 ) match (c1,c2) with
j (noC,noC) ) true
213j (uniC,uniC) ) true
j (mulC,mulC) ) true
j ) false
end.
(* A set of capabilities is implemented as a (partial) function from region identiers to multiplicities
*)
Denition capset := rgn ! accap.
(* These are syntactic sugar for the Capability Language constructs of Crary, Walker, et al. *)
Denition nullcap : capset := fun r ) noC.
Denition uniqcap : rgn ! capset
:= fun rk r ) if (beq rgn r rk) then uniC else noC.
Denition multcap : rgn ! capset
:= fun rk r ) if (beq rgn r rk) then mulC else noC.
Denition disjcap : capset ! capset ! Prop :=
fun A1 A2 ) 8 p, (A1 p = noC) _ (A2 p = noC).
Denition pluscap : 8 (A1 A2:capset), (disjcap A1 A2) ! capset :=
fun A1 A2 D r )
if (beq accap (A1 r) noC) then (A2 r) else
if (beq accap (A2 r) noC) then (A1 r) else noC.
Denition barcap : capset ! capset
:= fun A r ) match (A r) with uniC ) mulC j ) (A r) end.
Notation A ./ B := (disjcap A B) (at level 0).
Notation A  B  C := (pluscap A B C) (at level 0).
Registers and labels
Denition label := nat.
Denition beq label := beq nat.
Denition beq label neq := natutil.beq neq false.
Denition beq label re := beq nat re.
Hint Immediate beq label re.
Inductive regt : Set :=
j r0 : regt j r1 : regt j r2 : regt j r3 : regt
j r4 : regt j r5 : regt j r6 : regt j r7 : regt.
Load talreg.
Denition beq regt re := beq regt true id.
Denition beq regt neq := beq regt neq false.
Hint Immediate beq regt re.
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(* Types with free variables (tracked deBruijn style) *)
Inductive omegaV : nat ! Set :=
j tvvar : 8 i, omegaV (S i)
j tvlift : 8 i, omegaV i ! omegaV (S i)
j tvint : omegaV 0
j tvhandle : rgn ! omegaV 0
j tvpair : 8 i, omegaV i ! omegaV i ! rgn ! omegaV i
j tvcode : 8 i, capset ! (regt ! omegaV i) ! omegaV i
j tvabsr : 8 i, (rgn ! omegaV i) ! omegaV i
j tvabsc : 8 i, (capset ! omegaV i) ! omegaV i
j tvabscb : 8 i, (capset ! omegaV i) ! capset ! omegaV i
j tvabscd : 8 i, 8 (c1 c2:capset), ((c1 ./ c2) ! omegaV i) ! omegaV i
j tvabst : 8 i, omegaV (S i) ! omegaV i
j tvrec : 8 i, omegaV (S i) ! omegaV i.
(* Top-level types *)
Inductive omega : Set :=
j tint : omega
j thandle : rgn ! omega
j tpair : omega ! omega ! rgn ! omega
j tcode : capset ! (regt ! omega) ! omega
j tabsr : (rgn ! omega) ! omega
j tabsc : (capset ! omega) ! omega
j tabscb : (capset ! omega) ! capset ! omega
j tabscd : 8 (c1 c2:capset), ((c1 ./ c2) ! omega) ! omega
j tabst : (omegaV 1) ! omega
j trec : (omegaV 1) ! omega.
(* Utility denitions for reasoning about equality *)
Denition myfequal
: 8 (A B : Type) (f : A ! B) (x y : A), x = y ! f x = f y
Denition myeqaddS : 8 n m, S n = S m ! n = m.
Denition O S set : 8 (A:Set) j, 0=S j ! A.
(* Denition of substitution for deBruijn representation *)
Fixpoint subst aux (i:nat) (t:omegaV i) fstruct tg
: 8 j, i=(S j) ! omegaV j ! omegaV j
:= match
t as X in (omegaV i)
return (8 j (p:i=S j) (e':omegaV j), omegaV j) with
215j tvvar n ) fun j e' ) e'
j tvlift n t' ) fun j (p:S n=S j) )
eq rec n t' j (myeqaddS n j p)
j tvint ) fun j (p:0=S j) ) O S set j p
j tvhandle ) fun j (p:0=S j) ) O S set j p
j tvpair n t1 t2 p'
) fun j (p:n=S j) e' )
tvpair j (subst aux n t1 j p e')
(subst aux n t2 j p e') p'
j tvcode n A G ) fun j (p:n=S j) e' )
tvcode j A
(fun r ) (subst aux n (G r) j p e'))
j tvabsr n Fr ) fun j (p:n=S j) e' )
tvabsr j
(fun p' ) (subst aux n (Fr p') j p e'))
j tvabsc n Fc ) fun j (p:n=S j) e' )
tvabsc j
(fun c ) (subst aux n (Fc c) j p e'))
j tvabscb n Fc A ) fun j (p:n=S j) e' )
tvabscb j
(fun c ) (subst aux n (Fc c) j p e')) A
j tvabscd n c1 c2 Fcd ) fun j (p:n=S j) e' )
tvabscd j c1 c2
(fun D )
(subst aux n (Fcd D) j p e'))
j tvabst n t' ) fun j (p:n=S j) e' )
tvabst j
(subst aux (S n) t' (S j)
(myfequal S p)
(tvlift j e'))
j tvrec n t' ) fun j (p:n=S j) e' )
tvrec j
(subst aux (S n) t' (S j)
(myfequal S p)
(tvlift j e'))
end.
(* Top-level substitution function *)
Denition substV : omegaV 1 ! omegaV 0 ! omegaV 0
:= fun T t ) (subst aux T (re equal 1) t).
(* Converting between [omega] representations *)
216Fixpoint unliftV i (t:omegaV i) fstruct tg : 0=i ! omega :=
match t as X in (omegaV i) return (8 (D:0=i), omega) with
j tvvar n ) fun D ) (O S set D)
j tvlift n ) fun D ) (O S set D)
j tvint ) fun ) tint
j tvhandle p ) fun ) thandle p
j tvpair n t1 t2 p ) fun D ) tpair (unliftV n t1 D) (unliftV n t2 D) p
j tvcode n A G ) fun D ) tcode A (fun r ) (unliftV (G r) D))
j tvabsr n Fr ) fun D ) tabsr (fun p ) (unliftV (Fr p) D))
j tvabsc n Fc ) fun D ) tabsc (fun c ) (unliftV (Fc c) D))
j tvabscb n Fc A ) fun D ) tabscb (fun c ) (unliftV (Fc c) D)) A
j tvabscd n c1 c2 Fcd ) fun D ) tabscd c1 c2(fun Dc
) (unliftV (Fcd Dc) D))
j tvabst n t' ) fun D ) tabst (eq rec t' 1 (sym eq (eq S D)))
j tvrec n t' ) fun D ) trec (eq rec t' 1 (sym eq (eq S D)))
end.
Denition unliftV0 : omegaV 0 ! omega := fun t ) unliftV t (re equal ).
Fixpoint lifttoV (t:omega) : omegaV 0 :=
match t with
j tint ) tvint
j thandle p ) tvhandle p
j tpair t1 t2 p ) tvpair (lifttoV t1) (lifttoV t2) p
j tcode A G ) tvcode A (fun r ) (lifttoV (G r)))
j tabsr Fr ) tvabsr (fun p ) (lifttoV (Fr p)))
j tabsc Fc ) tvabsc (fun c ) (lifttoV (Fc c)))
j tabscb Fc A ) tvabscb (fun c ) (lifttoV (Fc c))) A
j tabscd c1 c2 Fcd ) tvabscd (fun Dc ) (lifttoV (Fcd Dc)))
j tabst t' ) tvabst t'
j trec t' ) tvrec t'
end.
Denition unfoldV := fun t:(omegaV 1) ) unliftV0 (substV t (tvrec t)).
(* Constructors of the type system: regions, capabilities, types *)
Inductive constr : Set :=
j c rgn : rgn ! constr
j c cap : capset ! constr
j c disj : 8 c1 c2, c1 ./ c2 ! constr
j c type : omega ! constr.
(* Register le type *)
Denition rftype : Set := regt ! omega.
217(* Heap region type *)
Denition rgntype : Set := fmap label omega.
(* Data memory type *)
Denition memtype : Set := fmap rgn rgntype.
Program state
Inductive wordval : Set :=
j wi : nat ! wordval
j wl : rgn ! label ! wordval
j wf : label ! wordval
j wh : rgn ! wordval
j wappr : wordval ! rgn ! wordval
j wappc : wordval ! capset ! wordval
j wappcd : 8 (c1 c2:capset), wordval ! (c1 ./ c2) ! wordval
j wappt : wordval ! omega ! wordval
j wfold : wordval ! omega ! wordval.
Inductive instr : Set :=
j iadd : regt ! regt ! regt ! instr
j iaddi : regt ! regt ! nat ! instr
j imov : regt ! regt ! instr
j imovi : regt ! nat ! instr
j imovf : regt ! label ! instr
j ild : regt ! regt ! nat ! instr
j ist : regt ! nat ! regt ! instr
j ibgt : regt ! regt ! label ! instr
j ibgti : regt ! nat ! label ! instr
j iappr : regt ! rgn ! instr
j iappc : regt ! capset ! instr
j iappcd : 8 c1 c2, regt ! (c1 ./ c2) ! instr
j iappt : regt ! omega ! instr
j ifold : regt ! omega ! instr
j iunfold : regt ! instr.
Inductive iseq : Set :=
j icons : instr ! iseq ! iseq
j ijd : label ! iseq
j ijmp : regt ! iseq.
Inductive codeval : Set :=
j cvcode : omega ! ciseq ! codeval
218j cvstub : omega ! codeval.
Inductive heapval : Set :=
j hvpair : wordval ! wordval ! heapval.
Notation [ A , B ] := (hvpair A B) (at level 0).
(* Heap region *)
Denition heap := fmap label heapval.
(* Data memory *)
Denition datamem := fmap rgn heap.
(* Register le *)
Denition regle := regt ! wordval.
(* Code memory *)
Denition codemem := fmap label codeval.
(* Program state *)
Denition progstate := datamem  regle  iseq.
B.3 RgnTAL Operational Semantics
(* Update utility functions *)
Denition rf upd (R:regle) (r:regt) (v:wordval) : regle
:= fun r' ) if (beq regt r' r) then v else R r'.
Denition hp upd (H:heap) (l:label) (hv:heapval) : heap
:= (fmapupd beq label H l hv).
Denition dm upd (DM:datamem) (p:rgn) (H:heap) : datamem
:= (fmapupd beq rgn DM p H).
Denition rft upd (G:rftype) (r:regt) (t:omega) : rftype
:= fun r' ) if (beq regt r' r) then t else G r'.
(* Utility function for type erasure *)
Fixpoint stripabs (v:wordval) fstruct vg : (option label) :=
match v with
j wf f ) (Some f)
j wappr v' ) (stripabs v')
j wappc v' ) (stripabs v')
j wappcd v' ) (stripabs v')
j wappt v' ) (stripabs v')
j ) (None)
219end.
The Step relation
Inductive rt eval : codemem ! progstate ! progstate ! Prop :=
j ev iadd
: 8 CM DM R IS rd rs rt s t,
let i:=(iadd rd rs rt) in
let R':=(rf upd R rd (wi (plus s t))) in
(R rs)=(wi s) !
(R rt)=(wi t) !
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM, R', IS))
j ev iaddi
: 8 CM DM R IS rd rs s t,
let i:=(iaddi rd rs t) in
let R':=(rf upd R rd (wi (plus s t))) in
(R rs)=(wi s) !
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM, R', IS))
j ev imov
: 8 CM DM R IS rd rs,
let i:=(imov rd rs) in
let R':=(rf upd R rd (R rs)) in
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM, R', IS))
j ev imovi
: 8 CM DM R IS rd t,
let i:=(imovi rd t) in
let R':=(rf upd R rd (wi t)) in
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM, R', IS))
j ev imovf
: 8 CM DM R IS rd f,
let i:=(imovf rd f) in
let R':=(rf upd R rd (wf f)) in
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM, R', IS))
j ev ild
: 8 CM DM R IS rd rs n p l H v0 v1 v,
let i:=(ild rd rs n) in
let R':=(rf upd R rd v) in
(R rs)=(wl p l) !
(fmaplook DM p H) !
(fmaplook H l [v0,v1]) !
(match n with j 0 ) v=v0 j 1 ) v=v1 j ) False end) !
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM, R', IS))
220j ev ist
: 8 CM DM R IS rd n rs p l H v0 v1 v0' v1',
let i:=(ist rd n rs) in
let v:=(R rs) in
let H':=(hp upd H l [v0',v1']) in
let DM':=(dm upd DM p H') in
(R rd)=(wl p l) !
(fmaplook DM p H) !
(fmaplook H l [v0,v1]) !
(match n with 0 ) v0'=v ^ v1'=v1
j 1 ) v0'=v0 ^ v1'=v j ) False end) !
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM', R, IS))
j ev ibgt
: 8 CM DM R IS rs rt f s t G IS' IS,
let i:=(ibgt rs rt f) in
(R rs)=(wi s) !
(R rt)=(wi t) !
(fmaplook CM f (cvcode G IS')) !
(match (le gt dec s t) with left ) IS=IS
j ) IS=IS' end) !
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM, R, IS))
j ev ibgti
: 8 CM DM R IS rs f s t G IS' IS,
let i:=(ibgti rs t f) in
(R rs)=(wi s) !
(fmaplook CM f (cvcode G IS')) !
(match (le gt dec s t) with left ) IS=IS
j ) IS=IS' end) !
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM, R, IS))
j ev iappr
: 8 CM DM R IS r p,
let i:=(iappr r p) in
let R':=(rf upd R r (wappr (R r) p)) in
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM, R', IS))
j ev iappc
: 8 CM DM R IS r c,
let i:=(iappc r c) in
let R':=(rf upd R r (wappc (R r) c)) in
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM, R', IS))
j ev iappcd
221: 8 CM DM R IS r c1 c2 Dc,
let i:=(iappcd c1 c2 r Dc) in
let R':=(rf upd R r (wappcd c1 c2 (R r) Dc)) in
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM, R', IS))
j ev iappt
: 8 CM DM R IS r t,
let i:=(iappt r t) in
let R':=(rf upd R r (wappt (R r) t)) in
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM, R', IS))
j ev ifold
: 8 CM DM R IS r t,
let i:=(ifold r t) in
let R':=(rf upd R r (wfold (R r) t)) in
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM, R', IS))
j ev iunfold
: 8 CM DM R IS r v t,
let i:=(iunfold r) in
let R':=(rf upd R r v) in
(R r)=(wfold v t) !
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (icons i IS)) (DM, R', IS))
j ev ijd
: 8 CM DM R f G IS,
(fmaplook CM f (cvcode G IS)) !
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (ijd f)) (DM, R, IS))
j ev ijmp
: 8 CM DM R r G IS f,
(stripabs (R r))=(Some f) !
(fmaplook CM f (cvcode G IS)) !
(rt eval CM (DM, R, (ijmp r)) (DM, R, IS)).
B.4 RgnTAL Static Semantics
(* Dening capability set equality *)
Denition eqcap (A1 A2:capset) : Prop
:= 8 p, (A1 p)=(A2 p).
Notation A =c B := (eqcap A B) (at level 0).
(* Derivable properties of the equality *)
Lemma eqcap re : 8 A, A =c A.
Lemma eqcap sym : 8 A1 A2, A1 =c A2 ! A2 =c A1.
222Lemma eqcap trans : 8 A1 A2 A3, A1 =c A2 ! A2 =c A3 ! A1 =c A3.
Lemma eqcap barcap each
: 8 A1 A2, A1 =c A2 ! (barcap A1) =c (barcap A2).
Lemma eqcap distrib
: 8 A1 A2 D1 D2,
(barcap (A1  A2  D1)) =c ((barcap A1)  (barcap A2)  D2).
Hint Immediate eqcap distrib.
Hint Immediate eqcap re eqcap sym eqcap barcap each.
Lemma eqcap cong plus
: 8 A1 A2 A1' A2' D D',
A1 =c A1' ! A2 =c A2' ! (A1  A2  D) =c (A1'  A2'  D').
Lemma eqcap cong bar : 8 A1 A2, A1 =c A2 ! (barcap A1) =c (barcap A2).
Lemma eqcap null : 8 A D, (nullcap  A  D) =c A.
Lemma eqcap comm
: 8 A1 A2 D12 D21, (A1  A2  D12) =c (A2  A1  D21).
Lemma eqcap assoc
: 8 A1 A2 A3 D1 D2 D3 D4,
(A1  (A2  A3  D1)  D2) =c ((A1  A2  D3)  A3  D4).
Lemma eqcap dup
: 8 A D, (barcap A) =c ((barcap A)  (barcap A)  D).
Lemma eqcap bar null : (barcap nullcap) =c nullcap.
Lemma eqcap ag : 8 p, (barcap (uniqcap p)) =c (multcap p).
Lemma eqcap bar idem : 8 A, (barcap (barcap A)) =c (barcap A).
Hint Immediate eqcap cong plus eqcap cong bar eqcap null eqcap comm
eqcap assoc eqcap dup eqcap bar null eqcap ag eqcap bar idem.
(* Capability set subtyping *)
Inductive subaccap : accap ! accap ! Prop :=
j subaccap re : 8 c, subaccap c c
j subaccap mult : subaccap uniC mulC.
Denition subcap : capset ! capset ! Prop
:= fun A1 A2 ) 8 p, subaccap (A1 p) (A2 p).
Notation A c B := (subcap A B) (at level 0).
Lemma subcap eq : 8 A1 A2, A1 =c A2 ! A1 c A2.
Lemma subcap trans
223: 8 A1 A2, A1 c A2 ! 8 A3, A2 c A3 ! A1 c A3.
Lemma subcap cong bar
: 8 A1 A2, A1 c A2 ! (barcap A1) c (barcap A2).
Lemma subcap bar : 8 A, A c (barcap A).
(* Code type instantiation *)
Inductive instcodetype : omega ! list constr ! omega ! Prop :=
j inst code
: 8 t,
instcodetype t (nil) t
j inst absr
: 8 Fr g Cs t,
instcodetype (Fr g) Cs t !
instcodetype (tabsr Fr) ((c rgn g)::Cs) t
j inst absc
: 8 Fc c Cs t,
instcodetype (Fc c) Cs t !
instcodetype (tabsc Fc) ((c cap c)::Cs) t
j inst abscb
: 8 Fc A c Cs t,
instcodetype (Fc c) Cs t !
c c A !
instcodetype (tabscb Fc A) ((c cap c)::Cs) t
j inst abscd
: 8 c1 c2 Fcd Dc Cs t,
instcodetype (Fcd Dc) Cs t !
instcodetype (tabscd c1 c2 Fcd) ((c disj c1 c2 Dc)::Cs) t
j inst abst
: 8 Ft t Cs t' t,
t' = unliftV0 (substV Ft (lifttoV t)) !
instcodetype t' Cs t !
instcodetype (tabst Ft) ((c type t)::Cs) t.
(* Type equality *)
Denition eqtype (t1 t2:omega) : Prop
:= t1=t2.
(* Register le type equality *)
Denition eqrftype (G1 G2:rftype) : Prop := 8 r, eqtype (G1 r) (G2 r).
(* Properties of type equality *)
Denition eqtype re : 8 t, eqtype t t := fun t ) re equal t.
224Denition eqtype sym : 8 t1 t2, eqtype t1 t2 ! eqtype t2 t1
:= fun t1 t2 D ) (sym eq D).
Denition eqtype trans
: 8 t1 t2 t3, eqtype t1 t2 ! eqtype t2 t3 ! eqtype t1 t3
:= fun t1 t2 t3 D1 D2 ) (trans eq D1 D2).
Hint Immediate eqtype re eqtype sym.
Hint Immediate eqtype re eqtype sym.
(* Memory type lookup *)
Denition memtypeof (MT:memtype) (p:rgn) (l:label) (t:omega) : Prop
:= 9 g, (fmaplook MT p g) ^ (fmaplook g l t).
(* Syntactic restrictions on code types *)
Inductive iscodetype : omega ! Prop :=
j isct tabsr : 8 F, (8 x, iscodetype (F x)) ! (iscodetype (tabsr F))
j isct tabsc : 8 F, (8 x, iscodetype (F x)) ! (iscodetype (tabsc F))
j isct tabscb : 8 F A, (8 x, iscodetype (F x)) ! (iscodetype (tabscb F A))
j isct tabscd : 8 c1 c2 F, (8 (D:c1 ./ c2), iscodetype (F D)) !
(iscodetype (tabscd c1 c2 F))
j isct tabst : 8 F, (8 x, iscodetype (unliftV0 (substV F (lifttoV x)))) !
(iscodetype (tabst F))
j isct tcode : 8 A G, iscodetype (tcode A G).
Denition codevaltype (cv:codeval) : omega :=
match cv with (cvcode t ) ) t j (cvstub t) ) t end.
(* Well-formed word values *)
Inductive wf wordval : codemem ! memtype ! wordval ! omega ! Prop :=
j wfv int : 8 CM MT i, wf wordval CM MT (wi i) tint
j wfv addr : 8 CM MT p l t,
memtypeof MT p l t !
wf wordval CM MT (wl p l) t
j wfv addr pair
: 8 CM MT p l t1 t2,
notindomf MT p !
wf wordval CM MT (wl p l) (tpair t1 t2 p)
j wfv codeptr
: 8 CM MT f cv t,
fmaplook CM f cv !
eqtype t (codevaltype cv) !
wf wordval CM MT (wf f) t
j wfv handle
225: 8 CM MT g,
wf wordval CM MT (wh g) (thandle g)
j wfv typer
: 8 CM MT v g Fr,
wf wordval CM MT v (tabsr Fr) !
iscodetype (tabsr Fr) !
wf wordval CM MT (wappr v g) (Fr g)
j wfv typec
: 8 CM MT v A Fc,
wf wordval CM MT v (tabsc Fc) !
iscodetype (tabsc Fc) !
wf wordval CM MT (wappc v A) (Fc A)
j wfv typecb
: 8 CM MT v A Fc A',
wf wordval CM MT v (tabscb Fc A') !
subcap A A' !
iscodetype (tabscb Fc A') !
wf wordval CM MT (wappc v A) (Fc A)
j wfv typet
: 8 CM MT v t Ft t',
wf wordval CM MT v (tabst Ft) !
unliftV0 (substV Ft (lifttoV t)) = t' !
iscodetype (tabst Ft) !
wf wordval CM MT (wappt v t) t'
j wfv fold
: 8 CM MT v t,
wf wordval CM MT v (unliftV0 (substV t (tvrec t))) !
wf wordval CM MT (wfold v (trec t)) (trec t).
(* Well-formed instruction sequences *)
Inductive wf iseq : codemem ! capset ! rftype ! iseq ! Prop :=
j wf iadd
: 8 CM A G rd rs rt Is,
G(rs)=tint !
G(rt)=tint !
wf iseq CM A (rft upd G rd tint) Is !
wf iseq CM A G (icons (iadd rd rs rt) Is)
j wf iaddi
: 8 CM A G rd rs t Is,
G(rs)=tint !
wf iseq CM A (rft upd G rd tint) Is !
226wf iseq CM A G (icons (iaddi rd rs t) Is)
j wf imov
: 8 CM A G rd rs Is,
wf iseq CM A (rft upd G rd (G(rs))) Is !
wf iseq CM A G (icons (imov rd rs) Is)
j wf imovi
: 8 CM A G rd s Is,
wf iseq CM A (rft upd G rd tint) Is !
wf iseq CM A G (icons (imovi rd s) Is)
j wf imovf
: 8 CM A G rd f Is cv t,
fmaplook CM f cv !
eqtype t (codevaltype cv) !
wf iseq CM A (rft upd G rd t) Is !
wf iseq CM A G (icons (imovf rd f) Is)
j wf ild
: 8 CM A G rd rs n Is t t1 t2 g,
(n=0 ^ t=t1) _ (n=1 ^ t=t2) !
G(rs) = tpair t1 t2 g !
subaccap (A g) mulC !
wf iseq CM A (rft upd G rd t) Is !
wf iseq CM A G (icons (ild rd rs n) Is)
j wf ist
: 8 CM A G rd n rs Is t t1 t2 g,
(n=0 ^ t=t1) _ (n=1 ^ t=t2) !
G(rd) = tpair t1 t2 g !
G(rs) = t !
subaccap (A g) mulC !
wf iseq CM A G Is !
wf iseq CM A G (icons (ist rd n rs) Is)
j wf ibgt
: 8 CM A G rs rt f Is cv ts A' G',
G(rs) = tint !
G(rt) = tint !
fmaplook CM f cv ! instcodetype (codevaltype(cv)) ts (tcode A' G') !
eqrftype G G' !
subcap A A' !
wf iseq CM A G Is ! wf iseq CM A G (icons (ibgt rs rt f) Is)
227j wf ibgti
: 8 CM A G rs t f Is cv ts A' G',
G(rs) = tint !
fmaplook CM f cv ! instcodetype (codevaltype(cv)) ts (tcode A' G') !
eqrftype G G' !
subcap A A' !
wf iseq CM A G Is ! wf iseq CM A G (icons (ibgti rs t f) Is)
j wf iappr
: 8 CM A G r g Is Fr,
G(r) = tabsr Fr !
wf iseq CM A (rft upd G r (Fr g)) Is !
wf iseq CM A G (icons (iappr r g) Is)
j wf iappc
: 8 CM A G r c Is Fc,
G(r) = tabsc Fc !
wf iseq CM A (rft upd G r (Fc c)) Is !
wf iseq CM A G (icons (iappc r c) Is)
j wf iappcb
: 8 CM A G r c Is Fc A',
G(r) = tabscb Fc A' !
subcap c A' !
wf iseq CM A (rft upd G r (Fc c)) Is !
wf iseq CM A G (icons (iappc r c) Is)
j wf iappcd
: 8 CM A G r c1 c2 Dc Is Fcd,
G(r) = tabscd c1 c2 Fcd !
wf iseq CM A (rft upd G r (Fcd Dc)) Is !
wf iseq CM A G (icons (iappcd c1 c2 r Dc) Is)
j wf iappt
: 8 CM A G r t Is Ft t',
G(r) = tabst Ft !
t' = unliftV0 (substV Ft (lifttoV t)) !
wf iseq CM A (rft upd G r t') Is !
wf iseq CM A G (icons (iappt r t) Is)
j wf ifold
: 8 CM A G r t Is,
G(r) = unfoldV t !
wf iseq CM A (rft upd G r (trec t)) Is !
wf iseq CM A G (icons (ifold r (trec t)) Is)
228j wf iunfold
: 8 CM A G r Is t t',
G(r) = trec t !
t' = unfoldV t !
wf iseq CM A (rft upd G r t') Is !
wf iseq CM A G (icons (iunfold r) Is)
j wf ijd
: 8 CM A G f cv ts A' G',
fmaplook CM f cv ! instcodetype (codevaltype(cv)) ts (tcode A' G') !
eqrftype G G' !
subcap A A' !
wf iseq CM A G (ijd f)
j wf ijmp
: 8 CM A G r t ts A' G',
G(r) = t !
instcodetype t ts (tcode A' G') ! eqrftype G G' !
subcap A A' !
wf iseq CM A G (ijmp r).
(* Well-formed code heap values *)
Inductive wf codeval : codemem ! codeval ! Prop :=
j wf cvcode : 8 CM t Is,
iscodetype t !
(8 Ts A G, instcodetype t Ts (tcode A G) !
wf iseq CM A G Is) !
wf codeval CM (cvcode t Is)
j wf cvstub : 8 CM t,
iscodetype t !
wf codeval CM (cvstub t).
(* Well-formed data type values *)
Inductive wf heapval : codemem ! memtype ! heapval ! rgn ! omega ! Prop :=
j wf hvpair : 8 CM MT v1 v2 t1 t2 g,
wf wordval CM MT v1 t1 !
wf wordval CM MT v2 t2 !
wf heapval CM MT [v1, v2] g (tpair t1 t2 g).
(* Well-formed heap region *)
Denition wf heap : codemem ! memtype ! heap ! rgn ! rgntype ! Prop :=
fun CM MT H g gt )
(eqdomf H gt) ^
(8 l hv t, fmaplook H l hv ! fmaplook gt l t !
wf heapval CM MT hv g t).
229(* Well-formed data memory *)
Denition wf datamem : codemem ! datamem ! memtype ! Prop :=
fun CM M MT )
(eqdomf M MT) ^
(8 p H gt, fmaplook M p H ! fmaplook MT p gt !
wf heap CM MT H p gt).
(* Well-formed register le *)
Denition wf regle : codemem ! memtype ! regle ! rftype ! Prop :=
fun CM MT R G )
8 r, wf wordval CM MT (R r) (G r).
(* Well-formed code memory *)
Denition wf codemem : codemem ! Prop :=
fun CM ) 8 l cv, fmaplook CM l cv ! wf codeval CM cv.
(* Memory typecapability satisability *)
Denition sat cap memtype : memtype ! capset ! Prop :=
fun MT A )
(8 g, indomf MT g ! subaccap (A g) mulC) ^
(8 g, subaccap (A g) mulC ! indomf MT g).
(* Well-formed program state *)
Denition wf state
: codemem ! datamem ! regle ! memtype ! capset ! rftype ! Prop :=
fun CM M R MT A G )
wf codemem CM ^
wf datamem CM M MT ^
wf regle CM MT R G ^
sat cap memtype MT A.
(* Well-formed program *)
Inductive wf program : (codemem  progstate) ! Prop :=
j wf rgntalprog : 8 CM M R Is MT A G,
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G Is !
wf program (CM, (M, R, Is)).
B.5 RgnTAL Soundness Proofs
Lemmas about the types that appear in the data and code memory types
Lemma memtype not int
: 8 CM M MT p l, wf datamem CM M MT ! :memtypeof MT p l tint.
230Lemma memtype not handle
: 8 CM M MT p l g, wf datamem CM M MT ! :memtypeof MT p l (thandle g).
Lemma memtype not rec
: 8 CM M MT p l t, wf datamem CM M MT ! :memtypeof MT p l (trec t).
Lemma memtype not code
: 8 CM M MT p l A G, wf datamem CM M MT ! :memtypeof MT p l (tcode A G).
Lemma memtype not absr
: 8 CM M MT p l Fr, wf datamem CM M MT ! :memtypeof MT p l (tabsr Fr).
Lemma memtype not absc
: 8 CM M MT p l Fc, wf datamem CM M MT ! :memtypeof MT p l (tabsc Fc).
Lemma memtype not abscb
: 8 CM M MT p l Fc A, wf datamem CM M MT ! :memtypeof MT p l (tabscb Fc A).
Lemma memtype not abscd
: 8 CM M MT p l c1 c2 Fc,
wf datamem CM M MT ! :memtypeof MT p l (tabscd c1 c2 Fc).
Lemma memtype not abst
: 8 CM M MT p l Ft,
wf datamem CM M MT ! :memtypeof MT p l (tabst Ft).
Lemmas about the syntactic form of code value types
Lemma iscodetype not int : 8 t, iscodetype t ! t 6= tint.
Lemma codevaltype not int
: 8 CM f cv, wf codemem CM ! fmaplook CM f cv ! :codevaltype cv=tint.
Lemma codevaltype not handle
: 8 CM f cv g, wf codemem CM ! fmaplook CM f cv ! :codevaltype cv=(thandle g).
Lemma codevaltype not rec
: 8 CM f cv t, wf codemem CM ! fmaplook CM f cv ! :codevaltype cv=trec t.
Lemma codevaltype not pair
: 8 CM f cv t1 t2 p, wf codemem CM ! fmaplook CM f cv ! :codevaltype cv=tpair t1 t2 p.
Lemma codevaltype iscodetype
: 8 CM f cv, wf codemem CM ! fmaplook CM f cv ! iscodetype (codevaltype cv).
Type erasure with code pointers
Lemma wf tabsr stripabs
: 8 CM M MT v t,
wf datamem CM M MT !
wf wordval CM MT v t !
231(9 Fr, t = (tabsr Fr)) _
(9 Fc, t = (tabsc Fc)) _
(9 Fc, 9 A, t = (tabscb Fc A)) _
(9 c1, 9 c2, 9 Fc, t = (tabscd c1 c2 Fc)) _
(9 Ft, t = (tabst Ft)) !
9 f, stripabs v = Some f.
Canonical forms lemmas
Lemma canform regval int
: 8 CM M R MT A G r,
wf state CM M R MT A G !
G(r)=tint !
9 s, R(r)=wi s.
Lemma canform regval handle
: 8 CM M R MT A G r g,
wf state CM M R MT A G !
G(r)=thandle g !
R(r)=wh g.
Lemma canform regval pair
: 8 CM M R MT A G r t1 t2 g,
wf state CM M R MT A G !
G(r) = tpair t1 t2 g !
subaccap (A g) mulC !
9 p, 9 l, 9 H, 9 v1, 9 v2,
R(r) = (wl p l) ^
fmaplook M p H ^
fmaplook H l [v1, v2].
Lemma canform regval rec
: 8 CM M R MT A G r t,
wf state CM M R MT A G !
G(r)=trec t !
9 v, R(r)=wfold v (trec t).
Lemma canform regval code
: 8 CM M R MT A G r A' G',
wf state CM M R MT A G !
G(r)=tcode A' G' !
9 f, stripabs(R(r))=(Some f).
Lemma canform regval absr
: 8 CM M R MT A G r Fr,
232wf state CM M R MT A G !
G(r)=tabsr Fr !
9 f, stripabs(R(r))=(Some f).
Lemma canform regval absc
: 8 CM M R MT A G r F,
wf state CM M R MT A G !
G(r)=tabsc F !
9 f, stripabs(R(r))=(Some f).
Lemma canform regval abscb
: 8 CM M R MT A G r F A',
wf state CM M R MT A G !
G(r)=tabscb F A' !
9 f, stripabs(R(r))=(Some f).
Lemma canform regval abscd
: 8 CM M R MT A G r c1 c2 F,
wf state CM M R MT A G !
G(r)=tabscd c1 c2 F !
9 f, stripabs(R(r))=(Some f).
Lemma canform regval abst
: 8 CM M R MT A G r F,
wf state CM M R MT A G !
G(r)=tabst F !
9 f, stripabs(R(r))=(Some f).
Progress lemmas
Denition isgoodjump : codemem ! regle ! iseq ! Prop :=
fun CM R Is )
match Is with
j (icons (ibgt f) ) )
(9 t', 9 Is', (fmaplook CM f (cvcode t' Is')))
j (icons (ibgti f) ) )
(9 t', 9 Is', (fmaplook CM f (cvcode t' Is')))
j (ijd f) )
(9 t', 9 Is', (fmaplook CM f (cvcode t' Is')))
j (ijmp r) )
8 f, stripabs(R r)=(Some f) !
(9 t', 9 Is', (fmaplook CM f (cvcode t' Is')))
j ) True
end.
Lemma progress iadd
233: 8 CM M R MT A G rd rs rt Is,
let curIs := (icons (iadd rd rs rt) Is) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress iaddi
: 8 CM M R MT A G rd rs t Is,
let curIs := (icons (iaddi rd rs t) Is) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress imov
: 8 CM M R MT A G rd rs Is,
let curIs := (icons (imov rd rs) Is) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress imovi
: 8 CM M R MT A G rd t Is,
let curIs := (icons (imovi rd t) Is) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress imovf
: 8 CM M R MT A G rd f Is,
let curIs := (icons (imovf rd f) Is) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress ild
: 8 CM M R MT A G rd rs n Is,
let curIs := (icons (ild rd rs n) Is) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress ist
: 8 CM M R MT A G rd rs n Is,
let curIs := (icons (ist rd n rs) Is) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
234wf iseq CM A G curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress ibgt
: 8 CM M R MT A G rs rt f Is,
let curIs := (icons (ibgt rs rt f) Is) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
isgoodjump CM R curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress ibgti
: 8 CM M R MT A G rs t f Is,
let curIs := (icons (ibgti rs t f) Is) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
isgoodjump CM R curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress iappr
: 8 CM M R MT A G r g Is,
let curIs := (icons (iappr r g) Is) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress iappc
: 8 CM M R MT A G r c Is,
let curIs := (icons (iappc r c) Is) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress iappcd
: 8 CM M R MT A G r c1 c2 Dc Is,
let curIs := (icons (iappcd c1 c2 r Dc) Is) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress iappt
: 8 CM M R MT A G r t Is,
let curIs := (icons (iappt r t) Is) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
2359 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress ifold
: 8 CM M R MT A G r t Is,
let curIs := (icons (ifold r t) Is) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress iunfold
: 8 CM M R MT A G r Is,
let curIs := (icons (iunfold r) Is) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress ijd
: 8 CM M R MT A G f,
let curIs := (ijd f) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
isgoodjump CM R curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Lemma progress ijmp
: 8 CM M R MT A G r,
let curIs := (ijmp r) in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
isgoodjump CM R curIs !
9 P, rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P.
Preservation lemmas
Lemma preserv iadd
: 8 CM M R MT A G rd rs rt Is M' R' Is',
let curIs := (icons (iadd rd rs rt) Is) in
let P := (M', R', Is') in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P !
9 MT',
wf state CM M' R' MT' A (rft upd G rd tint).
Lemma preserv iaddi
236: 8 CM M R MT A G rd rs t Is M' R' Is',
let curIs := (icons (iaddi rd rs t) Is) in
let P := (M', R', Is') in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P !
9 MT',
wf state CM M' R' MT' A (rft upd G rd tint).
Lemma preserv imov
: 8 CM M R MT A G rd rs Is M' R' Is',
let curIs := (icons (imov rd rs) Is) in
let P := (M', R', Is') in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P !
9 MT',
wf state CM M' R' MT' A (rft upd G rd (G rs)).
Lemma preserv imovi
: 8 CM M R MT A G rd t Is M' R' Is',
let curIs := (icons (imovi rd t) Is) in
let P := (M', R', Is') in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P !
9 MT',
wf state CM M' R' MT' A (rft upd G rd tint).
Lemma preserv imovf
: 8 CM M R MT A G rd f Is M' R' Is',
let curIs := (icons (imovf rd f) Is) in
let P := (M', R', Is') in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P !
9 MT', 9 cv, 9 t,
fmaplook CM f cv ^ eqtype t (codevaltype cv) ^
wf state CM M' R' MT' A (rft upd G rd t).
Lemma preserv ild
: 8 CM M R MT A G rd rs n Is M' R' Is',
let curIs := (icons (ild rd rs n) Is) in
237let P := (M', R', Is') in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P !
9 MT', 9 t, 9 t1, 9 t2, 9 g,
(n = 0 ^ t = t1 _ n = 1 ^ t = t2) ^ (G rs = tpair t1 t2 g) ^
wf state CM M' R' MT' A (rft upd G rd t).
Lemma preserv ist
: 8 CM M R MT A G rd rs n Is M' R' Is',
let curIs := (icons (ist rd n rs) Is) in
let P := (M', R', Is') in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P !
9 MT',
wf state CM M' R' MT' A G.
Lemma preserv ibgt
: 8 CM M R MT A G rs rt f Is M' R' Is',
let curIs := (icons (ibgt rs rt f) Is) in
let P := (M', R', Is') in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P !
9 MT',
wf state CM M' R' MT' A G .
Lemma preserv ibgti
: 8 CM M R MT A G rs t f Is M' R' Is',
let curIs := (icons (ibgti rs t f) Is) in
let P := (M', R', Is') in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P !
9 MT',
wf state CM M' R' MT' A G .
Lemma preserv iappr
: 8 CM M R MT A G r g Is M' R' Is',
let curIs := (icons (iappr r g) Is) in
let P := (M', R', Is') in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
238wf iseq CM A G curIs !
rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P !
9 MT', 9 Fr,
G r = tabsr Fr ^
wf state CM M' R' MT' A (rft upd G r (Fr g)).
Lemma preserv iappc
: 8 CM M R MT A G r c Is M' R' Is',
let curIs := (icons (iappc r c) Is) in
let P := (M', R', Is') in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P !
9 MT',
9 Fc, (G r = tabsc Fc _ 9 A', G r = tabscb Fc A') ^
wf state CM M' R' MT' A (rft upd G r (Fc c)).
Lemma preserv iappt
: 8 CM M R MT A G r t Is M' R' Is',
let curIs := (icons (iappt r t) Is) in
let P := (M', R', Is') in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P !
9 MT', 9 A', 9 G',
wf state CM M' R' MT' A' G' .
Lemma preserv ifold
: 8 CM M R MT A G r t Is M' R' Is',
let curIs := (icons (ifold r t) Is) in
let P := (M', R', Is') in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P !
9 MT', 9 A', 9 G',
wf state CM M' R' MT' A' G' .
Lemma preserv iunfold
: 8 CM M R MT A G r Is M' R' Is',
let curIs := (icons (iunfold r) Is) in
let P := (M', R', Is') in
wf state CM M R MT A G !
wf iseq CM A G curIs !
239rt eval CM (M, R, curIs) P !
9 MT', 9 A', 9 G',
wf state CM M' R' MT' A' G' .
B.6 Translating RgnTAL to CAP
Notation for separation logic primitives
Denition mempred := fmapPred word word.
Denition truemp := @truefp word word.
Denition falsemp : mempred := fun ) False.
Denition emptymp : mempred := @emptyfp word word.
Notation P1 & P2 := (andfp P1 P2) (at level 0).
Notation ` P := (liftfp P) (at level 0).
Notation `ex P := (@existsfp P) (at level 0).
Notation a j > w := (singfp a w) (at level 0).
Notation a j > ? := (`ex fun w ) (a j > w)) (at level 0).
Denition appliesto (M:fmap word word) (MM:mem) : Prop :=
8 a w, fmaplook M a w ! MM a = w.
The runtime system
Section rgntal2tis.
Denition rgnsize := 10.
Denition nilptr := 0.
Denition heaplyt := fmap label word.
Denition datamemlyt := fmap rgn heaplyt.
Denition rgnlyt := fmap rgn word.
Denition extcodety := word ! optT (list cmd ** pred).
Variable ExtCode : extcodety.
Variable DMLyt : datamemlyt.
Variable RLyt : rgnlyt.
Variable CMLyt : heaplyt.
(* Translating a data pointer using the layout functions *)
Denition tr dataptr : rgn ! label ! option word
:= fun p l ) match (DMLyt p) with
j Some HL ) match (HL l) with
j Some w ) Some w
j ) None
240end
j ) None
end.
Fixpoint iseq size (Is : iseq) : nat :=
match Is with
j icons Is' ) S (iseq size Is')
j ) 1
end.
Fixpoint wordsinmem (ws : wordlist) (w : word) fstruct wsg : mempred :=
match ws with
j nil ) emptymp
j w' :: ws' ) ((w j > w') && (wordsinmem ws' (S w)))
end.
Denition cmdsinmem (Cs : cmdlist) w : mempred :=
`ex fun Ws ) `(map Dc Ws = Cs) & (wordsinmem Ws w).
Fixpoint tailnth (n : nat) A (Ls : list A) fstruct ng :
option (list A) :=
match n with
j O ) Some Ls
j S m ) match Ls with
j nil ) None
j ) tailnth m (tail Ls)
end
end.
Describing the free list
Fixpoint ptrtoanylist (a sz:word) fstruct szg : mempred :=
match sz with
j 0 ) emptymp
j (S n) ) ((a j > ?) && (ptrtoanylist (a+1) n))
end.
Denition freeblock (a sz nxt:word) : mempred :=
`(a 6= nilptr) &
((a j > sz) &&
(((a+1) j > ?) && (((a+2) j > nxt) && (ptrtoanylist (a+3) sz)))).
Denition newblock (a sz:word) : mempred :=
`(a 6= nilptr) &
((a j > sz) &&
(((a+1) j > 0) && (((a+2) j > ?) && (ptrtoanylist (a+3) sz)))).
Fixpoint fblist (n a:word) fstruct ng : mempred :=
241match n with
j 0 ) `(a=nilptr) & emptymp
j (S n') ) `(a6=nilptr)
& (`ex fun sz )
`ex fun a' ) ((freeblock a sz a') && (fblist n' a')))
end.
Denition freelist (a:word) : mempred :=
`ex fun n ) (fblist n a).
Translation relations
(* Word Values and Data Heap Values *)
Inductive tr wordval : wordval ! word ! Prop :=
j tr wi : 8 n, tr wordval (wi n) n
j tr wl : 8 p l w,
tr dataptr p l = Some w !
tr wordval (wl p l) w
j tr wlnop : 8 p l w,
notindomf DMLyt p !
tr wordval (wl p l) w
j tr wlnol : 8 p l HLyt w,
fmaplook DMLyt p HLyt !
notindomf HLyt l !
tr wordval (wl p l) w
j tr wf : 8 f w,
fmaplook CMLyt f w !
tr wordval (wf f) w
j tr wh : 8 p w,
fmaplook RLyt p w !
tr wordval (wh p) w
j tr wappr : 8 v p w,
tr wordval v w !
tr wordval (wappr v p) w
j tr wappc : 8 v c w,
tr wordval v w !
tr wordval (wappc v c) w
j tr wappcd : 8 v c1 c2 Dc w,
tr wordval v w !
tr wordval (wappcd c1 c2 v Dc) w
j tr wappt : 8 v t w,
242tr wordval v w !
tr wordval (wappt v t) w
j tr wfold : 8 v t w,
tr wordval v w !
tr wordval (wfold v t) w.
(* Utility functions for maps *)
Fixpoint limmapfoldr
B1 B2
(Lim:nat)
(H:natfmap B1)
(f:B1 ! B2 ! B2)
(b2:B2) fstruct Limg : B2 :=
match Lim with
j 0 ) b2
j (S m) ) match (H Lim) with
j None ) limmapfoldr m H f b2
j Some b1 ) f b1 (limmapfoldr m (fmapdelN H Lim) f b2)
end
end.
Fixpoint limmapstarfp
B1 B2
(Lim:nat)
(H:natfmap B1)
(eP : nat ! B1 ! (fmapPred nat B2)) fstruct Limg
: fmapPred nat B2 :=
match Lim with
j 0 ) (`(nulldomf H) & (@emptyfp ))
j (S m) ) match (H Lim) with
j None ) limmapstarfp m H eP
j Some b ) ((eP Lim b) &&
(limmapstarfp m (fmapdelN H Lim) eP))
end
end.
Denition tr heapval (p:rgn) (l:nat) (a:word) (hv:heapval) : mempred :=
match hv with [v0,v1] )
`ex fun w0 )
`ex fun w1 )
`(tr dataptr p l = (Some a)) &
`(tr wordval v0 w0) &
243`(tr wordval v1 w1) &
( (a j > w0) && ((a+1) j > w1))
end.
Fixpoint tr hvs (p:rgn) (a:word) (Lim:word) (H:heap) fstruct Limg : mempred :=
match Lim with
j 0 ) (`(nulldomf H) & (@emptyfp ))
j (S m) ) match (H Lim) with
j None ) tr hvs p a m H
j Some hv ) ((tr heapval p Lim a hv) &&
(tr hvs p (2+a) m (fmapdelN H Lim)))
end
end.
Denition hvlist size (Lim:nat) (H:heap) : nat :=
limmapfoldr Lim H (fun hv sz ) 2+sz) 0.
Denition tr heap : rgn ! heap ! mempred :=
fun p H )
`ex fun a )
`ex fun hplim )
`ex fun rsize )
`ex fun diff )
`(a 6= nilptr) &
`(fmaplook RLyt p a) &
`(@limitf heapval H hplim) &
`((hvlist size hplim H)+diff = rsize) &
(((a j > rsize) &&
(((a+1) j > (hvlist size hplim H)) &&
((a+2) j > ?))) &&
((tr hvs p (a+3) hplim H) &&
(ptrtoanylist (a+3+(hvlist size hplim H)) diff))).
(* Instructions and code values *)
Denition regt2reg (r : regt) : reg := nat2reg (regt2nat r).
Coercion regt2reg : regt ¿-¿ reg.
Inductive tr instr : cmdlist ! instr ! cmdlist ! Prop :=
j tr iadd : 8 Cs rd rs rt,
tr instr Cs (iadd rd rs rt) (add rd rs rt :: Cs)
j tr iaddi : 8 Cs rd rs t,
tr instr Cs (iaddi rd rs t) (addi rd rs t :: Cs)
j tr imov : 8 Cs rd rs,
tr instr Cs (imov rd rs) (mov rd rs :: Cs)
244j tr imovi : 8 Cs rd s,
tr instr Cs (imovi rd s) (movi rd s :: Cs)
j tr imovf : 8 Cs rd f w,
fmaplook CMLyt f w !
tr instr Cs (imovf rd f) (movi rd w :: Cs)
j tr ild : 8 Cs rd rs n,
tr instr Cs (ild rd rs n) (ld rd rs n :: Cs)
j tr ist : 8 Cs rd n rs,
tr instr Cs (ist rd n rs) (st rd n rs :: Cs)
j tr ibgt : 8 Cs rs rt f w,
fmaplook CMLyt f w !
tr instr Cs (ibgt rs rt f) (bgt rs rt w :: Cs)
j tr ibgti : 8 Cs rs t f w,
fmaplook CMLyt f w !
tr instr Cs (ibgti rs t f) (bgti rs t w :: Cs)
j tr iappr : 8 Cs r x,
tr instr Cs (iappr r x) (mov r r :: Cs)
j tr iappc : 8 Cs r x,
tr instr Cs (iappc r x) (mov r r :: Cs)
j tr iappcd : 8 Cs r c1 c2 Dc,
tr instr Cs (iappcd c1 c2 r Dc) (mov r r :: Cs)
j tr iappt : 8 Cs r x,
tr instr Cs (iappt r x) (mov r r :: Cs)
j tr ifold : 8 Cs r x,
tr instr Cs (ifold r x) (mov r r :: Cs)
j tr iunfold : 8 Cs r,
tr instr Cs (iunfold r) (mov r r :: Cs).
Inductive tr iseq : iseq ! cmdlist ! Prop :=
j tr icons : 8 i Is cs Cs,
tr iseq Is Cs ! tr instr Cs i cs ! tr iseq (icons i Is) cs
j tr ijd : 8 f w,
fmaplook CMLyt f w !
tr iseq (ijd f) (jd w :: nil)
j tr ijmp : 8 r,
tr iseq (ijmp r) (jmp r :: nil).
Inductive tr codeval : codeval ! wordlist ! Prop :=
j tr cvcode : 8 G Is Cs Ws,
tr iseq Is Cs !
Cs = map Dc Ws !
245tr codeval (cvcode G Is) Ws
j tr cvstub : 8 G, tr codeval (cvstub G) nil.
(* Translating the data and code heaps *)
Section sizevars.
Variables ec min ec size cm min cm size : word.
Denition tr datamem aux (Lim:nat) (DM:datamem) : mempred
:= limmapstarfp Lim DM tr heap.
Denition tr datamem (DM:datamem) dm min dm size : mempred :=
`ex fun dmlim )
`ex fun fp ) (fun M ) coversfnat M dm min (dm min+dm size)) &
`(limitf DM dmlim) &
((dm min j > dm size) &&
(((dm min+1) j > fp) && ((tr datamem aux dmlim DM) && (freelist fp)))).
Denition tr datamem exc freelist (DM:datamem) dm min dm size : mempred :=
`ex fun dmlim )
`(limitf DM dmlim) &
((dm min j > dm size) && (tr datamem aux dmlim DM)).
Denition tr codemem (CM:codemem) : mempred :=
fun M )
(coversfnat M cm min (cm min+cm size)) ^
(8 f cv,
fmaplook CM f cv !
9 Ws, 9 a, fmaplook CMLyt f a ^ tr codeval cv Ws
^ ((wordsinmem Ws a) && truemp) M).
Denition extcode in ec : Prop :=
(8 a Cs Pcs,
ExtCode a = someT (Cs,*Pcs) !
(ec min  a ^ a+(length Cs) ¡ ec min+ec size)).
Denition tr extcode : codemem ! mem ! Prop :=
fun CM MM )
9 M,
(extcode in ec) ^
(8 f w G Is,
fmaplook CMLyt f w ! fmaplook CM f (cvcode G Is)
! ExtCode w = noneT ) ^
(coversfnat M ec min (ec min+ec size)) ^
(8 a Cs Pcs, ExtCode a = someT (Cs,*Pcs) ! cmdsinmem Cs a M) ^
(appliesto M MM).
246Denition tr memstate aux (CM:codemem) (DM:datamem) : mempred :=
`ex fun dm min ) `ex fun dm size )
`(eqdomf CMLyt CM)
& `(eqdomf DMLyt DM)
& (((0 j > ?)
&& ((1 j > cm min)
&& ((2 j > dm min))))
&& ((tr codemem CM)
&& (tr datamem DM dm min dm size)))
.
Denition tr memstate (CM:codemem) (DM:datamem) (MM:mem) : Prop :=
9 M,
tr memstate aux CM DM M
^ (appliesto M MM)
^ True (*(9 mlim, 8 a, a  mlim ! notindomf M a)*).
(* Register le and current program counter *)
Denition tr regle (Rf:regle) (R:rle) : Prop :=
8 r v w, Rf r = v ! R r = w ! tr wordval v w.
(* Tail subsets of instruction sequences *)
Inductive subseqis : iseq ! iseq ! nat ! Prop :=
j isubd0 : 8 Is, subseqis Is Is 0
j isubds : 8 Is Is' i n, subseqis Is' Is n ! subseqis Is' (icons i Is) (S n).
Denition tr pc (CM:codemem) (Is:iseq) (pc:word) : Prop :=
9 f, 9 G', 9 Is', 9 w, 9 n,
fmaplook CM f (cvcode G' Is') ^ subseqis Is Is' n ^ fmaplook CMLyt f w ^ pc = n + w.
(* The top-level translation relation between RgnTAL programs and machine states *)
Denition maxrgnprop (CM:codemem) (DM:datamem) (R:regle) :=
9 maxp,
8 p, (rgn in codemem CM p _
rgn in datamem DM p _
rgn in regle R p) ! le p maxp.
Inductive tr program : codemem ! progstate ! state ! Prop :=
j tr prog :
8 CM DM R Is MM RR pc,
tr extcode CM MM !
maxrgnprop CM DM R !
tr memstate CM DM MM !
tr regle R RR !
247tr pc CM Is pc !
tr program CM (DM,R,Is) (MM,RR,pc).
End sizevars.
End rgntal2tis.
B.7 Correctness of RgnTAL to CAP Translation
Section Proofs.
Variable ExtCode : extcodety.
Variable CMLyt : heaplyt.
Variables ec min ec size cm min cm size : word.
A custom safety policy
Denition MySP (St:state) :=
match St with (M,R,pc) )
let dm min := (M 2) in
let dm size := (M dm min) in
match (curcmd St) with
j ld rd rs n ) let a:=(R rs)+n in dm min ¡ a ¡ (dm min+dm size)
_ (ec min  pc ¡ (ec min+ec size))
j st rd n rs ) let a:=(R rd)+n in dm min ¡ a ¡ (dm min+dm size)
_ (ec min  pc ¡ (ec min+ec size))
j ) True
end
end.
Denition of CpInv
Denition cpinv (CM:codemem) (T:omega) : pred :=
fun St ) match St with (MM,RR,pc) )
9 DLyt, 9 RLyt, 9 DM, 9 RF, 9 MT, 9 Ts, 9 A, 9 G,
instcodetype T Ts (tcode A G) ^
wf state CM DM RF MT A G ^
tr memstate DLyt RLyt CMLyt cm min cm size CM DM MM ^
tr regle DLyt RLyt CMLyt RF RR ^
maxrgnprop CM DM RF
end.
Constraints on CpGen
Denition ext in ct (CT:cdspec) : Prop :=
8 w Cs P,
ExtCode w = someT (Cs ,* P) !
CT w = someT (length Cs ,* P).
248Denition cmcode in ct (CT:cdspec) (CM:codemem) : Prop :=
8 f G Is w,
fmaplook CM f (cvcode G Is) !
fmaplook CMLyt f w !
CT w = someT (iseq size Is ,* cpinv CM G).
Denition cmstub in ext (CM:codemem) : Prop :=
8 f G w,
fmaplook CM f (cvstub G) !
fmaplook CMLyt f w !
9 Cs, 9 P, ExtCode w = someT (Cs ,* P).
Denition cmlyt in ct (CT:cdspec) : Prop :=
8 f w,
fmaplook CMLyt f w !
9 P, CT w = someT P.
Denition ct from ext or cm (CT:cdspec) (CM:codemem) : Prop :=
8 w n P,
CT w = someT (n ,* P) !
(9 Cs, ExtCode w = someT (Cs ,* P) ^ n = length Cs)
_
(9 f, 9 G, 9 Is,
fmaplook CM f (cvcode G Is) ^
fmaplook CMLyt f w ^
n = iseq size Is ^
P = cpinv CM G).
Denition ext interf corr (CM:codemem) : Prop :=
8 w Cs P,
ExtCode w = someT (Cs ,* P) !
(8 f G,
fmaplook CM f (cvstub G) !
fmaplook CMLyt f w !
(8 St, cpinv CM G St !
ec min  (curpc St) !
(curpc St)+(length Cs) ¡ ec min + ec size !
P St)).
Denition iscpgen (CT:cdspec) (CM:codemem) : Prop :=
onetoonef CMLyt ^
ext in ct CT ^
cmcode in ct CT CM ^
cmstub in ext CM ^
249cmlyt in ct CT ^
ct from ext or cm CT CM ^
ext interf corr CM.
Utility lemmas
Lemma regt neq reg neq
: 8 r r', r 6= r' ! regt2reg r 6= regt2reg r'.
Lemma limmapstarfp eqf
: 8 B1 B2 Lim (H H':natfmap B1) eP M,
eqf H H' !
limmapstarfp B1 B2 Lim H eP M !
limmapstarfp B1 B2 Lim H' eP M.
Lemma limmapstarfp fmaplook and limmapstar fmapdel :
8 B1 B2 im F P M n b,
limmapstarfp B1 B2 im F P M !
fmaplook F n b !
((P n b) && (limmapstarfp B1 B2 im (fmapdelN F n) P)) M.
Lemma limmapstarfp fmaplook and truefp :
8 B1 B2 im F P M n b,
limmapstarfp B1 B2 im F P M !
fmaplook F n b !
((P n b) && (@truefp )) M.
Lemma tr datamem aux tr heap M :
8 DLyt RLyt dmlim DM M p H,
tr datamem aux DLyt RLyt CMLyt dmlim DM M !
(fmaplook DM p H) !
((tr heap DLyt RLyt CMLyt p H) && (truemp)) M.
Lemma tr heapval tr wordval :
8 DLyt RLyt hplim H M a p l v0 v1,
tr hvs DLyt RLyt CMLyt p a hplim H M !
(fmaplook H l [v0,v1]) !
9 a,
(`ex (fun w0 ) `ex (fun w1 )
`(tr dataptr DLyt p l = Some a) &
`(tr wordval DLyt RLyt CMLyt v0 w0) &
`(tr wordval DLyt RLyt CMLyt v1 w1) &
((a j > w0) && ((a+1) j > w1)))) && truemp) M.
Lemma tr heap tr wordval :
2508 DLyt RLyt H M p l v0 v1,
tr heap DLyt RLyt CMLyt p H M !
fmaplook H l [v0,v1] !
9 a,
(`ex (fun w0 ) `ex (fun w1 )
`(tr dataptr DLyt p l = Some a) &
`(tr wordval DLyt RLyt CMLyt v0 w0) &
`(tr wordval DLyt RLyt CMLyt v1 w1) &
((a j > w0) && ((a+1) j > w1)))) && truemp) M.
Lemma tr memstate tr wordval :
8 DLyt RLyt CM DM MM
RF RR p H l v0 v1 r,
tr memstate DLyt RLyt CMLyt cm min cm size CM DM MM !
tr regle DLyt RLyt CMLyt RF RR !
fmaplook DM p H !
fmaplook H l [v0, v1] !
RF r = wl p l !
tr wordval DLyt RLyt CMLyt v0 (MM (RR r + 0)) ^
tr wordval DLyt RLyt CMLyt v1 (MM (RR r + 1)).
Lemma appliesto eqf
: 8 M MM M1 M2 (x:disjf M1 M2),
appliesto M MM !
eqf (appendf x) M !
appliesto M1 MM.
Lemma appliesto pappendf left :
8 MM M M1 M2,
appliesto M MM !
pappendf M1 M2 M !
appliesto M1 MM.
Lemma appliesto pappendf right :
8 MM M M1 M2,
appliesto M MM !
pappendf M1 M2 M !
appliesto M2 MM.
Lemma cmdsin atten
: 8 Cs M MM w,
cmdsinmem Cs w M ! appliesto M MM ! atten Cs MM w.
Lemma triseq size eq :
8 Lyt Is Cs, tr iseq Lyt Is Cs ! length Cs = iseq size Is.
251Lemma tr iseq subseq :
8 n Is Is' Ws MM a,
subseqis Is Is' n !
tr iseq CMLyt Is' (map Dc Ws) !
atten (map Dc Ws) MM a !
9 Ws',
tr iseq CMLyt Is (map Dc Ws') ^ atten (map Dc Ws') MM (n+a).
Lemma not listnth nil :
8 A n p, (listnth A nil n)=(Some p).
Main lemmas and proofs
Preservation of CpInv for RgnTAL instructions
Lemma cpinv preserv add :
8 CM A G rd rs rt Is St
(D0 : cpinv CM (tcode A G) St)
(D1 : wf iseq CM A G (icons (iadd rd rs rt) Is))
(D2 : curcmd St = (add rd rs rt)),
cpinv CM (tcode A (rft upd G rd tint)) (Step St).
Lemma cpinv preserv addi :
8 CM A G rd rs t Is St
(D0 : cpinv CM (tcode A G) St)
(D1 : wf iseq CM A G (icons (iaddi rd rs t) Is))
(D2 : curcmd St = (addi rd rs t)),
cpinv CM (tcode A (rft upd G rd tint)) (Step St).
Lemma cpinv preserv mov :
8 CM A G rd rs Is St
(D0 : cpinv CM (tcode A G) St)
(D1 : wf iseq CM A G (icons (imov rd rs) Is))
(D2 : curcmd St = (mov rd rs)),
cpinv CM (tcode A (rft upd G rd (G rs))) (Step St).
Lemma cpinv preserv movi :
8 CM A G rd s Is St
(D0 : cpinv CM (tcode A G) St)
(D1 : wf iseq CM A G (icons (imovi rd s) Is))
(D2 : curcmd St = (movi rd s)),
cpinv CM (tcode A (rft upd G rd tint)) (Step St).
Lemma cpinv preserv movf :
8 CM A G rd f Is St a
252(D0 : cpinv CM (tcode A G) St)
(D1 : wf iseq CM A G (icons (imovf rd f) Is))
(D2 : curcmd St = (movi rd a))
(D3 : fmaplook CMLyt f a),
9 cv, 9 t,
fmaplook CM f cv ^
eqtype t (codevaltype cv) ^
cpinv CM (tcode A (rft upd G rd t)) (Step St).
Lemma cpinv preserv ld :
8 CM A G rd rs n Is St
(D0 : cpinv CM (tcode A G) St)
(D1 : wf iseq CM A G (icons (ild rd rs n) Is))
(D2 : curcmd St = (ld rd rs n)),
9 t, 9 t1, 9 t2, 9 g,
(n = 0 ^ t = t1 _ n = 1 ^ t = t2) ^
G rs = tpair t1 t2 g ^
cpinv CM (tcode A (rft upd G rd t)) (Step St).
Lemma tr memstate heap update0 :
8 DLyt RLyt CM DM MM
RF RR p H l v0 v1 rd rs,
tr memstate DLyt RLyt CMLyt cm min cm size CM DM MM !
tr regle DLyt RLyt CMLyt RF RR !
fmaplook DM p H !
fmaplook H l [v0, v1] !
RF rd = wl p l !
tr memstate DLyt RLyt CMLyt cm min cm size CM
(dm upd DM p (hp upd H l [RF rs, v1]))
(updatemem MM (RR rd) (RR rs)).
Lemma tr memstate heap update1 :
8 DLyt RLyt CM DM MM
RF RR p H l v0 v1 rd rs,
tr memstate DLyt RLyt CMLyt cm min cm size CM DM MM !
tr regle DLyt RLyt CMLyt RF RR !
fmaplook DM p H !
fmaplook H l [v0, v1] !
RF rd = wl p l !
tr memstate DLyt RLyt CMLyt cm min cm size CM
(dm upd DM p (hp upd H l [v0, RF rs]))
(updatemem MM (RR rd + 1) (RR rs)).
253Lemma cpinv preserv st :
8 CM A G rd n rs Is St
(D0 : cpinv CM (tcode A G) St)
(D1 : wf iseq CM A G (icons (ist rd n rs) Is))
(D2 : curcmd St = (st rd n rs)),
cpinv CM (tcode A G) (Step St).
Lemma cpinv preserv appr :
8 CM A G r p Is St
(D0 : cpinv CM (tcode A G) St)
(D1 : wf iseq CM A G (icons (iappr r p) Is))
(D2 : curcmd St = (mov r r)),
9 Fr,
G r = tabsr Fr ^
cpinv CM (tcode A (rft upd G r (Fr p))) (Step St).
Load and store RgnTAL instructions respect the custom safety policy
Lemma wf iseq ld MySP :
8 DLyt RLyt CM DM MM
RF RR pc MT A G rd rs n Is,
wf state CM DM RF MT A G !
tr memstate DLyt RLyt CMLyt cm min cm size CM DM MM !
tr regle DLyt RLyt CMLyt RF RR !
wf iseq CM A G (icons (ild rd rs n) Is) !
curcmdp (MM, RR, pc) (ld rd rs n) !
MySP (MM, RR, pc).
Lemma wf iseq st MySP :
8 DLyt RLyt CM DM MM
RF RR pc MT A G rd rs n Is,
wf state CM DM RF MT A G !
tr memstate DLyt RLyt CMLyt cm min cm size CM DM MM !
tr regle DLyt RLyt CMLyt RF RR !
wf iseq CM A G (icons (ist rd n rs) Is) !
curcmdp (MM, RR, pc) (st rd n rs) !
MySP (MM, RR, pc).
RgnTAL-CAP instruction safety
Lemma rgntal2wfcapcmds :
8 CT CM Is T Ws Cs
(D0 : iscpgen CT CM)
(D1 : extcode in ec ExtCode ec min ec size)
(D2 : tr codeval CMLyt (cvcode T Is) Ws)
254(D3 : Cs = map Dc Ws)
(D4 : 8 Ts A G, instcodetype T Ts (tcode A G)
! wf iseq CM A G Is),
WFCapCmds MySP CT (cpinv CM T) Cs.
RgnTAL-CAP code heap safety
Lemma rgntal2wfcapcdspec :
8 DLyt RLyt CT CM DM R Is MM RR pc
(D0:iscpgen CT CM)
(D1:wf program (CM, (DM,R,Is)))
(D2:tr program ExtCode DLyt RLyt CMLyt ec min ec size
cm min cm size CM (DM,R,Is) (MM,RR,pc))
(extcode wf: 8 f Cs P,
ExtCode f = someT (Cs ,* P) !
8 CT', iscpgen CT' CM ! WFCapCmds MySP CT' P Cs),
WFCapcdspec MySP MM CT.
RgnTAL-CAP safety theorem
Theorem rgntal2cap :
8 DLyt RLyt CT CM DM R Is St
(D0:iscpgen CT CM)
(D1:wf program (CM, (DM,R,Is)))
(D2:tr program ExtCode DLyt RLyt CMLyt ec min ec size
cm min cm size CM (DM,R,Is) St)
(extcode wf: 8 f Cs P,
ExtCode f = someT (Cs ,* P) !
8 CT', iscpgen CT' CM ! WFCapCmds MySP CT' P Cs),
WFCapstate MySP St.
End Proofs.
B.8 RgnTAL Runtime System
The free region library function
Denition freergn cmds : cmdlist :=
(movi rI 2) :: (ld rI rI 0) :: (ld rJ rI 1) :: (st rA 2 rJ) :: (st rI 1 rA) :: (jmp rH) :: (@nil cmd).
Denition talregs : list reg := rA::rB::rC::rD::rE::rF::rG::rH::(nil).
Fixpoint eqonregs (rs:list reg) : rle ! rle ! Prop :=
fun R R' )
match rs with
255j (r'::rs') ) (R r') = (R' r') ^ (eqonregs rs' R R')
j ) True
end.
Section Proofs.
Variables ec min ec size cm min cm size : word.
Denition freergn jmp req
(CT:cdspec) RR (PmemA PmemB:mempred) dmmin dmsize
: Prop :=
9 n, 9 Q, CT(RR rH) = someT (n,*Q) ^
8 (M:fmap word word) (MM:mem) RR' fp,
(appliesto M MM) ^
(PmemA && (2 j > dmmin)) &&
((fun Md ) (8 a, indomf Md a ! (iscodearea CT a 1))) &
(fun Md ) (coversfnat Md dmmin (dmmin+dmsize))) &
(PmemB && (dmmin j > dmsize)
&& ((dmmin+1) j > fp)
&& (freelist fp)))
M ^
(eqonregs talregs RR RR')
! Q(MM,RR',RR rH).
Denition freergn req
: cdspec ! pred ! Prop :=
fun CT Pfree )
8 St, Pfree(St) !
match St with ((MM,RR),pc) )
ec min  pc ^ (pc + (length freergn cmds)) ¡ ec min+ec size
^
9 M, 9 PmemA, 9 PmemB,
9 dmmin, 9 dmsize, 9 fp, 9 rsize, 9 nxt,
(appliesto M MM) ^
(PmemA && (2 j > dmmin)) &&
((fun Md ) (8 a, indomf Md a ! (iscodearea CT a 1))) &
(fun Md ) (coversfnat Md dmmin (dmmin+dmsize))) &
(PmemB && (freeblock (RR rA) rsize nxt)
&& (dmmin j > dmsize)
&& ((dmmin+1) j > fp)
&& (freelist fp)))
M ^
(freergn jmp req CT RR PmemA PmemB dmmin dmsize)
256end.
Lemma coversfnat fmapupd
: 8 B M min size a b,
coversfnat B M min size !
indomf M a !
coversfnat B (fmapupd beq nat M a b) min size.
Lemma singfp fmapupdN
: 8 B a b' b (M:fmap nat B),
a j > b' M !
a j > b (fmapupd beq nat M a b).
Proving CAP safety of the library code
Lemma freergn wfcap
: 8 CT Pfree
(D:freergn req CT Pfree),
WFCapCmds (MySP ec min ec size) CT (Pfree) (freergn cmds).
RgnTAL type for the free region library call
Denition freergn type : omega :=
tabsr (fun p )
tabsc (fun c )
tabscd (uniqcap p) c (fun Djcp )
tabst (
(* a1 = 5 *)
tvabst (
(* a2 = 4 *)
tvabst (
(* a3 = 3 *)
tvabst (
(* a4 = 2 *)
tvabst (
(* a5 = 1 *)
tvabst (
(* a6 = 0 *)
tvcode 6 (pluscap (uniqcap p) c Djcp)
(fun r )
match r with
j r0 ) (tvlift (tvlift (tvlift (tvlift
(tvlift (tvlift 0 (tvhandle p)))))))
j r1 ) (tvvar 5)
j r2 ) (tvlift (tvvar 4))
257j r3 ) (tvlift (tvlift (tvvar 3)))
j r4 ) (tvlift (tvlift (tvlift (tvvar 2))))
j r5 ) (tvlift (tvlift (tvlift (tvlift (tvvar 1)))))
j r6 ) (tvlift (tvlift (tvlift
(tvlift (tvlift (tvvar 0))))))
j ) (tvabst 6 (
(* a0 = 1 *)
tvabst 7 (
(* a7 = 0 *)
tvcode 8 (c)
(fun r )
match r with
j r0 ) (tvlift (tvlift (tvlift
(tvlift (tvlift (tvlift
(tvvar 1)))))))
j r1 ) (tvvar 7)
j r2 ) (tvlift (tvvar 6))
j r3 ) (tvlift (tvlift (tvvar 5)))
j r4 ) (tvlift (tvlift
(tvlift
(tvvar 4))))
j r5 ) (tvlift (tvlift
(tvlift (tvlift
(tvvar 3)))))
j r6 ) (tvlift (tvlift
(tvlift (tvlift (tvlift
(tvvar 2))))))
j r7 ) (tvlift (tvlift (tvlift
(tvlift (tvlift (tvlift
(tvlift (tvvar 0))))))))
end)
)))
end)))))))))).
Denition cpinvshort :=
fun CMLyt CM )
(cpinv CMLyt cm min cm size CM).
Denition cpinv' :=
fun CMLyt CM t (cmds:cmdlist) )
fun (St:state) )
let (p,pc) := St in let (MM,RR) := p in
258(ec min  pc) ^
(pc + length cmds ¡ ec min + ec size) ^
(cpinvshort CMLyt CM t St).
Denition iscpgen' :=
fun EC CMLyt CT CM )
(iscpgen EC CMLyt ec min ec size cm min cm size CT CM).
Lemmas
Lemma trdatamem fmapdel trheap
: 8 DLyt RLyt CMLyt dm min dm size DM M g h,
fmaplook DM g h !
tr datamem DLyt RLyt CMLyt DM dm min dm size M !
(`ex fun dmlim ) `ex fun fp )
(fun M ) coversfnat M dm min (dm min+dm size)) &
`(limitf DM dmlim) &
((dm min j > dm size)
&& ((dm min+1) j > fp)
&& (freelist fp)
&& (tr datamem aux (fmapdelN DLyt g)
RLyt CMLyt dmlim (fmapdelN DM g))
&& (tr heap DLyt RLyt CMLyt g h)
)) M.
Lemma tr hvs ptrtoanylist
: 8 DLyt RLyt CMLyt hplim g a h M,
tr hvs DLyt RLyt CMLyt g a hplim h M !
ptrtoanylist a (hvlist size hplim h) M.
Lemma ptrtoanylist eqf
: 8 n a M1 M2,
eqf M1 M2 !
ptrtoanylist a n M1 !
ptrtoanylist a n M2.
Lemma ptrtoanylist concat
: 8 n a m M M1 M2,
pappendf M1 M2 M !
ptrtoanylist a n M1 !
ptrtoanylist (a+n) m M2 !
ptrtoanylist a (n+m) M.
Lemma tr hvs plus ptrtoanylist
259: 8 DLyt RLyt CMLyt M M1 M2 g a hplim h n rsize,
(hvlist size hplim h) + n = rsize !
pappendf M1 M2 M !
tr hvs DLyt RLyt CMLyt g (a + 3) hplim h M2 !
ptrtoanylist (a + 3 + hvlist size hplim h) n M1 !
ptrtoanylist (a + 3) rsize M.
Lemma memtype tpair
: 8 CM M MT p l t,
wf datamem CM M MT !
memtypeof MT p l t !
9 t1, 9 t2, t = (tpair t1 t2 p).
Lemma memtype gc wf wordval
: 8 CM M MT v t g,
wf datamem CM M MT !
wf wordval CM MT v t !
wf wordval CM (fmapdelN MT g) v t.
Lemma memtype gc wf regle
: 8 CM M MT RF G g,
wf datamem CM M MT !
wf regle CM MT RF G !
wf regle CM (fmapdelN MT g) RF G.
Lemma memtype gc sat cap memtype
: 8 MT A g c D,
eqcap A (pluscap (uniqcap g) c D) !
sat cap memtype MT A !
sat cap memtype (fmapdelN MT g) c.
Lemma tr wordval fmapdelheaplyt
: 8 DLyt RLyt CMLyt v w g,
tr wordval DLyt RLyt CMLyt v w !
tr wordval (fmapdelN heaplyt DLyt g) RLyt CMLyt v w.
Lemma tr regle fmapdelheaplyt eqregs
: 8 DLyt RLyt CMLyt RF RR RR' g,
tr regle DLyt RLyt CMLyt RF RR !
eqonregs talregs RR RR' !
tr regle (fmapdelN heaplyt DLyt g) RLyt CMLyt RF RR'.
Fixpoint typevarsof (v:wordval) : list constr ! list constr :=
fun ts )
match v with
260j wappr w p ) typevarsof w ((c rgn p)::ts)
j wappc w c ) typevarsof w ((c cap c)::ts)
j wappcd c1 c2 w Dj ) typevarsof w ((c disj Dj)::ts)
j wappt w t ) typevarsof w ((c type t)::ts)
j ) ts
end.
Lemma memtype not codetype
: 8 CM M MT p l t,
wf datamem CM M MT !
memtypeof MT p l t !
:iscodetype t.
Lemma instcodetype cons r
: 8 t ts r t' F,
instcodetype t ts t' !
eqtype t' (tabsr F) !
instcodetype t (ts ++ (c rgn r::nil)) (F r).
Lemma instcodetype cons c
: 8 t ts c t' F,
instcodetype t ts t' !
eqtype t' (tabsc F) !
instcodetype t (ts ++ (c cap c::nil)) (F c).
Lemma instcodetype cons cb
: 8 t ts c A t' F,
instcodetype t ts t' !
subcap c A !
eqtype t' (tabscb F A) !
instcodetype t (ts ++ (c cap c::nil)) (F c).
Lemma instcodetype cons t
: 8 t t' ts o t F,
instcodetype t ts t' !
eqtype t' (tabst F) !
(unliftV0 (substV F (lifttoV o))) = t !
instcodetype t (ts ++ (c type o::nil)) t.
Lemma typevarsof app
: 8 v t ts,
typevarsof v (t :: ts) = (typevarsof v nil) ++ (t :: ts).
Lemma instcodetype trans
: 8 T ts t,
261instcodetype T ts t !
8 ts' t',
instcodetype t ts' t' !
instcodetype T (ts ++ ts') t'.
Lemma wf wordval codetype inst
: 8 CM M MT v t (Dwf:wf datamem CM M MT),
wf wordval CM MT v t !
iscodetype t !
9 f, 9 cv, 9 cvt,
stripabs(v) = Some f ^
fmaplook CM f cv ^
instcodetype (codevaltype cv) (typevarsof v nil) cvt ^
eqtype cvt t.
(* Finally, prove that the RgnTAL type satises the pre- and post-condition requirements for the
freergn library function *)
Denition freergn pred
: heaplyt ! codemem ! pred
:= fun CMLyt CM St ) (cpinv' CMLyt CM freergn type freergn cmds St).
Theorem freergn type req
: 8 CT EC CMLyt CM (Dx:extcode in ec EC ec min ec size),
iscpgen' EC CMLyt CT CM !
freergn req CT (freergn pred CMLyt CM).
End Proofs.
262Appendix C
Computing Fibonacci Numbers in
RgnTAL
In this chapter, I give an example program written in RgnTAL to demonstrate the lan-
guage and the use of the runtime library functions. The program will be one to compute
the nth pair of Fibonacci numbers. In ML, the code would look like the following:
fun fib 0 (a,b) = (a,b)
| fib n (a,b) = fib (n-1) (b, a+b);
This function recurses on an integer parameter n and a pair of Fibonacci numbers (a,b).
This high-level code hides the details of how memory for the pairs is allocated and deal-
located. A version of the same program at the C level of abstraction would be:
pair* fib(int n, pair* f /* in p */, rgnblock* p) {
if (n == 0) return f;
int a = f.snd;
int b = f.fst + f.snd;
rgnblock* p' = newrgn();
freergn(p);
pair* f' = alloc(p', a, b);
return fib(n-1, f', p');
}
This code uses the data structures and associated operations dened in Figure 5.14 to
create and delete regions and allocate data. Note the overlapping lifetimes of regions
263p and p' and also the fact that the region pointers are explicitly passed along function
calls. Of course, we are interested in a version of this fib code compiled to a well-typed
RgnTAL program.
ForourRgnTALversion, werstdenetheinterfacesfortheregionlibrary primitives:
freergn =
stub[; ; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6]
( {1},
{ r0 :  handle; r1 : 1; :::; r6 : 6;
r7 :8[0;7](, {r0 : 0; :::; r[7] : 7})
}).;
newrgn =
stub[; 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6]
( ,
{r0 : 0; :::; r6 : 6;
r7 :8[;7]({1}, {r0 :  handle; r1 : 1; :::; r7 : 7})
}).;
alloc =
stub[; ; 0 {+}; 3; 4; 5; 6]
( 0,
{r0 :  handle; r1 : int; r2 : int; r3 : 3; :::; r6 : 6;
r7:8[2;7](0, {r0: handle; r1:hint  inti at ; r2 : 2; :::; r7 : 7})
}).;
Recall, the syntax for RgnTAL stub values is stub [](A; ):; where  is a list of con-
structor variables, parameterizing over region names, capabilities, or types; A is the set of
capabilities that thecode needsin orderto execute; and   is the typethat must be satised
by the register le. freergn above requires a unique capability for a given region, , and
also a handle to that region in register r0. Since the capability for that region is unique,
the type system can ensure that there are no other region variables or names active in the
program that alias   thus it will be safe to free it and remove that capability from the set
of capabilities  in the continuation (in register r7).
newrgn can be invoked with any current capability set  and a continuation pointer
in register r7 that expects a new, unique region to be added to . The alloc function
requires a capability set 0 in which the region  is accessible, whether it is aliased or not
264halt_type =
8[; ; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7]
({1}, { r0 : hint  inti at ; r1 :  handle; r2 : 2; :::; r7 : 7 })
fib_entry =
code[; ; 3; 4; 5; 6]
({1},
{ r0 : int; r1 : hint  inti at ; r2 :  handle; r3 : 3; :::; r6 : 6; r7 :halt_type })
bgti r0, 0, fib_loop_addr[; ; 3; 4; 5; 6]
mov r0, r1
mov r1, r2
jmp r7[; ;  handle; 3; 4; 5; 6; halt_type]
fib_loop =
code[; ; 3; 4; 5; 6]
({1},
{ r0 : int; r1 : hint  inti at ; r2 :  handle; r3 : 3; :::; r6 : 6; r7 :halt_type })
subi r0, r0, 1 // n--
ld r3, r1, 1 // r3 = f.snd
ld r4, r1, 0 // r4 = f.fst
add r4, r4, r3 // r4 = f.fst + f.snd
mov r5, r0 // r5 = n --- save n
mov r6, r7 // save TAL ret ptr
movf r7, fib_free_addr
tapp r7 []
tapp r7 []
jd newrgn_addr[{1}; int; hint  inti at ;  handle; int; int; int; halt_type]
fib_free =
code[; ; 0; 7]
({0
1}({1}),
{ r0 : 0 handle; r1 : hint  inti at ; r2 :  handle; r3 : int; r4 : int; r5 : int;
r6 :halt_type; r7 : 7 })
mov r1, r0 // r1 = 0 handle --- save it
mov r0, r2 // r0 =  handle --- to be freed
movf r7, fib_alloc_addr
tapp r7 [0]
tapp r7 []
tapp r7 [ handle] // will be unusable afterwards
jd freergn_addr[; {0
1}; 0 handle;  handle; int; int; int; halt_type]
Figure C.1: RgnTAL fib function blocks (1 of 2).
265fib_alloc =
code[; ; 2; 0; 7]
({1},
{r0 : 0; r1 :  handle; r2 : 2; r3 : int; r4 : int; r5 : int; r6 :halt_type; r7 : 7})
mov r0, r1 // r0 =  handle
mov r1, r3 // r1 = f.snd
mov r2, r4 // r2 = f.fst + f.snd
mov r7, fib_ret_addr
tapp r7 []
tapp r7 []
tapp r7 [int]
tapp r7 [int]
jd alloc_addr[; ; {1}; int; int; int; halt_type]
fib_ret =
code[; ; 3; 4; 2; 7]
({1},
{r0 :  handle; r1 : hint  inti at ; r2 : 2; r3 : 3; r4 : 4; r5 : int;
r6 :halt_type; r7 : 7})
mov r2, r0 // r2 =  handle
mov r0, r5 // restore n to r0
mov r7, r6 // restore TAL ret ptr
jd fib_entry_addr[; ; 3; 4; int; halt_type]
halt =
code[; ; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7]
({1},
{r0 : hint  inti at ; r1 :  handle; r2 : 2; :::; r7 : 7})
jd halt_addr[; ; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7]
Figure C.2: RgnTAL fib function blocks (2 of 2).
266Definition fib_loop_type : omega :=
tabsr (fun p => (* \rho *)
tabsc (fun c => (* \epsilon *)
tabscd (uniqcap p) c (fun Djcp => (* p and c disjoint *)
tabst ( (* \alpha_3 *)
(tvabst _ (* \alpha_4 *)
(tvabst _ (* \alpha_5 *)
(tvabst _ (* \alpha_6 *)
(tvcode 4 ((uniqcap p) (+) c \ Djcp)
(fun r => match r with
| r0 => tvlift4 (tvint)
| r1 => tvpair _ (tvlift4 (tvint)) (tvlift4 (tvint)) p
| r2 => tvlift4 (tvhandle p)
| r3 => V 3
| r4 => tvlift (V 2)
| r5 => tvlift2 (V 1)
| r6 => tvlift3 (V 0)
| r7 =>
(tvabsr _ (fun p' =>
(tvabsc _ (fun c' =>
(tvabscd _ (uniqcap p') c' (fun Djcp' =>
(tvabst _ (* \alpha_2 *)
(tvabst _ (* \alpha_7 *)
(tvcode 6 ((uniqcap p') (+) c' \ Djcp')
(fun r =>
match r with
| r0 => tvpair _ (tvlift6 tvint) (tvlift6 tvint) p'
| r1 => tvlift6 (tvhandle p')
| r2 => tvlift4 (V 1)
| r3 => tvlift6 tvint
| r4 => tvlift6 tvint
| r5 => tvlift6 tvint
| r6 => tvlift6 tvint
| r7 => tvlift5 (V 0) end)))))))))) end))))))))).
Definition fib_loop_cmds : ciseq :=
ciabsr (fun p => ciabsc (fun c => ciabsd (uniqcap p) c (fun Djcp =>
ciabst (fun a3 => ciabst (fun a4 => ciabst (fun a5 => ciabst (fun a6 =>
cibase (icons (isubi r0 r0 1) (* n-- *)
(icons (ild r3 r1 1) (* r3 = f.snd *)
(icons (ild r4 r1 0) (* r4 = f.fst *)
(icons (iadd r4 r4 r3) (* r4 = f.fst + f.snd *)
(icons (imov r5 r0) (* r5 = n // save n *)
(icons (imov r6 r7) (* save TAL retptr *)
(icons (imovf r7 fib_free_addr)
(icons (iappr r7 p)
(icons (iappc r7 c)
(icons (iappcd _ _ r7 Djcp)
(ijd newrgn_addr)))))))))))))))))).
Definition fib_loop_cv : codeval := cvcode fib_loop_type fib_loop_cmds.
Figure C.3: RgnTAL fib loop block in Coq
267 hence the use of the bounded quantication. alloc will create a new, initialized (using
the values of r1 and r2) pair of data in that region and pass a pointer to the new pair on to
the continuation pointer.
Wecannowwritethemainprogram. BecauseRgnTALprogramsarewrittenincontinuation-
passing style (CPS), the fib function is actually split into several blocks, each of which
perform some statements and then call one of the region library primitives, passing along
a continuation to the next block. The RgnTAL code is listed in Figures C.1 and C.2.
fib_entry tests if the parameter n (stored in r0) is zero, jumping to the halt continua-
tion pointer if so. The halt code expects a pointer to the nal pair of Fibonacci numbers
in r0 and a unique handle to the region in r1.
If the base case has not been reached, the fib_entry code branches to the body of
a recursive loop, fib_loop, which decrements n, loads the current Fibonacci pair into
registersand computesthenextpair, and thenmakesa call to thelibrary function, newrgn,
passing the address of the next block, fib_free, as a continuation.
fib_free prepares to free the region in which the old pair of Fibonacci numbers is
stored. Notice that both regions are accessible in the capability of fib_free. The con-
tinuation passed to the freergn library call is the next block, fib_alloc, which prepares
for the allocation and initialization of a new pair in the newly acquired region. Having
allocated a pair, fib_ret restores the data of registers that had been shufed around and
jumps back to the main entry point, fib_entry.
This code, along with the CAP implementations of the region library primitives, has
been dened and simulated on my prototypeCAP machine. The type checking and certi-
cation, however, is only partially complete at the time of this writing, due to the tedious
nature of working with even such moderately complex programs in the Coq proof assis-
tant, as discussed in the main text of the dissertation (e.g. Sections 6.16.3). To illustrate,
the Coq denition of the fib_loop code block is given in Figure C.3. This uses the syn-
tax encoding for RgnTAL types and code blocks dened in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, and the
deBruijn representation of types with free variables dened on page 143.
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